Narrative:

Performed preflight, started engine, and called ground controller for taxi clearance stating location on field, with current ATIS, and 'unfamiliar with area and would appreciate any assistance.' gave destination, direction of flight (northeast), and requested radar services. Informed to taxi to runway 12R, then ground control issued progressive taxi instructions, and recommended departure heading 340 degrees. 'Transponder code shortly.' taxied to right and stopped to perform run-up and depart runway 12R from that position. Ground controller stated, 'run-up area to runway 7 to your left.' there were 2 cessna's performing run-ups at taxiway F, and I got into position behind them and performed my run-up. My left magneto had some roughness, and the cessnas departed during this time. Taxied up to the hold line at taxiway F, changed to tower frequency and announced I was '#1, ready for departure, still did not have a squawk.' tower gave me the transponder code and cleared me for takeoff. Dialed in transponder code and taxied from taxiway F onto the departure end of runway 7. I quickly advanced the throttle (did not want to be sitting on an active runway at a busy airport) while checking on engine performance due to the magneto roughness at run-up. I was almost to the intersection of runways 12R and 7 when I realized I was on runway 7 and not runway 12R and was mentally questioning my run-up clearance. There were no airplanes directly in front of me on runway 7 and a cessna was turning final for one of the parallel 12 runways. I could not easily see over my shoulder to check for traffic on runway 12R and since trying to stop would place me on 1 and possibly 2 active runways with landing traffic, I proceeded with a takeoff roll on runway 7 as the safest option. The tower controller stated I had departed the wrong runway on climb out. Contributing factors and human performance considerations: 1) ground controller's instructions of run-up area of runway 7 to my left. 2) pilot unfamiliar with airport. 3) the 2 aircraft in run-up area gave the perception of the correct runway. 4) use of multiple runways placed increased demands of situational awareness on pilots and controllers. 5) engine roughness and transponder code given right at departure were distractions. 6) high perceived airport traffic volume by transient pilot. 7) pilot fatigue was a significant contributing factor affecting judgement and situational awareness. Should have queried the ground controller about a runway change after the controller comments about runway 7.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE35 PLT, DEPARTING VGT, TOOK OFF ON THE WRONG RWY, HAVING A POSSIBLE GND CONFLICT IN DOING SO.

Narrative: PERFORMED PREFLT, STARTED ENG, AND CALLED GND CTLR FOR TAXI CLRNC STATING LOCATION ON FIELD, WITH CURRENT ATIS, AND 'UNFAMILIAR WITH AREA AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ASSISTANCE.' GAVE DEST, DIRECTION OF FLT (NE), AND REQUESTED RADAR SVCS. INFORMED TO TAXI TO RWY 12R, THEN GND CTL ISSUED PROGRESSIVE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, AND RECOMMENDED DEP HEADING 340 DEGS. 'XPONDER CODE SHORTLY.' TAXIED TO R AND STOPPED TO PERFORM RUN-UP AND DEPART RWY 12R FROM THAT POS. GND CTLR STATED, 'RUN-UP AREA TO RWY 7 TO YOUR L.' THERE WERE 2 CESSNA'S PERFORMING RUN-UPS AT TXWY F, AND I GOT INTO POS BEHIND THEM AND PERFORMED MY RUN-UP. MY L MAGNETO HAD SOME ROUGHNESS, AND THE CESSNAS DEPARTED DURING THIS TIME. TAXIED UP TO THE HOLD LINE AT TXWY F, CHANGED TO TWR FREQ AND ANNOUNCED I WAS '#1, READY FOR DEP, STILL DID NOT HAVE A SQUAWK.' TWR GAVE ME THE XPONDER CODE AND CLRED ME FOR TKOF. DIALED IN XPONDER CODE AND TAXIED FROM TXWY F ONTO THE DEP END OF RWY 7. I QUICKLY ADVANCED THE THROTTLE (DID NOT WANT TO BE SITTING ON AN ACTIVE RWY AT A BUSY ARPT) WHILE CHKING ON ENG PERFORMANCE DUE TO THE MAGNETO ROUGHNESS AT RUN-UP. I WAS ALMOST TO THE INTXN OF RWYS 12R AND 7 WHEN I REALIZED I WAS ON RWY 7 AND NOT RWY 12R AND WAS MENTALLY QUESTIONING MY RUN-UP CLRNC. THERE WERE NO AIRPLANES DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF ME ON RWY 7 AND A CESSNA WAS TURNING FINAL FOR ONE OF THE PARALLEL 12 RWYS. I COULD NOT EASILY SEE OVER MY SHOULDER TO CHK FOR TFC ON RWY 12R AND SINCE TRYING TO STOP WOULD PLACE ME ON 1 AND POSSIBLY 2 ACTIVE RWYS WITH LNDG TFC, I PROCEEDED WITH A TKOF ROLL ON RWY 7 AS THE SAFEST OPTION. THE TWR CTLR STATED I HAD DEPARTED THE WRONG RWY ON CLBOUT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: 1) GND CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS OF RUN-UP AREA OF RWY 7 TO MY L. 2) PLT UNFAMILIAR WITH ARPT. 3) THE 2 ACFT IN RUN-UP AREA GAVE THE PERCEPTION OF THE CORRECT RWY. 4) USE OF MULTIPLE RWYS PLACED INCREASED DEMANDS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON PLTS AND CTLRS. 5) ENG ROUGHNESS AND XPONDER CODE GIVEN RIGHT AT DEP WERE DISTRACTIONS. 6) HIGH PERCEIVED ARPT TFC VOLUME BY TRANSIENT PLT. 7) PLT FATIGUE WAS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR AFFECTING JUDGEMENT AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. SHOULD HAVE QUERIED THE GND CTLR ABOUT A RWY CHANGE AFTER THE CTLR COMMENTS ABOUT RWY 7.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.