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A B737 captain is concerned with the fact that ord controllers clear aircraft for takeoff before preceding aircraft have lifted off.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 583135 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200305 |
| Day | Thu |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : ord.airport |
| State Reference | IL |
| Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
| Environment | |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | B737-300 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tower : ord.tower |
| Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
| Flight Phase | ground : taxi ground : position and hold |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| ASRS Report | 583135 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe non adherence : required legal separation |
| Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Narrative:
As we were accelerating through 100 KTS during the takeoff roll, ord tower issued a takeoff clearance to the subsequent aircraft. Based on the rate of departures at that time and on when that aircraft received its 'position and hold' clearance, I would estimate that the subsequent aircraft was either in position or completing its line up with the runway centerline when it received the takeoff clearance. While I understand the pressures that the ord controllers face, and while I have seen this issue occur occasionally in the past, I think it is very unsafe practice. If I were to abort my takeoff, the potential for a double-abort or even a collision would be significant.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737 CAPT IS CONCERNED WITH THE FACT THAT ORD CTLRS CLR ACFT FOR TKOF BEFORE PRECEDING ACFT HAVE LIFTED OFF.
Narrative: AS WE WERE ACCELERATING THROUGH 100 KTS DURING THE TKOF ROLL, ORD TWR ISSUED A TKOF CLRNC TO THE SUBSEQUENT ACFT. BASED ON THE RATE OF DEPS AT THAT TIME AND ON WHEN THAT ACFT RECEIVED ITS 'POS AND HOLD' CLRNC, I WOULD ESTIMATE THAT THE SUBSEQUENT ACFT WAS EITHER IN POS OR COMPLETING ITS LINE UP WITH THE RWY CTRLINE WHEN IT RECEIVED THE TKOF CLRNC. WHILE I UNDERSTAND THE PRESSURES THAT THE ORD CTLRS FACE, AND WHILE I HAVE SEEN THIS ISSUE OCCUR OCCASIONALLY IN THE PAST, I THINK IT IS VERY UNSAFE PRACTICE. IF I WERE TO ABORT MY TKOF, THE POTENTIAL FOR A DOUBLE-ABORT OR EVEN A COLLISION WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.