Narrative:

The problem arose due to fact that on an overwater routing, requiring life vests, rafts, long range navigation equipment and international qualified crew was accepting flight planning and dispatch release with non-overwater equipped aircraft and crews, and not being realized by dispatcher or captain. Flight lax to mia was en route when I accepted and signed turnover for flight dispatch desk . After reviewing appropriate en route and terminal WX, NOTAMS, etc. Flight advised me via ACARS of rerte via sat J138 pekon J86 srq mia. When I tried to input new route of flight into computer flight planning system, computer alerted me to fact that extended overwater equipment was required and would not accept new routing. I immediately advised crew via ACARS (several times) that new routing was unacceptable due to no J86 (J58) life vests on board. After not receiving an acknowledgement of receipt of messages by crew I managed to raise crew on commercial radio frequency 131.17 and reiterated that routing was unacceptable. The last transmission I recieved from the crew was they were going to initiate a left hand turn (back towards the coastline) which I took to mean that they may have already been more than 50 NM from coastline. After debriefing crew on arrival mia and seeing that flight was only 14 mins over original flight planned time, though the captain did not come right out and say it, I felt crew proceeded on J86 to mia, despite my insistance he not fly the route. Contributing factors: increasing reliance on computers to save time due to ever increasing workload on dispatchers. In this case it was a dispatcher 'support group', the navigation data base group, that failed to ensure all overwater points in the system were specified as such. I don't feel that the dispatcher is any less responsible for releasing this flight in violation of FARS but that a combination of things, especially the high workload environment the company has placed us in requiring increased reliance on 'support groups' to do their jobs to retain a system of checks and balances required to run the airline and maximize safety. This particular desk has up to 30 flts in the air at one time which I feel is too much to handle for any one person regardless of the level of sophistication of the computer system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING COMPUTERIZATION OF REROUTE OF FLT, DISPATCHER REALIZED A NON OVER WATER EQUIPPED ACFT WAS PROCEEDING ON A PLANNED OVERWATER ROUTE.

Narrative: THE PROB AROSE DUE TO FACT THAT ON AN OVERWATER RTING, REQUIRING LIFE VESTS, RAFTS, LONG RANGE NAV EQUIP AND INTL QUALIFIED CREW WAS ACCEPTING FLT PLANNING AND DISPATCH RELEASE WITH NON-OVERWATER EQUIPPED ACFT AND CREWS, AND NOT BEING REALIZED BY DISPATCHER OR CAPT. FLT LAX TO MIA WAS ENRTE WHEN I ACCEPTED AND SIGNED TURNOVER FOR FLT DISPATCH DESK . AFTER REVIEWING APPROPRIATE ENRTE AND TERMINAL WX, NOTAMS, ETC. FLT ADVISED ME VIA ACARS OF RERTE VIA SAT J138 PEKON J86 SRQ MIA. WHEN I TRIED TO INPUT NEW RTE OF FLT INTO COMPUTER FLT PLANNING SYS, COMPUTER ALERTED ME TO FACT THAT EXTENDED OVERWATER EQUIP WAS REQUIRED AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT NEW RTING. I IMMEDIATELY ADVISED CREW VIA ACARS (SEVERAL TIMES) THAT NEW RTING WAS UNACCEPTABLE DUE TO NO J86 (J58) LIFE VESTS ON BOARD. AFTER NOT RECEIVING AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF MESSAGES BY CREW I MANAGED TO RAISE CREW ON COMMERCIAL RADIO FREQ 131.17 AND REITERATED THAT RTING WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE LAST XMISSION I RECIEVED FROM THE CREW WAS THEY WERE GOING TO INITIATE A L HAND TURN (BACK TOWARDS THE COASTLINE) WHICH I TOOK TO MEAN THAT THEY MAY HAVE ALREADY BEEN MORE THAN 50 NM FROM COASTLINE. AFTER DEBRIEFING CREW ON ARR MIA AND SEEING THAT FLT WAS ONLY 14 MINS OVER ORIGINAL FLT PLANNED TIME, THOUGH THE CAPT DID NOT COME RIGHT OUT AND SAY IT, I FELT CREW PROCEEDED ON J86 TO MIA, DESPITE MY INSISTANCE HE NOT FLY THE RTE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: INCREASING RELIANCE ON COMPUTERS TO SAVE TIME DUE TO EVER INCREASING WORKLOAD ON DISPATCHERS. IN THIS CASE IT WAS A DISPATCHER 'SUPPORT GROUP', THE NAV DATA BASE GROUP, THAT FAILED TO ENSURE ALL OVERWATER POINTS IN THE SYS WERE SPECIFIED AS SUCH. I DON'T FEEL THAT THE DISPATCHER IS ANY LESS RESPONSIBLE FOR RELEASING THIS FLT IN VIOLATION OF FARS BUT THAT A COMBINATION OF THINGS, ESPECIALLY THE HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT THE COMPANY HAS PLACED US IN REQUIRING INCREASED RELIANCE ON 'SUPPORT GROUPS' TO DO THEIR JOBS TO RETAIN A SYS OF CHKS AND BALANCES REQUIRED TO RUN THE AIRLINE AND MAXIMIZE SAFETY. THIS PARTICULAR DESK HAS UP TO 30 FLTS IN THE AIR AT ONE TIME WHICH I FEEL IS TOO MUCH TO HANDLE FOR ANY ONE PERSON REGARDLESS OF THE LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION OF THE COMPUTER SYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.