Narrative:

We had just been handed off from ZLC to salt lake approach control for our landing at provo, utah. Thunderstorms were being reported in the vicinity of the airport to the east. We had briefed the GPS runway 13 approach with a circle to land runway 31. After contacting salt lake approach control, we were advised that the GPS runway 13 approach was not available due to the restr airspace, R-6412A/B, being active. It was agreed to accept the ILS for runway 13 and circle to land runway 31. After crossing the ffu VOR, we were assigned a heading of 10 degrees and instructed to descend to 11000 ft. I began to tune and identify the radios for the ILS when ATC advised that the vector was going to take us through the localizer. When I acknowledged ATC, I did not understand that the instructions included 'expect a left turn after crossing the localizer.' my attention was divided between setting and tuning radios and communicating with ATC. Although the workload for the PNF was acceptable, the mindset was expecting a turn back toward the airport to intercept the localizer. The approach checklist had been completed, and the radios were set for the approach. It was at this time I advised the PF that I was going to get a wind check at the airport. While I was listening to the ASOS WX, ATC gave instructions to turn to a heading of 160 degrees and to descend to 8000 ft. The PF acknowledged a heading of 60 degrees. The 60 degree heading was a logical heading for vectors back to the localizer, however, after a short time, ATC realized we were not on their assigned heading of 160 degrees and advised an immediate left turn and make an immediate climb to 11000 ft. We initiated the left turn and a climb when ATC then advised to make an immediate right turn and to increase our angle of bank. A right climbing turn was initiated with a bank angle of 35 degrees. After approaching 11000 ft, ATC then instructed a left turn for vectors to runway 13 ILS. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. The PF had conducted a complete approach briefing, and the significance of the terrain had been acknowledged. The radar was being used on the PNF pilot's navigation display unit and the egpws were displayed on the PF's navigation display unit. It was obvious that ATC had become concerned with the surrounding terrain, however, there was never an egpws terrain warning. The contributing factors, which I believe resulted in the loss of terrain separation, are as follows: open loop communication. The crew did not confirm the turning instructions to be expected after crossing the localizer and no confirmation of those turning instructions were requested from ATC. When the incorrect heading of 60 degrees was repeated back to ATC, there was no challenge or correction advised at that time. With the change from the expected GPS approach to the ILS approach, there was an increase in the workload that created a division in attention for the PNF. Monitoring the progress of the thunderstorm and the associated winds in the vicinity of the airport was also a factor. Recommendations: when an airplane is being vectored through a localizer course, especially in mountainous areas, there should be additional instructions in the event there is a loss of communications. This will serve to alert the crew of impending restrs such as minimum vectoring altitudes, terrain, and restr areas. It should be listed in the NOTAMS when restrs are in effect that will prevent certain approachs to an airport. Supplemental information from acn 581178: (acting PIC and PF/acting first officer and PNF.) the reason we were told to cross the localizer was because there was someone in front of us on an approach. We knew the cell near the airport would cause the winds to shift so the copilot elected to tune in the ASOS for a wind update. 2 radios were on at once, which made for a noisy cockpit. At this point, ATC issued a left turn to a heading of 160 degrees. The PF moved the heading bug to 60 degrees, and read back to ATC '060 degrees.' this was verified by ATC tape playback. Our confign was south+20 flap and gear down. Altitude was 8000 ft. Full anti-ice protection was employed due to current WX conditions, and the checklist was completed for the approach. In conclusion, the first error seems to have been both pilots not hearing the 'expect left turn after the xingof the localizer.' however, I wonder if this is significant, because even if I had heard it, and then heard ATC issue a 60 degree heading, I would be inclined to take that heading without knowledge of the MVA. Also, a contributing factor was that the restr airspace was not listed in the NOTAMS and, therefore, not included in the planning. Listen up for the 'expect' part of the clearance after told to cross the localizer. Call ahead to learn as early as possible, which approach is in use so detailed planning can happen earlier. Learn more about 'reactive' management practices.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CFTT DURING DSCNT ON APCH BY A CORPORATE MDT AFTER THE FLT CREW MISINTERPED THE HDG ISSUED BY S56 CTLR FOR A LOC INTERCEPT 15 NM NW OF PVU, UT.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST BEEN HANDED OFF FROM ZLC TO SALT LAKE APCH CTL FOR OUR LNDG AT PROVO, UTAH. TSTMS WERE BEING RPTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE ARPT TO THE E. WE HAD BRIEFED THE GPS RWY 13 APCH WITH A CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 31. AFTER CONTACTING SALT LAKE APCH CTL, WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE GPS RWY 13 APCH WAS NOT AVAILABLE DUE TO THE RESTR AIRSPACE, R-6412A/B, BEING ACTIVE. IT WAS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE ILS FOR RWY 13 AND CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 31. AFTER XING THE FFU VOR, WE WERE ASSIGNED A HDG OF 10 DEGS AND INSTRUCTED TO DSND TO 11000 FT. I BEGAN TO TUNE AND IDENT THE RADIOS FOR THE ILS WHEN ATC ADVISED THAT THE VECTOR WAS GOING TO TAKE US THROUGH THE LOC. WHEN I ACKNOWLEDGED ATC, I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDED 'EXPECT A L TURN AFTER XING THE LOC.' MY ATTN WAS DIVIDED BTWN SETTING AND TUNING RADIOS AND COMMUNICATING WITH ATC. ALTHOUGH THE WORKLOAD FOR THE PNF WAS ACCEPTABLE, THE MINDSET WAS EXPECTING A TURN BACK TOWARD THE ARPT TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. THE APCH CHKLIST HAD BEEN COMPLETED, AND THE RADIOS WERE SET FOR THE APCH. IT WAS AT THIS TIME I ADVISED THE PF THAT I WAS GOING TO GET A WIND CHK AT THE ARPT. WHILE I WAS LISTENING TO THE ASOS WX, ATC GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN TO A HDG OF 160 DEGS AND TO DSND TO 8000 FT. THE PF ACKNOWLEDGED A HDG OF 60 DEGS. THE 60 DEG HDG WAS A LOGICAL HDG FOR VECTORS BACK TO THE LOC, HOWEVER, AFTER A SHORT TIME, ATC REALIZED WE WERE NOT ON THEIR ASSIGNED HDG OF 160 DEGS AND ADVISED AN IMMEDIATE L TURN AND MAKE AN IMMEDIATE CLB TO 11000 FT. WE INITIATED THE L TURN AND A CLB WHEN ATC THEN ADVISED TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE R TURN AND TO INCREASE OUR ANGLE OF BANK. A R CLBING TURN WAS INITIATED WITH A BANK ANGLE OF 35 DEGS. AFTER APCHING 11000 FT, ATC THEN INSTRUCTED A L TURN FOR VECTORS TO RWY 13 ILS. THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE PF HAD CONDUCTED A COMPLETE APCH BRIEFING, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERRAIN HAD BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED. THE RADAR WAS BEING USED ON THE PNF PLT'S NAV DISPLAY UNIT AND THE EGPWS WERE DISPLAYED ON THE PF'S NAV DISPLAY UNIT. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT ATC HAD BECOME CONCERNED WITH THE SURROUNDING TERRAIN, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NEVER AN EGPWS TERRAIN WARNING. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, WHICH I BELIEVE RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF TERRAIN SEPARATION, ARE AS FOLLOWS: OPEN LOOP COM. THE CREW DID NOT CONFIRM THE TURNING INSTRUCTIONS TO BE EXPECTED AFTER XING THE LOC AND NO CONFIRMATION OF THOSE TURNING INSTRUCTIONS WERE REQUESTED FROM ATC. WHEN THE INCORRECT HDG OF 60 DEGS WAS REPEATED BACK TO ATC, THERE WAS NO CHALLENGE OR CORRECTION ADVISED AT THAT TIME. WITH THE CHANGE FROM THE EXPECTED GPS APCH TO THE ILS APCH, THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE WORKLOAD THAT CREATED A DIVISION IN ATTN FOR THE PNF. MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF THE TSTM AND THE ASSOCIATED WINDS IN THE VICINITY OF THE ARPT WAS ALSO A FACTOR. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHEN AN AIRPLANE IS BEING VECTORED THROUGH A LOC COURSE, ESPECIALLY IN MOUNTAINOUS AREAS, THERE SHOULD BE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS IN THE EVENT THERE IS A LOSS OF COMS. THIS WILL SERVE TO ALERT THE CREW OF IMPENDING RESTRS SUCH AS MINIMUM VECTORING ALTS, TERRAIN, AND RESTR AREAS. IT SHOULD BE LISTED IN THE NOTAMS WHEN RESTRS ARE IN EFFECT THAT WILL PREVENT CERTAIN APCHS TO AN ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 581178: (ACTING PIC AND PF/ACTING FO AND PNF.) THE REASON WE WERE TOLD TO CROSS THE LOC WAS BECAUSE THERE WAS SOMEONE IN FRONT OF US ON AN APCH. WE KNEW THE CELL NEAR THE ARPT WOULD CAUSE THE WINDS TO SHIFT SO THE COPLT ELECTED TO TUNE IN THE ASOS FOR A WIND UPDATE. 2 RADIOS WERE ON AT ONCE, WHICH MADE FOR A NOISY COCKPIT. AT THIS POINT, ATC ISSUED A L TURN TO A HDG OF 160 DEGS. THE PF MOVED THE HDG BUG TO 60 DEGS, AND READ BACK TO ATC '060 DEGS.' THIS WAS VERIFIED BY ATC TAPE PLAYBACK. OUR CONFIGN WAS S+20 FLAP AND GEAR DOWN. ALT WAS 8000 FT. FULL ANTI-ICE PROTECTION WAS EMPLOYED DUE TO CURRENT WX CONDITIONS, AND THE CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED FOR THE APCH. IN CONCLUSION, THE FIRST ERROR SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BOTH PLTS NOT HEARING THE 'EXPECT L TURN AFTER THE XINGOF THE LOC.' HOWEVER, I WONDER IF THIS IS SIGNIFICANT, BECAUSE EVEN IF I HAD HEARD IT, AND THEN HEARD ATC ISSUE A 60 DEG HDG, I WOULD BE INCLINED TO TAKE THAT HDG WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE MVA. ALSO, A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THAT THE RESTR AIRSPACE WAS NOT LISTED IN THE NOTAMS AND, THEREFORE, NOT INCLUDED IN THE PLANNING. LISTEN UP FOR THE 'EXPECT' PART OF THE CLRNC AFTER TOLD TO CROSS THE LOC. CALL AHEAD TO LEARN AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, WHICH APCH IS IN USE SO DETAILED PLANNING CAN HAPPEN EARLIER. LEARN MORE ABOUT 'REACTIVE' MGMNT PRACTICES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.