Narrative:

Our aircraft had been cleared for ILS runway 22L at ewr. Ceiling was approximately 3500 ft broken and visibility was around 4 or 5 mi. We contacted the tower as instructed. The controller called out traffic as a 'VFR helicopter' to our left and low. The controller said the helicopter had us in sight, but we could not confirm that as the helicopter was on a different ATC frequency. We looked for the target, but did not see it and at that point it did not show on the TCASII. The tower cleared us to land on runway 22L. As we continued the approach, still looking for the helicopter with no contact (very distracting during a high workload time -- one pilot flying the approach and the other running the landing checklist), I noticed a target on the TCASII which was set to the '6 mi, below' setting. The target was to the left of our aircraft, showing about 400 ft below us and perhaps 1 mi away. I again tried to see the target, but still no joy, especially from the right seat trying to look below across to the other side of the plane. I called the TCASII traffic to the captain, who was flying. We concurred that it must be the helicopter, and continued the approach. A couple of seconds later, the TCASII emitted the aural 'traffic, traffic' TA alert. Still no contact with the helicopter. At this point, the TCASII showed the helicopter on a converging course with us. The captain decided to arrest the descent rate and leveled off at between 600-800 ft AGL. As we leveled off, the TCASII went into RA mode, first with 'monitor vertical speed' and almost immediately after 'climb, climb!' I remember looking at the TCASII and seeing the target depicted at 300 ft below us, and then, very briefly, at 200 ft below. The captain added power and initiated a climb. We gained around 200 ft and the helicopter passed behind us. The TCASII reported 'clear of conflict.' the captain elected to continue the approach and we landed uneventfully. I reported to the tower that 'we just had an RA with that helicopter.' the controller responded 'roger.' after blocking in at the gate, the captain and I discussed the incident. Neither one of us ever saw the traffic visually. He said that during the RA, as he started the climb, he was preparing to call for a go around, but the whole thing happened so fast and our altitude gain was minimal, so he elected to continue the landing. I agreed with that decision as ceiling and visibility were good and the runway was long. The approach after the RA had been slightly above glide path, but the landing was well within the touchdown zone. A go around could have been considered equally appropriate, as our company policy calls for approachs to be stabilized by 500 ft AGL in visual conditions. Still, I believe continuing the approach was correct. Stabilized approach concerns aside, the primary question remains, why was there a VFR helicopter flying up the final approach course of the primary runway at one of the busiest airports in the country? The captain and I asked that question to our assistant chief pilot, who promptly and quite correctly furrowed his brow and got the ewr tower supervisor on the speakerphone. The tower supervisor explained that the helicopter was flying up an established VFR corridor and 'had us in sight' the whole time. The tower chief also suggested that to avoid future similar incidents, flight crew's should put the TCASII in 'TA only' mode while flying approachs. This seems like a nonsensical solution -- what point would there be in having the TCASII system in the first place if we deliberately disable its primary function? It is inevitable that in congested airspace sits like the nyc area, aircraft will get 'too close for comfort' from time to time. The TCASII system is an excellent safety measure for these sits. To suggest purposely disabling the RA function defeats the purpose of having TCASII in the first place. Better coordination in the tower may have prevented the situation. The helicopter, transiting the airspace, was on one frequency and arrs and departures were on another. Perhaps the tower controllers could have worked more closely with each other to separate us. Even though the helicopter allegedly had visual contact with us, what if he was looking at the wrong airplane? Human factors played heavily in this incident. Also, it is my impression thatthe tower controllers may be relying too heavily on their radar displays to separate traffic. What looks like sufficient separation on a radar scope can often lead to sweaty palms in the cockpit. Radar scopes are the only thing available in IMC or reduced visibility conditions, but the WX was VMC. A reassuring 'I have you both in sight' from the controller would have indicated that he could see us both visually and relieving some anxiety in our aircraft. The controller may have in fact seen us both, but if he did, he never said so. Our own distraction with checklists and configuring for landing prevented us from devoting full attention to the 'see and avoid' mantra. In retrospect, I could have, as the PNF, queried the tower more aggressively regarding the position of the helicopter and the fact that we did not see him. The frequency was not busy so it would not have been difficult for me to ask. In the end, nobody got hurt and no metal was bent. Whether the VFR helicopter procedures need to be changed is a matter for ATC specialists to address. In the future, I'll be more aggressive in telling the controllers when I'm uncomfortable with traffic I can't see. And I'll definitely be leaving the TCASII in 'TA/RA.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 CREW AND VFR HELI HAD TCASII RA ABOUT 2 PT 5 MI FROM THE RWY END ON THE RWY 22L ILS AT EWR.

Narrative: OUR ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR ILS RWY 22L AT EWR. CEILING WAS APPROX 3500 FT BROKEN AND VISIBILITY WAS AROUND 4 OR 5 MI. WE CONTACTED THE TWR AS INSTRUCTED. THE CTLR CALLED OUT TFC AS A 'VFR HELI' TO OUR L AND LOW. THE CTLR SAID THE HELI HAD US IN SIGHT, BUT WE COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT AS THE HELI WAS ON A DIFFERENT ATC FREQ. WE LOOKED FOR THE TARGET, BUT DID NOT SEE IT AND AT THAT POINT IT DID NOT SHOW ON THE TCASII. THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 22L. AS WE CONTINUED THE APCH, STILL LOOKING FOR THE HELI WITH NO CONTACT (VERY DISTRACTING DURING A HIGH WORKLOAD TIME -- ONE PLT FLYING THE APCH AND THE OTHER RUNNING THE LNDG CHKLIST), I NOTICED A TARGET ON THE TCASII WHICH WAS SET TO THE '6 MI, BELOW' SETTING. THE TARGET WAS TO THE L OF OUR ACFT, SHOWING ABOUT 400 FT BELOW US AND PERHAPS 1 MI AWAY. I AGAIN TRIED TO SEE THE TARGET, BUT STILL NO JOY, ESPECIALLY FROM THE R SEAT TRYING TO LOOK BELOW ACROSS TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PLANE. I CALLED THE TCASII TFC TO THE CAPT, WHO WAS FLYING. WE CONCURRED THAT IT MUST BE THE HELI, AND CONTINUED THE APCH. A COUPLE OF SECONDS LATER, THE TCASII EMITTED THE AURAL 'TFC, TFC' TA ALERT. STILL NO CONTACT WITH THE HELI. AT THIS POINT, THE TCASII SHOWED THE HELI ON A CONVERGING COURSE WITH US. THE CAPT DECIDED TO ARREST THE DSCNT RATE AND LEVELED OFF AT BTWN 600-800 FT AGL. AS WE LEVELED OFF, THE TCASII WENT INTO RA MODE, FIRST WITH 'MONITOR VERT SPD' AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER 'CLB, CLB!' I REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE TCASII AND SEEING THE TARGET DEPICTED AT 300 FT BELOW US, AND THEN, VERY BRIEFLY, AT 200 FT BELOW. THE CAPT ADDED PWR AND INITIATED A CLB. WE GAINED AROUND 200 FT AND THE HELI PASSED BEHIND US. THE TCASII RPTED 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. I RPTED TO THE TWR THAT 'WE JUST HAD AN RA WITH THAT HELI.' THE CTLR RESPONDED 'ROGER.' AFTER BLOCKING IN AT THE GATE, THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT. NEITHER ONE OF US EVER SAW THE TFC VISUALLY. HE SAID THAT DURING THE RA, AS HE STARTED THE CLB, HE WAS PREPARING TO CALL FOR A GAR, BUT THE WHOLE THING HAPPENED SO FAST AND OUR ALT GAIN WAS MINIMAL, SO HE ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE LNDG. I AGREED WITH THAT DECISION AS CEILING AND VISIBILITY WERE GOOD AND THE RWY WAS LONG. THE APCH AFTER THE RA HAD BEEN SLIGHTLY ABOVE GLIDE PATH, BUT THE LNDG WAS WELL WITHIN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. A GAR COULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED EQUALLY APPROPRIATE, AS OUR COMPANY POLICY CALLS FOR APCHS TO BE STABILIZED BY 500 FT AGL IN VISUAL CONDITIONS. STILL, I BELIEVE CONTINUING THE APCH WAS CORRECT. STABILIZED APCH CONCERNS ASIDE, THE PRIMARY QUESTION REMAINS, WHY WAS THERE A VFR HELI FLYING UP THE FINAL APCH COURSE OF THE PRIMARY RWY AT ONE OF THE BUSIEST ARPTS IN THE COUNTRY? THE CAPT AND I ASKED THAT QUESTION TO OUR ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT, WHO PROMPTLY AND QUITE CORRECTLY FURROWED HIS BROW AND GOT THE EWR TWR SUPVR ON THE SPEAKERPHONE. THE TWR SUPVR EXPLAINED THAT THE HELI WAS FLYING UP AN ESTABLISHED VFR CORRIDOR AND 'HAD US IN SIGHT' THE WHOLE TIME. THE TWR CHIEF ALSO SUGGESTED THAT TO AVOID FUTURE SIMILAR INCIDENTS, FLC'S SHOULD PUT THE TCASII IN 'TA ONLY' MODE WHILE FLYING APCHS. THIS SEEMS LIKE A NONSENSICAL SOLUTION -- WHAT POINT WOULD THERE BE IN HAVING THE TCASII SYS IN THE FIRST PLACE IF WE DELIBERATELY DISABLE ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION? IT IS INEVITABLE THAT IN CONGESTED AIRSPACE SITS LIKE THE NYC AREA, ACFT WILL GET 'TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT' FROM TIME TO TIME. THE TCASII SYS IS AN EXCELLENT SAFETY MEASURE FOR THESE SITS. TO SUGGEST PURPOSELY DISABLING THE RA FUNCTION DEFEATS THE PURPOSE OF HAVING TCASII IN THE FIRST PLACE. BETTER COORD IN THE TWR MAY HAVE PREVENTED THE SIT. THE HELI, TRANSITING THE AIRSPACE, WAS ON ONE FREQ AND ARRS AND DEPS WERE ON ANOTHER. PERHAPS THE TWR CTLRS COULD HAVE WORKED MORE CLOSELY WITH EACH OTHER TO SEPARATE US. EVEN THOUGH THE HELI ALLEGEDLY HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH US, WHAT IF HE WAS LOOKING AT THE WRONG AIRPLANE? HUMAN FACTORS PLAYED HEAVILY IN THIS INCIDENT. ALSO, IT IS MY IMPRESSION THATTHE TWR CTLRS MAY BE RELYING TOO HEAVILY ON THEIR RADAR DISPLAYS TO SEPARATE TFC. WHAT LOOKS LIKE SUFFICIENT SEPARATION ON A RADAR SCOPE CAN OFTEN LEAD TO SWEATY PALMS IN THE COCKPIT. RADAR SCOPES ARE THE ONLY THING AVAILABLE IN IMC OR REDUCED VISIBILITY CONDITIONS, BUT THE WX WAS VMC. A REASSURING 'I HAVE YOU BOTH IN SIGHT' FROM THE CTLR WOULD HAVE INDICATED THAT HE COULD SEE US BOTH VISUALLY AND RELIEVING SOME ANXIETY IN OUR ACFT. THE CTLR MAY HAVE IN FACT SEEN US BOTH, BUT IF HE DID, HE NEVER SAID SO. OUR OWN DISTR WITH CHKLISTS AND CONFIGURING FOR LNDG PREVENTED US FROM DEVOTING FULL ATTN TO THE 'SEE AND AVOID' MANTRA. IN RETROSPECT, I COULD HAVE, AS THE PNF, QUERIED THE TWR MORE AGGRESSIVELY REGARDING THE POS OF THE HELI AND THE FACT THAT WE DID NOT SEE HIM. THE FREQ WAS NOT BUSY SO IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR ME TO ASK. IN THE END, NOBODY GOT HURT AND NO METAL WAS BENT. WHETHER THE VFR HELI PROCS NEED TO BE CHANGED IS A MATTER FOR ATC SPECIALISTS TO ADDRESS. IN THE FUTURE, I'LL BE MORE AGGRESSIVE IN TELLING THE CTLRS WHEN I'M UNCOMFORTABLE WITH TFC I CAN'T SEE. AND I'LL DEFINITELY BE LEAVING THE TCASII IN 'TA/RA.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.