Narrative:

I was the captain on a revenue flight from ZZZ to atl on thurs/april/03. Preflight, taxi and takeoff roll were conducted within normal operating parameters. The co-pilot was the pilot flying. As we climbed through 10000 ft MSL, I saw and heard the following indications of an engine fire: the left engine fire switch illuminated. The fire bell sounded. The left fuel control switch fire warning light illuminated. The discrete fire warning light in the center forward panel illuminated. The master warning lights on the glare shield panel illuminated. Left engine fire appeared on the EICAS display. The egt on the left engine was above limits. I immediately called for the engine fire checklist. The number one engine was shut down consistent with the procedures in the QRH. Both fire bottles were discharged into the number one engine in accordance with the engine fire checklist. I also contacted ATC, declared an emergency and requested an immediate return to ZZZ. I then made a PA to advise the passengers and flight attendants that we were returning to ZZZ with an engine malfunction, and that we anticipated a normal landing. While on final approach to ZZZ, the fire warning lights ceased to be illuminated. A normal landing was made on ZZZ runway 16R. I exited the runway at high-speed taxiway A5 and brought the aircraft to a stop in the large open area between taxiway a and taxiway B. I then established radio communications with the fire rescue coordinator outside of the aircraft. Fire rescue and company maintenance personnel reported that they had inspected the number one engine and that the fire had been extinguished. The fire rescue coordinator then cleared the aircraft to taxi to gate. We then taxied to the gate and deplaned passenger. Appropriate logbook entries were made. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated during the emergency and after the QRH procedures were accomplished communication was established with the fire crash and rescue unit which was helpful to both parties. The reporter said after the engine was checked on the taxiway it was determined the engine did have an actual fire and it was out. The reporter stated that after parking on the gate maintenance found two large holes burned through the cowling on the left side of the engine. The reporter said the cause of the fire was a failed flexible hydraulic fuel line to the left vane actuator. The reporter stated everything that was supposed to work, warning systems, fire extinguisher systems and all emergency procedures worked perfectly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 ON CLB AT 10000 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO L ENG FIRE WARNING. CAUSED BY FAILED FLEXIBLE LINE TO VANE ACTUATOR.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT ON A REVENUE FLT FROM ZZZ TO ATL ON THURS/APRIL/03. PREFLT, TAXI AND TKOF ROLL WERE CONDUCTED WITHIN NORMAL OPERATING PARAMETERS. THE CO-PLT WAS THE PLT FLYING. AS WE CLBED THROUGH 10000 FT MSL, I SAW AND HEARD THE FOLLOWING INDICATIONS OF AN ENG FIRE: THE L ENG FIRE SWITCH ILLUMINATED. THE FIRE BELL SOUNDED. THE L FUEL CTL SWITCH FIRE WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE DISCRETE FIRE WARNING LIGHT IN THE CENTER FORWARD PANEL ILLUMINATED. THE MASTER WARNING LIGHTS ON THE GLARE SHIELD PANEL ILLUMINATED. L ENG FIRE APPEARED ON THE EICAS DISPLAY. THE EGT ON THE L ENG WAS ABOVE LIMITS. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR THE ENG FIRE CHKLIST. THE NUMBER ONE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN CONSISTENT WITH THE PROCS IN THE QRH. BOTH FIRE BOTTLES WERE DISCHARGED INTO THE NUMBER ONE ENG IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ENG FIRE CHKLIST. I ALSO CONTACTED ATC, DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO ZZZ. I THEN MADE A PA TO ADVISE THE PASSENGERS AND FLT ATTENDANTS THAT WE WERE RETURNING TO ZZZ WITH AN ENG MALFUNCTION, AND THAT WE ANTICIPATED A NORMAL LNDG. WHILE ON FINAL APCH TO ZZZ, THE FIRE WARNING LIGHTS CEASED TO BE ILLUMINATED. A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE ON ZZZ RWY 16R. I EXITED THE RWY AT HIGH-SPEED TXWY A5 AND BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP IN THE LARGE OPEN AREA BTWN TXWY A AND TXWY B. I THEN ESTABLISHED RADIO COMS WITH THE FIRE RESCUE COORDINATOR OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT. FIRE RESCUE AND COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL RPTED THAT THEY HAD INSPECTED THE NUMBER ONE ENG AND THAT THE FIRE HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED. THE FIRE RESCUE COORDINATOR THEN CLRED THE ACFT TO TAXI TO GATE. WE THEN TAXIED TO THE GATE AND DEPLANED PAX. APPROPRIATE LOGBOOK ENTRIES WERE MADE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED DURING THE EMER AND AFTER THE QRH PROCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED COM WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE FIRE CRASH AND RESCUE UNIT WHICH WAS HELPFUL TO BOTH PARTIES. THE RPTR SAID AFTER THE ENG WAS CHKED ON THE TXWY IT WAS DETERMINED THE ENG DID HAVE AN ACTUAL FIRE AND IT WAS OUT. THE RPTR STATED THAT AFTER PARKING ON THE GATE MAINT FOUND TWO LARGE HOLES BURNED THROUGH THE COWLING ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ENG. THE RPTR SAID THE CAUSE OF THE FIRE WAS A FAILED FLEXIBLE HYDRAULIC FUEL LINE TO THE LEFT VANE ACTUATOR. THE RPTR STATED EVERYTHING THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO WORK, WARNING SYSTEMS, FIRE EXTINGUISHER SYSTEMS AND ALL EMER PROCS WORKED PERFECTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.