Narrative:

Just prior to our flight, being cleared for takeoff on runway 25R at las, another aircraft was sent around on his approach to runway 25L. We were cleared for takeoff as the preceding B737 rotated and were instructed to maintain visual separation from air carrier Y. The captain was flying --initial clearance was to 7000 ft on the idale 2 SID. During the climb, after takeoff duties and checklists were being accomplished. At 5000 ft in the climb, with only the preceding B737 aircraft visible (the missed approach aircraft was behind us not in sight), the controller issued a vector, 'turn to 165 degrees, climb to 6000 ft.' the aircraft was leveling off at 6000 ft in the l-hand turn when the controller reissued his vector turn to heading 210 degrees, which now required a roll to the right. At this point, the TCASII alert went off, 'climb,' traffic displays showed the alert aircraft was behind us, while the proceeding B737 was still in sight and depicted on TCASII as well. The captain began a climb to silence the warning which did not happen until our aircraft had climbed 500 ft in altitude to 6500 ft MSL. We reported the TCASII resolution to ATC who then gave us a climb to 11000 ft and a vector to resume the idale 2 SID. At this point, the ATC controller instructed us to copy his phone number and have the captain contact him at the completion of our flight. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. My understanding is that the controller had the captain contact him to apologize for the controller's poor vectors which caused the missed approach aircraft behind us to give our aircraft a TCASII resolution.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CONFLICT OCCURS BTWN A B737 DEPARTING AND AN ACR ON A MISSED APCH ON THE PARALLEL RWY AT LAS.

Narrative: JUST PRIOR TO OUR FLT, BEING CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 25R AT LAS, ANOTHER ACFT WAS SENT AROUND ON HIS APCH TO RWY 25L. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AS THE PRECEDING B737 ROTATED AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM ACR Y. THE CAPT WAS FLYING --INITIAL CLRNC WAS TO 7000 FT ON THE IDALE 2 SID. DURING THE CLB, AFTER TKOF DUTIES AND CHKLISTS WERE BEING ACCOMPLISHED. AT 5000 FT IN THE CLB, WITH ONLY THE PRECEDING B737 ACFT VISIBLE (THE MISSED APCH ACFT WAS BEHIND US NOT IN SIGHT), THE CTLR ISSUED A VECTOR, 'TURN TO 165 DEGS, CLB TO 6000 FT.' THE ACFT WAS LEVELING OFF AT 6000 FT IN THE L-HAND TURN WHEN THE CTLR REISSUED HIS VECTOR TURN TO HEADING 210 DEGS, WHICH NOW REQUIRED A ROLL TO THE R. AT THIS POINT, THE TCASII ALERT WENT OFF, 'CLB,' TFC DISPLAYS SHOWED THE ALERT ACFT WAS BEHIND US, WHILE THE PROCEEDING B737 WAS STILL IN SIGHT AND DEPICTED ON TCASII AS WELL. THE CAPT BEGAN A CLB TO SILENCE THE WARNING WHICH DID NOT HAPPEN UNTIL OUR ACFT HAD CLBED 500 FT IN ALT TO 6500 FT MSL. WE RPTED THE TCASII RESOLUTION TO ATC WHO THEN GAVE US A CLB TO 11000 FT AND A VECTOR TO RESUME THE IDALE 2 SID. AT THIS POINT, THE ATC CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO COPY HIS PHONE NUMBER AND HAVE THE CAPT CONTACT HIM AT THE COMPLETION OF OUR FLT. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE CTLR HAD THE CAPT CONTACT HIM TO APOLOGIZE FOR THE CTLR'S POOR VECTORS WHICH CAUSED THE MISSED APCH ACFT BEHIND US TO GIVE OUR ACFT A TCASII RESOLUTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.