Narrative:

Mar/thu/09. Flight XXX operations bos-lga. Flight pushed, started 1 engine and taxied out of the alley at terminal X bos. Got a straight short routing to runway 9 (taxiway K, taxiway west, cross runway 4L taxiway south). In the process to get checklists completed and the other engine started, the aircraft was not configured properly for takeoff. The crew did not pick this up until takeoff roll was begun and the throttles advanced and the takeoff warning was heard. Throttles were closed, aircraft had attained a modest taxi speed, the crew ascertained the flap handle was set in the wrong position and exited the runway at the first available taxiway. The flap handle was readjusted, a passenger PA was made, checklists completed and the flight got back in line and made an uneventful takeoff. Contributing factors: the B737-800 is a high workload aircraft during taxi out for the first officer (starting engines, initiating checklists, making PA's) and is a handful for even an experienced first officer. On this occasion, the first officer had 100 hours on the B737-800 and did not pick up the wrong position of the flaps. The captain was taxiing the aircraft with his head outside and was also busy. During the before takeoff checklist, the captain glanced inside and thought he saw the correct setting while taxiing onto the runway. Another contributing factor: operations fly the same route, take off on the same runway, taxi the same route every other hour, 15 segments a day. Complacency had to be fought. Conclusion: slow down. There is no need to hurry. Execute checklists properly and completely. The captain has to be aware of first officer's workload. Don't allow complacency and familiarity to let your guard down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 FLC ABORTED TKOF WHEN THE TKOF CONFIGN WARNING SOUNDED DURING START OF TKOF ROLL CAUSED BY THE FLAPS NOT SET TO TKOF SETTING.

Narrative: MAR/THU/09. FLT XXX OPS BOS-LGA. FLT PUSHED, STARTED 1 ENG AND TAXIED OUT OF THE ALLEY AT TERMINAL X BOS. GOT A STRAIGHT SHORT ROUTING TO RWY 9 (TXWY K, TXWY W, CROSS RWY 4L TXWY S). IN THE PROCESS TO GET CHKLISTS COMPLETED AND THE OTHER ENG STARTED, THE ACFT WAS NOT CONFIGURED PROPERLY FOR TKOF. THE CREW DID NOT PICK THIS UP UNTIL TKOF ROLL WAS BEGUN AND THE THROTTLES ADVANCED AND THE TKOF WARNING WAS HEARD. THROTTLES WERE CLOSED, ACFT HAD ATTAINED A MODEST TAXI SPD, THE CREW ASCERTAINED THE FLAP HANDLE WAS SET IN THE WRONG POS AND EXITED THE RWY AT THE FIRST AVAILABLE TXWY. THE FLAP HANDLE WAS READJUSTED, A PAX PA WAS MADE, CHKLISTS COMPLETED AND THE FLT GOT BACK IN LINE AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL TKOF. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE B737-800 IS A HIGH WORKLOAD ACFT DURING TAXI OUT FOR THE FO (STARTING ENGS, INITIATING CHKLISTS, MAKING PA'S) AND IS A HANDFUL FOR EVEN AN EXPERIENCED FO. ON THIS OCCASION, THE FO HAD 100 HRS ON THE B737-800 AND DID NOT PICK UP THE WRONG POS OF THE FLAPS. THE CAPT WAS TAXIING THE ACFT WITH HIS HEAD OUTSIDE AND WAS ALSO BUSY. DURING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, THE CAPT GLANCED INSIDE AND THOUGHT HE SAW THE CORRECT SETTING WHILE TAXIING ONTO THE RWY. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR: OPS FLY THE SAME RTE, TAKE OFF ON THE SAME RWY, TAXI THE SAME RTE EVERY OTHER HR, 15 SEGMENTS A DAY. COMPLACENCY HAD TO BE FOUGHT. CONCLUSION: SLOW DOWN. THERE IS NO NEED TO HURRY. EXECUTE CHKLISTS PROPERLY AND COMPLETELY. THE CAPT HAS TO BE AWARE OF FO'S WORKLOAD. DON'T ALLOW COMPLACENCY AND FAMILIARITY TO LET YOUR GUARD DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.