Narrative:

Aborted takeoff crew duty day. Quick background, my IOE. Using the air carrier B FMS airplanes that even my check airman wasn't overly familiar with. We had been battling WX and reassignments the entire trip along with no ACARS on all the air carrier B aircraft. Our day started with a sign in for a deadhead to ZZZ to pick up our sequence on day 2. Every leg on day 2 consisted of rushing to an airplane full of passengers and the agent slamming the door behind us as we would battle the IRS's and FMS's. Things didn't quite work as the air carrier B differences classes made out. Flash forward to a xa:51L takeoff out of ZZZ with WX en route. My takeoff, at approximately 50 KTS I noticed a 'no mode' light on the thrust rating indicator, shortly thereafter, followed by check airman captain calling for the abort. I called 'no spoilers' and he got them quickly deployed and the airplane never made it above 60 KTS. We cleared the runway and discussed the problem. Check airman captain had seen flickering annunciator lights on the 'new' digital panel. That was why he called the low speed rejection. After consulting maintenance and finding nothing wrong, we decided to proceed. On the next takeoff, we once again had the 'no mode light' along with a 'left engine valve' light at about 50 KTS. We once again rejected the takeoff and proceeded to the gate. At the gate, maintenance took the airplane out of service. We proceeded to another airplane. Now we are butting up against contractual crew day. After consulting with a chief pilot, check airman captain made the command decision to proceed since we were not violating any far's. The flight made it uneventfully to ZZZ2. However, we violated the union contract by 29 mins, but were well inside the far's this worked out, despite being a new first officer on the airplane fighting all the problems listed above, but could have been different. The air carrier B differences class needs to address problems with the IRS alignments in more detail and the quirks associated with them. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: air carrier has recently acquired the assets of air carrier B. Both air carrier's had md-80 aircraft. Air carrier B's md-80 aircraft are considerably different than air carrier a's. Currently, reporter alleges air carrier a's crews are not allowed to fly with air carrier B's crews, and air carrier B's crews are not allowed to fly air carrier a's aircraft. The reporter alleges company has given air carrier a's crews a one day ground school. This is supposed to cover the differences in the aircraft, and allow air carrier a's crews to fly air carrier B's aircraft. Reporter states air carrier B's aircraft have FMC's and moving maps. Air carrier a aircraft do not. Reporter alleges these pilots are being asked to fly these aircraft with only a single day of class room ground school. The reporter notes that his IOE check airman did not know air carrier B's aircraft. The reporter thinks, pilots should have at least four hours in air carrier B's simulator. If the pilot has never operated glass aircraft, then a complete FMC training course in the simulator. The pilot foresees the same problem in reverse when air carrier B's crews have to operate air carrier a's aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-80, IN IOE, RECOUNTS THE PROBS THE CREW HAD FLYING ACFT ACQUIRED FROM A DIFFERENT ACR.

Narrative: ABORTED TKOF CREW DUTY DAY. QUICK BACKGROUND, MY IOE. USING THE ACR B FMS AIRPLANES THAT EVEN MY CHECK AIRMAN WASN'T OVERLY FAMILIAR WITH. WE HAD BEEN BATTLING WX AND REASSIGNMENTS THE ENTIRE TRIP ALONG WITH NO ACARS ON ALL THE ACR B ACFT. OUR DAY STARTED WITH A SIGN IN FOR A DEADHEAD TO ZZZ TO PICK UP OUR SEQUENCE ON DAY 2. EVERY LEG ON DAY 2 CONSISTED OF RUSHING TO AN AIRPLANE FULL OF PASSENGERS AND THE AGENT SLAMMING THE DOOR BEHIND US AS WE WOULD BATTLE THE IRS'S AND FMS'S. THINGS DIDN'T QUITE WORK AS THE ACR B DIFFERENCES CLASSES MADE OUT. FLASH FORWARD TO A XA:51L TKOF OUT OF ZZZ WITH WX ENRTE. MY TKOF, AT APPROX 50 KTS I NOTICED A 'NO MODE' LIGHT ON THE THRUST RATING INDICATOR, SHORTLY THEREAFTER, FOLLOWED BY CHECK AIRMAN CAPT CALLING FOR THE ABORT. I CALLED 'NO SPOILERS' AND HE GOT THEM QUICKLY DEPLOYED AND THE AIRPLANE NEVER MADE IT ABOVE 60 KTS. WE CLRED THE RWY AND DISCUSSED THE PROB. CHECK AIRMAN CAPT HAD SEEN FLICKERING ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS ON THE 'NEW' DIGITAL PANEL. THAT WAS WHY HE CALLED THE LOW SPEED REJECTION. AFTER CONSULTING MAINT AND FINDING NOTHING WRONG, WE DECIDED TO PROCEED. ON THE NEXT TKOF, WE ONCE AGAIN HAD THE 'NO MODE LIGHT' ALONG WITH A 'L ENG VALVE' LIGHT AT ABOUT 50 KTS. WE ONCE AGAIN REJECTED THE TKOF AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. AT THE GATE, MAINT TOOK THE AIRPLANE OUT OF SVC. WE PROCEEDED TO ANOTHER AIRPLANE. NOW WE ARE BUTTING UP AGAINST CONTRACTUAL CREW DAY. AFTER CONSULTING WITH A CHIEF PLT, CHECK AIRMAN CAPT MADE THE COMMAND DECISION TO PROCEED SINCE WE WERE NOT VIOLATING ANY FAR'S. THE FLT MADE IT UNEVENTFULLY TO ZZZ2. HOWEVER, WE VIOLATED THE UNION CONTRACT BY 29 MINS, BUT WERE WELL INSIDE THE FAR'S THIS WORKED OUT, DESPITE BEING A NEW FO ON THE AIRPLANE FIGHTING ALL THE PROBS LISTED ABOVE, BUT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. THE ACR B DIFFERENCES CLASS NEEDS TO ADDRESS PROBS WITH THE IRS ALIGNMENTS IN MORE DETAIL AND THE QUIRKS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ACR HAS RECENTLY ACQUIRED THE ASSETS OF ACR B. BOTH ACR'S HAD MD-80 ACFT. ACR B'S MD-80 ACFT ARE CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT THAN ACR A'S. CURRENTLY, RPTR ALLEGES ACR A'S CREWS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO FLY WITH ACR B'S CREWS, AND ACR B'S CREWS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO FLY ACR A'S ACFT. THE RPTR ALLEGES COMPANY HAS GIVEN ACR A'S CREWS A ONE DAY GND SCHOOL. THIS IS SUPPOSED TO COVER THE DIFFERENCES IN THE ACFT, AND ALLOW ACR A'S CREWS TO FLY ACR B'S ACFT. RPTR STATES ACR B'S ACFT HAVE FMC'S AND MOVING MAPS. ACR A ACFT DO NOT. RPTR ALLEGES THESE PLTS ARE BEING ASKED TO FLY THESE ACFT WITH ONLY A SINGLE DAY OF CLASS ROOM GND SCHOOL. THE RPTR NOTES THAT HIS IOE CHECK AIRMAN DID NOT KNOW ACR B'S ACFT. THE RPTR THINKS, PLTS SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST FOUR HRS IN ACR B'S SIMULATOR. IF THE PLT HAS NEVER OPERATED GLASS ACFT, THEN A COMPLETE FMC TRAINING COURSE IN THE SIMULATOR. THE PLT FORESEES THE SAME PROB IN REVERSE WHEN ACR B'S CREWS HAVE TO OPERATE ACR A'S ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.