Narrative:

Our flight was approaching the memphis airport from the southeast and was being vectored for sequence and landing on runway 27 by the final approach controller. We were approximately 15 NM east of the field, level at 4000 ft MSL, and on a heading (radar vector) of 360 degrees which would take us through the runway 27 localizer to the north. Our traffic were 2 B727's which we had visual contact with. The first B727 was to our 9-10 O'clock position, approximately 7 mi east of the field, intercepting the runway 27 localizer from the northeast. The second B727 was at our 1-2 O'clock position approximately 20 mi from the field and northeast of the runway 27 localizer on a southwest heading of approximately 240 degrees. After we passed through the runway 27 localizer we were told to turn left to 300 des and that we were being sequenced between the 2 B727's for runway 27. We were then cleared to turn left to 240 degrees, descend to 3000 ft, intercept the localizer and to call the field in sight. Since I was hand flying the aircraft, I turned to 240 degrees and began descent from 4000 ft. I then heard the altitude warning horn sound and leveled off at approximately 3700 ft. I looked at the forward control panel and 4000 ft was still set in the altitude select window -- thus, the reason for the warning horn. Since I was flying the aircraft, it was the first officer's responsibility to set the new altitude in the altitude select window on the fcp, but since he had not done so, I asked him to confirm that we had been cleared to 3000 ft. He informed me that the B727 at our 1-2 O'clock position had 'also' taken our clearance and he wasn't sure if we had been cleared to 3000 ft. Because of the controller's continuous xmissions (no breaks in xmissions) to the other flts he was controling, my first officer was unable to even transmit to the controller. We were unable to confirm our clearance altitude and also the fact that the B727 had accepted our clearance. The controller then cleared the B727 to turn left to a heading of 160 degrees for his sequence to runway 27 and that he'd have a turn back towards the localizer momentarily. My first officer and I had maintained visual contact with the B727 and it was closing on our aircraft rather rapidly. As we glanced at our TCASII it rendered an RA to climb at 300 FPM, as the B727 was showing 300 ft below us and closing. I told my first officer that I had the B727 visually and before I could start a climb, the TCASII alerted us 'clear of conflict,' so I did not execute the evasive maneuver. The time between our TCASII RA and TCASII 'clear of conflict' was less than 3-4 seconds. We could see the B727 making his turn to 160 degrees, away from us, and that there was no real conflict. The B727 passed below and behind us. I was able to contact the controller and tell him we had visual contact with runway 27 as well as the first B727 which we were in trail of for the runway. The controller cleared us for a visual approach to runway 27 behind the company B727 and to contact the tower. Prior to my making this call, my first officer had been able to contact the controller to inform him we'd received an RA to climb, and his only response was 'roger.' after we contacted the control tower, we were cleared for the visual approach to runway 27 behind the company B727. I informed the tower controller that we were too close in trail of the B727 as well as too high and that I was making a missed approach and going around. He agreed with my call and gave us a heading of 360 degrees and 5000 ft and to contact departure control for vectors for resequencing to the airport. The safety of our flight was never in question only because we had maintained visual contact with the other aircraft at all times. There were several factors which led to this incident. The most prevalent was that the approach controller was overloaded with too many flts and because of his continuous xmissions (no breaks) no one else could transmit on the frequency. Another factor was the B727 accepting our flight's clearance. All too often this is an issue at memphis because of the many flts with very close arrival or departure times with very similar call signs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A310 FLC RECEIVES TCASII RA AND EXECUTES A GAR AFTER BEING SEQUENCED IN LNDG TFC.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS APCHING THE MEMPHIS ARPT FROM THE SE AND WAS BEING VECTORED FOR SEQUENCE AND LNDG ON RWY 27 BY THE FINAL APCH CTLR. WE WERE APPROX 15 NM E OF THE FIELD, LEVEL AT 4000 FT MSL, AND ON A HDG (RADAR VECTOR) OF 360 DEGS WHICH WOULD TAKE US THROUGH THE RWY 27 LOC TO THE N. OUR TFC WERE 2 B727'S WHICH WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH. THE FIRST B727 WAS TO OUR 9-10 O'CLOCK POS, APPROX 7 MI E OF THE FIELD, INTERCEPTING THE RWY 27 LOC FROM THE NE. THE SECOND B727 WAS AT OUR 1-2 O'CLOCK POS APPROX 20 MI FROM THE FIELD AND NE OF THE RWY 27 LOC ON A SW HDG OF APPROX 240 DEGS. AFTER WE PASSED THROUGH THE RWY 27 LOC WE WERE TOLD TO TURN L TO 300 DES AND THAT WE WERE BEING SEQUENCED BTWN THE 2 B727'S FOR RWY 27. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO TURN L TO 240 DEGS, DSND TO 3000 FT, INTERCEPT THE LOC AND TO CALL THE FIELD IN SIGHT. SINCE I WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT, I TURNED TO 240 DEGS AND BEGAN DSCNT FROM 4000 FT. I THEN HEARD THE ALT WARNING HORN SOUND AND LEVELED OFF AT APPROX 3700 FT. I LOOKED AT THE FORWARD CTL PANEL AND 4000 FT WAS STILL SET IN THE ALT SELECT WINDOW -- THUS, THE REASON FOR THE WARNING HORN. SINCE I WAS FLYING THE ACFT, IT WAS THE FO'S RESPONSIBILITY TO SET THE NEW ALT IN THE ALT SELECT WINDOW ON THE FCP, BUT SINCE HE HAD NOT DONE SO, I ASKED HIM TO CONFIRM THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 3000 FT. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE B727 AT OUR 1-2 O'CLOCK POS HAD 'ALSO' TAKEN OUR CLRNC AND HE WASN'T SURE IF WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 3000 FT. BECAUSE OF THE CTLR'S CONTINUOUS XMISSIONS (NO BREAKS IN XMISSIONS) TO THE OTHER FLTS HE WAS CTLING, MY FO WAS UNABLE TO EVEN XMIT TO THE CTLR. WE WERE UNABLE TO CONFIRM OUR CLRNC ALT AND ALSO THE FACT THAT THE B727 HAD ACCEPTED OUR CLRNC. THE CTLR THEN CLRED THE B727 TO TURN L TO A HDG OF 160 DEGS FOR HIS SEQUENCE TO RWY 27 AND THAT HE'D HAVE A TURN BACK TOWARDS THE LOC MOMENTARILY. MY FO AND I HAD MAINTAINED VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE B727 AND IT WAS CLOSING ON OUR ACFT RATHER RAPIDLY. AS WE GLANCED AT OUR TCASII IT RENDERED AN RA TO CLB AT 300 FPM, AS THE B727 WAS SHOWING 300 FT BELOW US AND CLOSING. I TOLD MY FO THAT I HAD THE B727 VISUALLY AND BEFORE I COULD START A CLB, THE TCASII ALERTED US 'CLR OF CONFLICT,' SO I DID NOT EXECUTE THE EVASIVE MANEUVER. THE TIME BTWN OUR TCASII RA AND TCASII 'CLR OF CONFLICT' WAS LESS THAN 3-4 SECONDS. WE COULD SEE THE B727 MAKING HIS TURN TO 160 DEGS, AWAY FROM US, AND THAT THERE WAS NO REAL CONFLICT. THE B727 PASSED BELOW AND BEHIND US. I WAS ABLE TO CONTACT THE CTLR AND TELL HIM WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH RWY 27 AS WELL AS THE FIRST B727 WHICH WE WERE IN TRAIL OF FOR THE RWY. THE CTLR CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27 BEHIND THE COMPANY B727 AND TO CONTACT THE TWR. PRIOR TO MY MAKING THIS CALL, MY FO HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONTACT THE CTLR TO INFORM HIM WE'D RECEIVED AN RA TO CLB, AND HIS ONLY RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER.' AFTER WE CONTACTED THE CTL TWR, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27 BEHIND THE COMPANY B727. I INFORMED THE TWR CTLR THAT WE WERE TOO CLOSE IN TRAIL OF THE B727 AS WELL AS TOO HIGH AND THAT I WAS MAKING A MISSED APCH AND GOING AROUND. HE AGREED WITH MY CALL AND GAVE US A HDG OF 360 DEGS AND 5000 FT AND TO CONTACT DEP CTL FOR VECTORS FOR RESEQUENCING TO THE ARPT. THE SAFETY OF OUR FLT WAS NEVER IN QUESTION ONLY BECAUSE WE HAD MAINTAINED VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE OTHER ACFT AT ALL TIMES. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH LED TO THIS INCIDENT. THE MOST PREVALENT WAS THAT THE APCH CTLR WAS OVERLOADED WITH TOO MANY FLTS AND BECAUSE OF HIS CONTINUOUS XMISSIONS (NO BREAKS) NO ONE ELSE COULD XMIT ON THE FREQ. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THE B727 ACCEPTING OUR FLT'S CLRNC. ALL TOO OFTEN THIS IS AN ISSUE AT MEMPHIS BECAUSE OF THE MANY FLTS WITH VERY CLOSE ARR OR DEP TIMES WITH VERY SIMILAR CALL SIGNS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.