Narrative:

PIC, short leg (sea-pdx) after flying all night. Clear WX with fog patches and light east winds (landing runway 10L&right). ATIS described visual approachs. Checked in with approach control and told to expect runway 10R. Subsequent call queried our RVR requirements (1800 ft RVR). We were then told that runway 10R RVR was 1400 ft touchdown, 5000 ft mid, 6000 ft rollout. We acknowledged and were then asked if we wanted the ILS or remain with visual. We kept the visual. 5 mi out, we were asked if we wanted runway 10L (which was clear). We declined. As expected, visibility became poor, but centerline became visible in time to effect the landing. Remainder of rollout and taxi was normal. No further discussion with ATC or between cockpit crew. The seeds for this event were sown many weeks earlier (same crew for 2 months). Marginally capable captain easily intimidated and defensive, became combative and punitive when any incorrect, abnormal situation was idented. Poor command presence. CRM not fostered. Cockpit atmosphere had evolved to minimize communication. Checklists were read. Occasional hints were given. They were usually unheeded. Without collaborative environment, the take action line receded to events that were dangerous. Legal and efficient concerns were personally noted, but not offered. Most simple solution is to require less duty time (more rest). Even lackluster capts would perform better.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 CREW STARTED APCH WITH THE RPTR RWY RVR BELOW THE LNDG MINIMUMS ON RWY 10R AT PDX.

Narrative: PIC, SHORT LEG (SEA-PDX) AFTER FLYING ALL NIGHT. CLR WX WITH FOG PATCHES AND LIGHT E WINDS (LNDG RWY 10L&R). ATIS DESCRIBED VISUAL APCHS. CHKED IN WITH APCH CTL AND TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 10R. SUBSEQUENT CALL QUERIED OUR RVR REQUIREMENTS (1800 FT RVR). WE WERE THEN TOLD THAT RWY 10R RVR WAS 1400 FT TOUCHDOWN, 5000 FT MID, 6000 FT ROLLOUT. WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND WERE THEN ASKED IF WE WANTED THE ILS OR REMAIN WITH VISUAL. WE KEPT THE VISUAL. 5 MI OUT, WE WERE ASKED IF WE WANTED RWY 10L (WHICH WAS CLR). WE DECLINED. AS EXPECTED, VISIBILITY BECAME POOR, BUT CTRLINE BECAME VISIBLE IN TIME TO EFFECT THE LNDG. REMAINDER OF ROLLOUT AND TAXI WAS NORMAL. NO FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ATC OR BTWN COCKPIT CREW. THE SEEDS FOR THIS EVENT WERE SOWN MANY WKS EARLIER (SAME CREW FOR 2 MONTHS). MARGINALLY CAPABLE CAPT EASILY INTIMIDATED AND DEFENSIVE, BECAME COMBATIVE AND PUNITIVE WHEN ANY INCORRECT, ABNORMAL SIT WAS IDENTED. POOR COMMAND PRESENCE. CRM NOT FOSTERED. COCKPIT ATMOSPHERE HAD EVOLVED TO MINIMIZE COM. CHKLISTS WERE READ. OCCASIONAL HINTS WERE GIVEN. THEY WERE USUALLY UNHEEDED. WITHOUT COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENT, THE TAKE ACTION LINE RECEDED TO EVENTS THAT WERE DANGEROUS. LEGAL AND EFFICIENT CONCERNS WERE PERSONALLY NOTED, BUT NOT OFFERED. MOST SIMPLE SOLUTION IS TO REQUIRE LESS DUTY TIME (MORE REST). EVEN LACKLUSTER CAPTS WOULD PERFORM BETTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.