Narrative:

Upon checking in with ord tower on the ILS runway 4R, we were told we were #3 for runway 4R, with the first traffic touching down and second traffic 2.5 mi ahead. We began to slow about 2 mi prior to FAF (to final approach speed) in order to maintain the 2.5 mi separation from traffic ahead. As traffic ahead touched down, ord tower instructed them to roll to the end (runway 4R length 8071 ft) and was told to expedite, because traffic was 2 mi behind. Ord tower then cleared us to land runway 4R. Passing through 500 ft, it was apparent that traffic was still on the runway, but nearing the end. I asked the captain to let me know when the traffic cleared and shifted my focus to the instruments and touchdown zone for landing. Passing through 130 ft and approaching a go around decision. Ord tower once again came on the radio and said that traffic was clearing the runway, and again cleared us to land. We continued for a normal landing and rollout. On taxi-in, I commented to the captain how odd it was the tower cleared us to land a second time, when there was still a question in our mind about the traffic ahead clearing the runway. The captain commented that the clearance was marginal, because the traffic had still not cleared as we crossed the threshold and had just partially cleared by touchdown. Granted, the traffic was 7000 ft down the runway from us, but this is still disturbing. We should have initiated a go around about the time tower came on the second time, telling us the traffic was clearing, and again clearing us to land. I think the spacing was too tight. We were in a 737-900 at maximum landing weight, 160 KTS. Traffic ahead was a 737-200 with a 20 KTS slower approach speed. The tower also seemed to want to avoid a go around with the second clearance. We should have disregarded and initiated a go around. It's our decision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-900 FLT CREW QUERY THEMSELVES ABOUT WHAT THEY SHOULD HAVE DONE DURING A TIGHT SPACING EVENT WHILE LNDG AT ORD.

Narrative: UPON CHKING IN WITH ORD TWR ON THE ILS RWY 4R, WE WERE TOLD WE WERE #3 FOR RWY 4R, WITH THE FIRST TFC TOUCHING DOWN AND SECOND TFC 2.5 MI AHEAD. WE BEGAN TO SLOW ABOUT 2 MI PRIOR TO FAF (TO FINAL APCH SPD) IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE 2.5 MI SEPARATION FROM TFC AHEAD. AS TFC AHEAD TOUCHED DOWN, ORD TWR INSTRUCTED THEM TO ROLL TO THE END (RWY 4R LENGTH 8071 FT) AND WAS TOLD TO EXPEDITE, BECAUSE TFC WAS 2 MI BEHIND. ORD TWR THEN CLRED US TO LAND RWY 4R. PASSING THROUGH 500 FT, IT WAS APPARENT THAT TFC WAS STILL ON THE RWY, BUT NEARING THE END. I ASKED THE CAPT TO LET ME KNOW WHEN THE TFC CLRED AND SHIFTED MY FOCUS TO THE INSTS AND TOUCHDOWN ZONE FOR LNDG. PASSING THROUGH 130 FT AND APCHING A GAR DECISION. ORD TWR ONCE AGAIN CAME ON THE RADIO AND SAID THAT TFC WAS CLRING THE RWY, AND AGAIN CLRED US TO LAND. WE CONTINUED FOR A NORMAL LNDG AND ROLLOUT. ON TAXI-IN, I COMMENTED TO THE CAPT HOW ODD IT WAS THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND A SECOND TIME, WHEN THERE WAS STILL A QUESTION IN OUR MIND ABOUT THE TFC AHEAD CLRING THE RWY. THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT THE CLRNC WAS MARGINAL, BECAUSE THE TFC HAD STILL NOT CLRED AS WE CROSSED THE THRESHOLD AND HAD JUST PARTIALLY CLRED BY TOUCHDOWN. GRANTED, THE TFC WAS 7000 FT DOWN THE RWY FROM US, BUT THIS IS STILL DISTURBING. WE SHOULD HAVE INITIATED A GAR ABOUT THE TIME TWR CAME ON THE SECOND TIME, TELLING US THE TFC WAS CLRING, AND AGAIN CLRING US TO LAND. I THINK THE SPACING WAS TOO TIGHT. WE WERE IN A 737-900 AT MAX LNDG WT, 160 KTS. TFC AHEAD WAS A 737-200 WITH A 20 KTS SLOWER APCH SPD. THE TWR ALSO SEEMED TO WANT TO AVOID A GAR WITH THE SECOND CLRNC. WE SHOULD HAVE DISREGARDED AND INITIATED A GAR. IT'S OUR DECISION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.