Narrative:

I inadvertently exceeded the limitations of far 121.521(C) flight time limitation of 120 hours in 30 consecutive days. I am employed by a commercial air cargo carrier as an L1011 first officer. At the end of october, I had been aloft for 107 hours for the month (31 days) and 99 hours in 30 consecutive days. Another airman was taken ill, and I was required by the company to cover his schedule. According to my calculations, it appeared that I could drop hours from october and fly in november, not expecting to exceed 120 hours in 30 consecutive days. I then ceased flying. The company chooses to use an antiquated system, which does not provide safeguards for flight time limitations. An airman can only be informed after the fact. Typically, when an airman exceeds a flight time limitation, the company discloses on him and the FAA violates the individual, despite the fact that the company directly contributes by over-scheduling. As long as the individual employee continues to bear the full responsibility from the FAA, the company will not be motivated to provide any safeguards to avoid this problem. The FAA must make the company primarily responsible for having safeguards in place for its employees. The employee/airman should be responsible in the form of contingency checks only. Because most air cargo carriers operate throughout the night, the human internal clock becomes upset. With the inherent delays that are incurred daily, duty time continues well into daylight hours. Under international supplemental rules, there are only flight time rules and none for duty times. It is perfectly legal to be up and on duty for up to 6 days straight, as long as no flight times aloft have been exceeded. Because of this, duty days become excessive and crew rest is minimum. Fatigue is a major player in this operation. Every additional task or responsibility that can be alleviated from the day-to-day operations can help to minimize some of these problems for the airman. I believe that non-flying office personnel, with the proper software, can enter data and have the overall picture in sight. The ability to look backwards and forwards at schedules would allow them to make sound judgements and to avert any possible future conflicts of schedules or flight times. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that this occurred due to his replacing a sick crew member and he did not review his logbook to determine if he was legal to fly. He stated that the company often flies crew members to the maximum allowed on a regular basis and in this case, he was not notified that he was close to the maximum. The flight was rerted and became longer than expected.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: L1011 PLT EXCEEDS MAX FLT TIME OF 120 HRS WITHIN 30 CONSECUTIVE DAYS PER FAR 121 PT 521.

Narrative: I INADVERTENTLY EXCEEDED THE LIMITATIONS OF FAR 121.521(C) FLT TIME LIMITATION OF 120 HRS IN 30 CONSECUTIVE DAYS. I AM EMPLOYED BY A COMMERCIAL AIR CARGO CARRIER AS AN L1011 FO. AT THE END OF OCTOBER, I HAD BEEN ALOFT FOR 107 HRS FOR THE MONTH (31 DAYS) AND 99 HRS IN 30 CONSECUTIVE DAYS. ANOTHER AIRMAN WAS TAKEN ILL, AND I WAS REQUIRED BY THE COMPANY TO COVER HIS SCHEDULE. ACCORDING TO MY CALCULATIONS, IT APPEARED THAT I COULD DROP HRS FROM OCTOBER AND FLY IN NOVEMBER, NOT EXPECTING TO EXCEED 120 HRS IN 30 CONSECUTIVE DAYS. I THEN CEASED FLYING. THE COMPANY CHOOSES TO USE AN ANTIQUATED SYS, WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE SAFEGUARDS FOR FLT TIME LIMITATIONS. AN AIRMAN CAN ONLY BE INFORMED AFTER THE FACT. TYPICALLY, WHEN AN AIRMAN EXCEEDS A FLT TIME LIMITATION, THE COMPANY DISCLOSES ON HIM AND THE FAA VIOLATES THE INDIVIDUAL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COMPANY DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTES BY OVER-SCHEDULING. AS LONG AS THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE CONTINUES TO BEAR THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE FAA, THE COMPANY WILL NOT BE MOTIVATED TO PROVIDE ANY SAFEGUARDS TO AVOID THIS PROB. THE FAA MUST MAKE THE COMPANY PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR HAVING SAFEGUARDS IN PLACE FOR ITS EMPLOYEES. THE EMPLOYEE/AIRMAN SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE IN THE FORM OF CONTINGENCY CHKS ONLY. BECAUSE MOST AIR CARGO CARRIERS OPERATE THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT, THE HUMAN INTERNAL CLOCK BECOMES UPSET. WITH THE INHERENT DELAYS THAT ARE INCURRED DAILY, DUTY TIME CONTINUES WELL INTO DAYLIGHT HRS. UNDER INTL SUPPLEMENTAL RULES, THERE ARE ONLY FLT TIME RULES AND NONE FOR DUTY TIMES. IT IS PERFECTLY LEGAL TO BE UP AND ON DUTY FOR UP TO 6 DAYS STRAIGHT, AS LONG AS NO FLT TIMES ALOFT HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED. BECAUSE OF THIS, DUTY DAYS BECOME EXCESSIVE AND CREW REST IS MINIMUM. FATIGUE IS A MAJOR PLAYER IN THIS OP. EVERY ADDITIONAL TASK OR RESPONSIBILITY THAT CAN BE ALLEVIATED FROM THE DAY-TO-DAY OPS CAN HELP TO MINIMIZE SOME OF THESE PROBS FOR THE AIRMAN. I BELIEVE THAT NON-FLYING OFFICE PERSONNEL, WITH THE PROPER SOFTWARE, CAN ENTER DATA AND HAVE THE OVERALL PICTURE IN SIGHT. THE ABILITY TO LOOK BACKWARDS AND FORWARDS AT SCHEDULES WOULD ALLOW THEM TO MAKE SOUND JUDGEMENTS AND TO AVERT ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE CONFLICTS OF SCHEDULES OR FLT TIMES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THIS OCCURRED DUE TO HIS REPLACING A SICK CREW MEMBER AND HE DID NOT REVIEW HIS LOGBOOK TO DETERMINE IF HE WAS LEGAL TO FLY. HE STATED THAT THE COMPANY OFTEN FLIES CREW MEMBERS TO THE MAX ALLOWED ON A REGULAR BASIS AND IN THIS CASE, HE WAS NOT NOTIFIED THAT HE WAS CLOSE TO THE MAX. THE FLT WAS RERTED AND BECAME LONGER THAN EXPECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.