Narrative:

We were cleared for takeoff at cvg on runway 27 by the tower. At approximately 90 KTS, the tower controller told us our takeoff clearance was canceled. I took control of the aircraft from the first officer and performed the abort. As I looked down the runway, I saw a regional jet roll through our runway. It had landed on runway 36L, which intersects runway 27. The same controller is responsible for both runways and had cleared the regional jet to land. We could not see landing traffic touch down on runway 36L due to buildings blocking our view. Had the controller not caught the error, our 2 aircraft would have come close together. Cvg has a potential problem when aircraft takeoff on runway 27. Both ends of runways 18R/36L are not visible to an aircraft rolling for takeoff. By the time you can get a good view of runways 18R/36L, you are going too fast to stop by the intersection, if there is a conflict that goes unnoticed. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter indicated that the traffic volume was heavy during this event with a line of aircraft waiting for takeoff on runway 27 and aircraft spaced for landing on the crossing runway 36L. This is the normal confign for the airport with 1 local controller handling the west side of the airport and another controling arrs on runway 36R. The reporter was on the local frequency from the time he was #4 in line for takeoff, but lost track of who was at what position in the landing sequence because landing clrncs were being given with arriving aircraft 5 or more mi out on final. The clearance onto the runway was followed directly by clearance for takeoff, with no holding time on the runway. After the rejected takeoff, there was an immediate change of local controllers with no explanation or discussion of the event. During a follow up phone contact with the tower supervisor later in the day, it was found that no reports would be filed relative to the incident. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter's company ATC liaison person investigated and found this to be correct. The restrs to visibility due to the obstructions consisting of building and trees that make it impossible for pilots to observe aircraft on the crossing runway until the last min have, according to the reporter, produced similar incidents in the past involving aircraft from his airline.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 REJECTS TKOF ON TWR COMMAND AT CVG. AN RJ IS THEN OBSERVED XING THE RWY AHEAD DURING ROLLOUT AFTER LNDG ON THE XING RWY.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AT CVG ON RWY 27 BY THE TWR. AT APPROX 90 KTS, THE TWR CTLR TOLD US OUR TKOF CLRNC WAS CANCELED. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT FROM THE FO AND PERFORMED THE ABORT. AS I LOOKED DOWN THE RWY, I SAW A REGIONAL JET ROLL THROUGH OUR RWY. IT HAD LANDED ON RWY 36L, WHICH INTERSECTS RWY 27. THE SAME CTLR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH RWYS AND HAD CLRED THE REGIONAL JET TO LAND. WE COULD NOT SEE LNDG TFC TOUCH DOWN ON RWY 36L DUE TO BUILDINGS BLOCKING OUR VIEW. HAD THE CTLR NOT CAUGHT THE ERROR, OUR 2 ACFT WOULD HAVE COME CLOSE TOGETHER. CVG HAS A POTENTIAL PROB WHEN ACFT TKOF ON RWY 27. BOTH ENDS OF RWYS 18R/36L ARE NOT VISIBLE TO AN ACFT ROLLING FOR TKOF. BY THE TIME YOU CAN GET A GOOD VIEW OF RWYS 18R/36L, YOU ARE GOING TOO FAST TO STOP BY THE INTXN, IF THERE IS A CONFLICT THAT GOES UNNOTICED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR INDICATED THAT THE TFC VOLUME WAS HVY DURING THIS EVENT WITH A LINE OF ACFT WAITING FOR TKOF ON RWY 27 AND ACFT SPACED FOR LNDG ON THE XING RWY 36L. THIS IS THE NORMAL CONFIGN FOR THE ARPT WITH 1 LCL CTLR HANDLING THE W SIDE OF THE ARPT AND ANOTHER CTLING ARRS ON RWY 36R. THE RPTR WAS ON THE LCL FREQ FROM THE TIME HE WAS #4 IN LINE FOR TKOF, BUT LOST TRACK OF WHO WAS AT WHAT POS IN THE LNDG SEQUENCE BECAUSE LNDG CLRNCS WERE BEING GIVEN WITH ARRIVING ACFT 5 OR MORE MI OUT ON FINAL. THE CLRNC ONTO THE RWY WAS FOLLOWED DIRECTLY BY CLRNC FOR TKOF, WITH NO HOLDING TIME ON THE RWY. AFTER THE REJECTED TKOF, THERE WAS AN IMMEDIATE CHANGE OF LCL CTLRS WITH NO EXPLANATION OR DISCUSSION OF THE EVENT. DURING A FOLLOW UP PHONE CONTACT WITH THE TWR SUPVR LATER IN THE DAY, IT WAS FOUND THAT NO RPTS WOULD BE FILED RELATIVE TO THE INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR'S COMPANY ATC LIAISON PERSON INVESTIGATED AND FOUND THIS TO BE CORRECT. THE RESTRS TO VISIBILITY DUE TO THE OBSTRUCTIONS CONSISTING OF BUILDING AND TREES THAT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PLTS TO OBSERVE ACFT ON THE XING RWY UNTIL THE LAST MIN HAVE, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR, PRODUCED SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE PAST INVOLVING ACFT FROM HIS AIRLINE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.