Narrative:

Descending on downwind in VMC conditions in the ord class B airspace, the captain had the speed brakes deployed. As the airplane started to level off, he closed the speed brakes. At that time, or close to it, we received a pitch trim inoperative warning on the EICAS. As per the appropriate checklist, we exercised the pitch trim switches, and discovered that the pitch trim had indeed failed. The pitch trim indicator was indicating up 4 degrees at the time of failure. Because we were in VMC conditions and the airplane had no pitch up or pitch down tendencies, we decided to continue on vectors for a visual approach. I was about halfway through the checklist when we came across the OM for a visual approach. Again because we had positive control of the airplane, in VMC conditions, and on about a 4 mi final with the trim failed in a suitable position for a normal landing, we decided to cease with the checklist and land the airplane. The landing was uneventful. Upon reaching the gate, we made the appropriate aircraft maintenance log entry. No emergency was ever declared. Although the PF cannot recall, we believe it is a possibility that at the time of speed brake retraction, he may have been trimming opposite to what the automatic trimming function was doing when the speed brakes were retracted, which could have caused a failure of one or both system. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated both the main electric trim actuator and the alternate trim actuator were inoperative and believes the actuators were replaced by maintenance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMBRAER 140 ON APCH AT 5000 FT HAD PITCH TRIM FAILURE WARNING. CREW DISCOVERED MAIN ELECTRIC AND ALTERNATE TRIM SYS FAILED.

Narrative: DSNDING ON DOWNWIND IN VMC CONDITIONS IN THE ORD CLASS B AIRSPACE, THE CAPT HAD THE SPD BRAKES DEPLOYED. AS THE AIRPLANE STARTED TO LEVEL OFF, HE CLOSED THE SPD BRAKES. AT THAT TIME, OR CLOSE TO IT, WE RECEIVED A PITCH TRIM INOP WARNING ON THE EICAS. AS PER THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST, WE EXERCISED THE PITCH TRIM SWITCHES, AND DISCOVERED THAT THE PITCH TRIM HAD INDEED FAILED. THE PITCH TRIM INDICATOR WAS INDICATING UP 4 DEGS AT THE TIME OF FAILURE. BECAUSE WE WERE IN VMC CONDITIONS AND THE AIRPLANE HAD NO PITCH UP OR PITCH DOWN TENDENCIES, WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE ON VECTORS FOR A VISUAL APCH. I WAS ABOUT HALFWAY THROUGH THE CHKLIST WHEN WE CAME ACROSS THE OM FOR A VISUAL APCH. AGAIN BECAUSE WE HAD POSITIVE CTL OF THE AIRPLANE, IN VMC CONDITIONS, AND ON ABOUT A 4 MI FINAL WITH THE TRIM FAILED IN A SUITABLE POS FOR A NORMAL LNDG, WE DECIDED TO CEASE WITH THE CHKLIST AND LAND THE AIRPLANE. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. UPON REACHING THE GATE, WE MADE THE APPROPRIATE ACFT MAINT LOG ENTRY. NO EMER WAS EVER DECLARED. ALTHOUGH THE PF CANNOT RECALL, WE BELIEVE IT IS A POSSIBILITY THAT AT THE TIME OF SPD BRAKE RETRACTION, HE MAY HAVE BEEN TRIMMING OPPOSITE TO WHAT THE AUTOMATIC TRIMMING FUNCTION WAS DOING WHEN THE SPD BRAKES WERE RETRACTED, WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED A FAILURE OF ONE OR BOTH SYS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED BOTH THE MAIN ELECTRIC TRIM ACTUATOR AND THE ALTERNATE TRIM ACTUATOR WERE INOP AND BELIEVES THE ACTUATORS WERE REPLACED BY MAINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.