Narrative:

The event occurred on the afternoon of apr/fri/02 at abq airport. I was charged with the duties of PF for this leg. The engines were started and we were cleared to taxi to runway 21. However, due to traffic dispatched from the airline terminal, our taxi instructions were vastly different from those we had used to get to FBO. The taxi instructions were 'taxi to runway 21 via left turn on taxiway G1, and right turn on taxiway east.' the PNF was collaborating with me to make sure that we were on the correct txwys and that we had direct or implied clearance through our taxi clearance to cross the 2 runways necessary to get to runway 21. After crossing runway 17, the PNF was then focused on checklist duties while I continued to taxi east on taxiway east. I had been aware that an air carrier B737 was squarely in the middle of the taxiway and facing west, a conflict that didn't make sense to me at the time. This should have alerted me to the possibility of loss of situational awareness but it did not. About that time, the PNF asked me to verify the flap and trim position which is a common and routine part of our before takeoff check. This distraction must have caused me to miss the runway markings that alert air crews of the existence of the runway entrance and I only stopped because of uncomfortable proximity to the previously mentioned air carrier B737 opposing us on the taxiway. Just as my situational awareness was becoming accurate and I was beginning to realize our proximity to runway 21, the tower called and informed us that we had indeed taxied beyond the hold short line. Looking onto the final approach, I saw an aircraft just beginning a turn from base to final as we resolved the conflict by taxiing across the active runway as instructed by the tower and repositioning on the other side. In retrospect, I am aware of many factors that can lead to such a breech of protocol. This is indeed one of those sits common in aviation where a slight error by an otherwise conscientious air crew can result in consequences disproportionately excessive and tragic by comparison to the degree of the mistake. The circumstances that led to this incident are common runway incursion events that I have read about. The crew was unfamiliar with the airport layout, there was a self-imposed rush to get the boss and his guests to the destination, there were distrs involved concerning inappropriately timed checklist execution, and, and the PF, I had developed inaccurate expectations of a longer taxi to the active runway which caused a loss of situational awareness.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE40 CREW, TAXIING FOR TKOF AT ABQ, TAXIED ACROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE.

Narrative: THE EVENT OCCURRED ON THE AFTERNOON OF APR/FRI/02 AT ABQ ARPT. I WAS CHARGED WITH THE DUTIES OF PF FOR THIS LEG. THE ENGS WERE STARTED AND WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 21. HOWEVER, DUE TO TFC DISPATCHED FROM THE AIRLINE TERMINAL, OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE WE HAD USED TO GET TO FBO. THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE 'TAXI TO RWY 21 VIA L TURN ON TXWY G1, AND R TURN ON TXWY E.' THE PNF WAS COLLABORATING WITH ME TO MAKE SURE THAT WE WERE ON THE CORRECT TXWYS AND THAT WE HAD DIRECT OR IMPLIED CLRNC THROUGH OUR TAXI CLRNC TO CROSS THE 2 RWYS NECESSARY TO GET TO RWY 21. AFTER XING RWY 17, THE PNF WAS THEN FOCUSED ON CHKLIST DUTIES WHILE I CONTINUED TO TAXI E ON TXWY E. I HAD BEEN AWARE THAT AN ACR B737 WAS SQUARELY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TXWY AND FACING W, A CONFLICT THAT DIDN'T MAKE SENSE TO ME AT THE TIME. THIS SHOULD HAVE ALERTED ME TO THE POSSIBILITY OF LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BUT IT DID NOT. ABOUT THAT TIME, THE PNF ASKED ME TO VERIFY THE FLAP AND TRIM POS WHICH IS A COMMON AND ROUTINE PART OF OUR BEFORE TKOF CHK. THIS DISTR MUST HAVE CAUSED ME TO MISS THE RWY MARKINGS THAT ALERT AIR CREWS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE RWY ENTRANCE AND I ONLY STOPPED BECAUSE OF UNCOMFORTABLE PROX TO THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED ACR B737 OPPOSING US ON THE TXWY. JUST AS MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS BECOMING ACCURATE AND I WAS BEGINNING TO REALIZE OUR PROX TO RWY 21, THE TWR CALLED AND INFORMED US THAT WE HAD INDEED TAXIED BEYOND THE HOLD SHORT LINE. LOOKING ONTO THE FINAL APCH, I SAW AN ACFT JUST BEGINNING A TURN FROM BASE TO FINAL AS WE RESOLVED THE CONFLICT BY TAXIING ACROSS THE ACTIVE RWY AS INSTRUCTED BY THE TWR AND REPOSITIONING ON THE OTHER SIDE. IN RETROSPECT, I AM AWARE OF MANY FACTORS THAT CAN LEAD TO SUCH A BREECH OF PROTOCOL. THIS IS INDEED ONE OF THOSE SITS COMMON IN AVIATION WHERE A SLIGHT ERROR BY AN OTHERWISE CONSCIENTIOUS AIR CREW CAN RESULT IN CONSEQUENCES DISPROPORTIONATELY EXCESSIVE AND TRAGIC BY COMPARISON TO THE DEGREE OF THE MISTAKE. THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THIS INCIDENT ARE COMMON RWY INCURSION EVENTS THAT I HAVE READ ABOUT. THE CREW WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT LAYOUT, THERE WAS A SELF-IMPOSED RUSH TO GET THE BOSS AND HIS GUESTS TO THE DEST, THERE WERE DISTRS INVOLVED CONCERNING INAPPROPRIATELY TIMED CHKLIST EXECUTION, AND, AND THE PF, I HAD DEVELOPED INACCURATE EXPECTATIONS OF A LONGER TAXI TO THE ACTIVE RWY WHICH CAUSED A LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.