Narrative:

The first officer and myself were operating a commuter turboprop under far part 121 passenger operations on the eagle three departure from medford, or. The first officer was flying. We checked in with cascade departure while on the prescribed 015 degree heading of the SID, just after takeoff. The controller had us turn to a heading of 360 degrees. After a min or two, the controller stated that he thought we were going to portland, or, instead of san francisco, ca. Upon realizing this, he instructed us to turn right to a heading of 100 degrees. At this point, the controller's instruction was to continue the turn to a heading of 180 degrees, to intercept J501 outbound from rogue valley VOR -- which was at our 2 O'clock position and about 4-5 mi. Meanwhile, the first officer had the oed 230 degree radial entered into his ehsi. The 230 degree radial is used on this particular departure in case of an engine failure on takeoff as per our airline's 'special engine failure procedures.' additionally, the first officer's autoplt was set up to course capture mode. Accordingly, the autoplt captured the oed 230 degree radial, and continued the turn through 160-170 degrees (at point of capture) to 230-250 degrees. I missed the initial sequence of events, but discovered what had happened when the airplane was around a 230 degree heading. At that time, we were probably 2-3 mi from the VOR and I asked the controller if the new heading would still work and he said that we needed to be on a 180 degree heading, and at the same time he handed us off to a new controller. Even with the corrective left turn in progress, we were almost on top of the VOR, so I instructed the first officer to proceed outbound from the station on J501, which seemed to be the best option at the time. There was no traffic observed, either visually or on TCASII, and terrain separation was not an issue as we were through 10000 ft at this time and the WX was day VFR with unrestr visibilities. Upon checking in with the new controller, we were given a phone number to call once down in sfo, pertaining to a possible pilot deviation. Several factors contributed to this situation: my limited to zero experience as a pilot in that part of the country. My records indicate I had only been to medford once before, 7 yrs ago. A brand new first officer, straight out of flight instructing with low time. The controller's initial 360 degree clearance to portland. I should have been more aware of our company's 'special engine out procedures' specifically how they could effect normal operations. I could have better delegated the set up of the navigation radios and to make sure there was better redundancy in place, considering that we had to re-setup to proceed both with the normal departure procedure and the special engine out procedure, should that occur. Last, in the future, I will take more time and pay increased diligence to sits like this where I am in new (all around) territory. On a final note, the supervisor stated that there was in fact no loss of aircraft separation throughout this episode. He did state that he was forwarding it as a 'possible pilot deviation' to the FSDO.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: E120 CREW HAD A TRACK DEV DEPARTING MFR.

Narrative: THE FO AND MYSELF WERE OPERATING A COMMUTER TURBOPROP UNDER FAR PART 121 PAX OPS ON THE EAGLE THREE DEP FROM MEDFORD, OR. THE FO WAS FLYING. WE CHKED IN WITH CASCADE DEP WHILE ON THE PRESCRIBED 015 DEG HDG OF THE SID, JUST AFTER TKOF. THE CTLR HAD US TURN TO A HEADING OF 360 DEGS. AFTER A MIN OR TWO, THE CTLR STATED THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE GOING TO PORTLAND, OR, INSTEAD OF SAN FRANCISCO, CA. UPON REALIZING THIS, HE INSTRUCTED US TO TURN R TO A HEADING OF 100 DEGS. AT THIS POINT, THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTION WAS TO CONTINUE THE TURN TO A HEADING OF 180 DEGS, TO INTERCEPT J501 OUTBOUND FROM ROGUE VALLEY VOR -- WHICH WAS AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS AND ABOUT 4-5 MI. MEANWHILE, THE FO HAD THE OED 230 DEG RADIAL ENTERED INTO HIS EHSI. THE 230 DEG RADIAL IS USED ON THIS PARTICULAR DEP IN CASE OF AN ENG FAILURE ON TKOF AS PER OUR AIRLINE'S 'SPECIAL ENG FAILURE PROCS.' ADDITIONALLY, THE FO'S AUTOPLT WAS SET UP TO COURSE CAPTURE MODE. ACCORDINGLY, THE AUTOPLT CAPTURED THE OED 230 DEG RADIAL, AND CONTINUED THE TURN THROUGH 160-170 DEGS (AT POINT OF CAPTURE) TO 230-250 DEGS. I MISSED THE INITIAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, BUT DISCOVERED WHAT HAD HAPPENED WHEN THE AIRPLANE WAS AROUND A 230 DEG HDG. AT THAT TIME, WE WERE PROBABLY 2-3 MI FROM THE VOR AND I ASKED THE CTLR IF THE NEW HEADING WOULD STILL WORK AND HE SAID THAT WE NEEDED TO BE ON A 180 DEG HDG, AND AT THE SAME TIME HE HANDED US OFF TO A NEW CTLR. EVEN WITH THE CORRECTIVE L TURN IN PROGRESS, WE WERE ALMOST ON TOP OF THE VOR, SO I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO PROCEED OUTBOUND FROM THE STATION ON J501, WHICH SEEMED TO BE THE BEST OPTION AT THE TIME. THERE WAS NO TFC OBSERVED, EITHER VISUALLY OR ON TCASII, AND TERRAIN SEPARATION WAS NOT AN ISSUE AS WE WERE THROUGH 10000 FT AT THIS TIME AND THE WX WAS DAY VFR WITH UNRESTR VISIBILITIES. UPON CHKING IN WITH THE NEW CTLR, WE WERE GIVEN A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL ONCE DOWN IN SFO, PERTAINING TO A POSSIBLE PLTDEV. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT: MY LIMITED TO ZERO EXPERIENCE AS A PLT IN THAT PART OF THE COUNTRY. MY RECORDS INDICATE I HAD ONLY BEEN TO MEDFORD ONCE BEFORE, 7 YRS AGO. A BRAND NEW FO, STRAIGHT OUT OF FLT INSTRUCTING WITH LOW TIME. THE CTLR'S INITIAL 360 DEG CLRNC TO PORTLAND. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE OF OUR COMPANY'S 'SPECIAL ENG OUT PROCS' SPECIFICALLY HOW THEY COULD EFFECT NORMAL OPS. I COULD HAVE BETTER DELEGATED THE SET UP OF THE NAV RADIOS AND TO MAKE SURE THERE WAS BETTER REDUNDANCY IN PLACE, CONSIDERING THAT WE HAD TO RE-SETUP TO PROCEED BOTH WITH THE NORMAL DEP PROC AND THE SPECIAL ENG OUT PROC, SHOULD THAT OCCUR. LAST, IN THE FUTURE, I WILL TAKE MORE TIME AND PAY INCREASED DILIGENCE TO SITS LIKE THIS WHERE I AM IN NEW (ALL AROUND) TERRITORY. ON A FINAL NOTE, THE SUPVR STATED THAT THERE WAS IN FACT NO LOSS OF ACFT SEPARATION THROUGHOUT THIS EPISODE. HE DID STATE THAT HE WAS FORWARDING IT AS A 'POSSIBLE PLTDEV' TO THE FSDO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.