Narrative:

Cleared for the visual approach to runway 27R. In order to reach a stabilized condition prior to 500 ft, the first officer who was flying had to use a combination of speed brakes, flaps and maneuvering to reduce altitude and slow the aircraft to approach speed due to altitude and close proximity to the airport when given the visual approach clearance. Aircraft intercepted VASI glide path at approximately 700 ft AGL and reached computer approach speed at 400-500 ft AGL. The rest of approach proceeded normally until at 30-40 ft AGL when the captain noticed the speed brake light was illuminated, indicating that the speed brakes were aft of the armed position or still partially deployed, at which point the captain reacted by trying to stow the speed brake handle. In his haste, he deployed the speed brakes even further, resulting in an excessive sink rate and hard landing. There were no injuries to any of the passenger and crew and the aircraft sustained minor damage to a communications antenna, low aft cargo area drain mast and scraping to the lower aft fuselage. Contributing factors to this incident were: 1) inexperience by the captain with only 120 hours total time in the aircraft, including IOE. 2) inexperience by the first officer with less than 300 hours in the aircraft, including IOE. 3) fatigue by the captain although only on duty for approximately 10 hours at the time of the incident he had been up for over 18 hours. 4) acceptance of a visual approach clearance much closer to the field than normally required to make a safe descent. An easy solution, and one that would have prevented this incident would be to add another audible warning to the enhanced GPWS that indicates the spoilers are aft of the armed position when below a certain altitude, possibly 500 ft, as there is no good reason for them to be deployed below that altitude. Supplemental information from acn 572459: we were fully configured and on speed at approximately 150 ft AGL. Engine power had been at idle but I brought it in to catch the approach speed. We crossed the runway 27R threshold at 50 ft AGL and on speed. We heard the 50 ft aural call from the GPWS. Split seconds after that, we received a yellow master caution annunciation accompanied by 2 new messages on the EICAS. The messages were 'flaps' and 'speed brakes extension.' I looked from the EICAS to the speed brake lever and observed the captain's hand on the lever. It appeared as if the lever was moving backwards (toward the extended position) and then he quickly shoved it forward, but it was too late. We dropped from the sky onto the runway. An exterior inspection revealed we had damage on the aft lower portion of the fuselage.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FLT CREW HAS UNSTABILIZED APCH RESULTING IN A TAIL STRIKE AT PBI.

Narrative: CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27R. IN ORDER TO REACH A STABILIZED CONDITION PRIOR TO 500 FT, THE FO WHO WAS FLYING HAD TO USE A COMBINATION OF SPD BRAKES, FLAPS AND MANEUVERING TO REDUCE ALT AND SLOW THE ACFT TO APCH SPD DUE TO ALT AND CLOSE PROX TO THE ARPT WHEN GIVEN THE VISUAL APCH CLRNC. ACFT INTERCEPTED VASI GLIDE PATH AT APPROX 700 FT AGL AND REACHED COMPUTER APCH SPD AT 400-500 FT AGL. THE REST OF APCH PROCEEDED NORMALLY UNTIL AT 30-40 FT AGL WHEN THE CAPT NOTICED THE SPD BRAKE LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED, INDICATING THAT THE SPD BRAKES WERE AFT OF THE ARMED POS OR STILL PARTIALLY DEPLOYED, AT WHICH POINT THE CAPT REACTED BY TRYING TO STOW THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE. IN HIS HASTE, HE DEPLOYED THE SPD BRAKES EVEN FURTHER, RESULTING IN AN EXCESSIVE SINK RATE AND HARD LNDG. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO ANY OF THE PAX AND CREW AND THE ACFT SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE TO A COMS ANTENNA, LOW AFT CARGO AREA DRAIN MAST AND SCRAPING TO THE LOWER AFT FUSELAGE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE: 1) INEXPERIENCE BY THE CAPT WITH ONLY 120 HRS TOTAL TIME IN THE ACFT, INCLUDING IOE. 2) INEXPERIENCE BY THE FO WITH LESS THAN 300 HRS IN THE ACFT, INCLUDING IOE. 3) FATIGUE BY THE CAPT ALTHOUGH ONLY ON DUTY FOR APPROX 10 HRS AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT HE HAD BEEN UP FOR OVER 18 HRS. 4) ACCEPTANCE OF A VISUAL APCH CLRNC MUCH CLOSER TO THE FIELD THAN NORMALLY REQUIRED TO MAKE A SAFE DSCNT. AN EASY SOLUTION, AND ONE THAT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT WOULD BE TO ADD ANOTHER AUDIBLE WARNING TO THE ENHANCED GPWS THAT INDICATES THE SPOILERS ARE AFT OF THE ARMED POS WHEN BELOW A CERTAIN ALT, POSSIBLY 500 FT, AS THERE IS NO GOOD REASON FOR THEM TO BE DEPLOYED BELOW THAT ALT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 572459: WE WERE FULLY CONFIGURED AND ON SPD AT APPROX 150 FT AGL. ENG PWR HAD BEEN AT IDLE BUT I BROUGHT IT IN TO CATCH THE APCH SPD. WE CROSSED THE RWY 27R THRESHOLD AT 50 FT AGL AND ON SPD. WE HEARD THE 50 FT AURAL CALL FROM THE GPWS. SPLIT SECONDS AFTER THAT, WE RECEIVED A YELLOW MASTER CAUTION ANNUNCIATION ACCOMPANIED BY 2 NEW MESSAGES ON THE EICAS. THE MESSAGES WERE 'FLAPS' AND 'SPD BRAKES EXTENSION.' I LOOKED FROM THE EICAS TO THE SPD BRAKE LEVER AND OBSERVED THE CAPT'S HAND ON THE LEVER. IT APPEARED AS IF THE LEVER WAS MOVING BACKWARDS (TOWARD THE EXTENDED POS) AND THEN HE QUICKLY SHOVED IT FORWARD, BUT IT WAS TOO LATE. WE DROPPED FROM THE SKY ONTO THE RWY. AN EXTERIOR INSPECTION REVEALED WE HAD DAMAGE ON THE AFT LOWER PORTION OF THE FUSELAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.