|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||airport : l18.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||general aviation : personal|
|Make Model Name||M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 91|
|Flight Phase||landing : roll|
|Function||flight crew : single pilot|
instruction : instructor
oversight : pic
|Function||flight crew : single pilot|
instruction : trainee
|Qualification||pilot : multi engine|
pilot : instrument
pilot : cfi
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 150|
flight time total : 4500
flight time type : 100
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
ground encounters : gear up landing
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
other flight crewb
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
Flight Crew Human Performance
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
PIC (CFI right seat -- PNF) was giving aircraft chkout/differences training to CFI (left seat -- PF). After airwork, stalls, steep turns, glide and slow flight, proceeded to non twred field for lndgs and takeoffs. PNF briefed PF to aircraft's tendency to float on lndgs and the need to retract flaps for braking and weight on wheels effectiveness. After a normal 45 degree entry and pattern, a 3 degree glide (PAPI) approach and normal touchdown, the PNF called for 'gear up' inadvertently. The appropriate call being 'flaps up.' as the PF reached and actuated the gear, the PNF followed the PF's arm and returned the gear handle to 'gear down.' the warning horn sounded at this time. The actuator circuit breaker popped, gear collapsed and aircraft skidded off centerline, stopping on runway edge approximately 1800 ft down along the right edge. Human performance: the PF and PNF were in the command/response (not respond) mode of CRM, ie, tell/do PNF was on day 5 of 12-14 hour duty days and received 7 hours sleep night before. The PF had not been told the landing would be to full stop by PNF and PF stated after occurrence he thought PNF was calling for go around. PF stated he was nervous because of the aircraft's tendency to dip and enter a spin during power on stalls. PF stated he should have familiarized himself with cockpit layout prior to flight to a higher degree. PNF stated (myself) that as soon as command was given, it was recognized as incorrect and corrected. PNF was not 100% mentally and stated this after the fact. I also feel that inconsistencies in CFI callouts/procedures has a partial role here.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MOONEY 201 FLC INADVERTENTLY RETRACTS GEAR DURING TOUCH-AND-GO LNDG.
Narrative: PIC (CFI R SEAT -- PNF) WAS GIVING ACFT CHKOUT/DIFFERENCES TRAINING TO CFI (L SEAT -- PF). AFTER AIRWORK, STALLS, STEEP TURNS, GLIDE AND SLOW FLT, PROCEEDED TO NON TWRED FIELD FOR LNDGS AND TKOFS. PNF BRIEFED PF TO ACFT'S TENDENCY TO FLOAT ON LNDGS AND THE NEED TO RETRACT FLAPS FOR BRAKING AND WT ON WHEELS EFFECTIVENESS. AFTER A NORMAL 45 DEG ENTRY AND PATTERN, A 3 DEG GLIDE (PAPI) APCH AND NORMAL TOUCHDOWN, THE PNF CALLED FOR 'GEAR UP' INADVERTENTLY. THE APPROPRIATE CALL BEING 'FLAPS UP.' AS THE PF REACHED AND ACTUATED THE GEAR, THE PNF FOLLOWED THE PF'S ARM AND RETURNED THE GEAR HANDLE TO 'GEAR DOWN.' THE WARNING HORN SOUNDED AT THIS TIME. THE ACTUATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED, GEAR COLLAPSED AND ACFT SKIDDED OFF CTRLINE, STOPPING ON RWY EDGE APPROX 1800 FT DOWN ALONG THE R EDGE. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: THE PF AND PNF WERE IN THE COMMAND/RESPONSE (NOT RESPOND) MODE OF CRM, IE, TELL/DO PNF WAS ON DAY 5 OF 12-14 HR DUTY DAYS AND RECEIVED 7 HRS SLEEP NIGHT BEFORE. THE PF HAD NOT BEEN TOLD THE LNDG WOULD BE TO FULL STOP BY PNF AND PF STATED AFTER OCCURRENCE HE THOUGHT PNF WAS CALLING FOR GAR. PF STATED HE WAS NERVOUS BECAUSE OF THE ACFT'S TENDENCY TO DIP AND ENTER A SPIN DURING PWR ON STALLS. PF STATED HE SHOULD HAVE FAMILIARIZED HIMSELF WITH COCKPIT LAYOUT PRIOR TO FLT TO A HIGHER DEGREE. PNF STATED (MYSELF) THAT AS SOON AS COMMAND WAS GIVEN, IT WAS RECOGNIZED AS INCORRECT AND CORRECTED. PNF WAS NOT 100% MENTALLY AND STATED THIS AFTER THE FACT. I ALSO FEEL THAT INCONSISTENCIES IN CFI CALLOUTS/PROCS HAS A PARTIAL ROLE HERE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.