Narrative:

In preparation for the flight, I filed a flight plan from the airport to the ZZZ intersection where I thought we could pick up J-211 which is in cleveland center airspace, and from there, direct to our destination. When my co-captain called the clearance delivery frequency, he received no answer. During taxi out to the runway, he called repeatedly, and no answer was received. We sat at the end of the runway, and after repeated calls, still received no response. Since the WX was good we decided to take off VFR and pick up our clearance from the ZZZ2 approach control after departure. The first officer called ZZZ2 approach and once again received no response. ZZZ airport is outside of ZZZ2 airspace, and we were heading away from ZZZ2 so we knew before departure that we wouldn't enter their airspace, but evidently to us, they do control the airspace over ZZZ. I climbed the aircraft to 6500 ft and leveled there to try to stay away from inbound and outbound traffic from ZZZ2. We started flying down toward ZZZ1 intersection while continuing to attempt contact with ZZZ2 approach without results. He tried the clearance frequency again. This time, someone replied that we should switch to a frequency he then issued. That frequency was selected and called. The controller said we were outside of his airspace, and told us to call ZZZ3 approach on a frequency. The controller who answered identified himself as a ZZZ4 center controller. He then told us that we were entering 'P40.' he told us to turn left or right 90 degrees. After that, we eventually got our clearance, along with an admonishment. The controller then told us that someone would be contacting us when we got back on the ground. Several things led to this mistake on my part. I had used the high altitude chart for planning our route, and P40 and R-4009 do not appear on this chart. Nor, is there any reason they should, I suppose, since the top of R-4009 is 12500 ft, and the high altitude chart is for 18000 ft and above. The ZZZ4 center controller, it should be noted, was in error when he stated that we had entered P40. Since we were at 6500 ft MSL, if we did indeed enter the charted circle, it was in R-4009. In addition, ZZZ1 intersection is inside P40 or R-4009. My error then, was in not checking the low altitude chart. I had expected, of course to pick up our clearance on the ground, or at least, above the airport. I certainly accept responsibility for my error, but also, wouldn't it have been reasonable for the ZZZ2 approach controller that we talked to, despite the fact that we were outside his airspace, since he did get us in radar contact, and since we were so close to that airspace, to take ten seconds to inform us and give us at least a suggested heading to avoid it? During my preflight briefing, why was there no mention of the clearance and overlying airspace frequencies being inoperative, or unmonitored? There were no NOTAMS issued or published. I believe that this information is indeed critical to safety of flight. Since this occurrence, we have decided to make some operational changes. First, at uncontrolled, unfamiliar airports, we will always get our clearance on the ground. This will eliminate the pressure to take off VFR and pick up the clearance in the air. Also, if there is a communication problem, we can go in and get clearance by telephone without having to go through a shutdown, and restart procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTT CREW WAS UNABLE TO ESTABLISH CTLR COM PRIOR TO TKOF AT AN UNCONTROLLED ARPT. THEY TOOK OFF ANYWAY AND BLUNDERED INTO RESTR AIRSPACE.

Narrative: IN PREPARATION FOR THE FLT, I FILED A FLT PLAN FROM THE ARPT TO THE ZZZ INTERSECTION WHERE I THOUGHT WE COULD PICK UP J-211 WHICH IS IN CLEVELAND CTR AIRSPACE, AND FROM THERE, DIRECT TO OUR DEST. WHEN MY CO-CAPT CALLED THE CLRNC DELIVERY FREQ, HE RECEIVED NO ANSWER. DURING TAXI OUT TO THE RWY, HE CALLED REPEATEDLY, AND NO ANSWER WAS RECEIVED. WE SAT AT THE END OF THE RWY, AND AFTER REPEATED CALLS, STILL RECEIVED NO RESPONSE. SINCE THE WX WAS GOOD WE DECIDED TO TAKE OFF VFR AND PICK UP OUR CLRNC FROM THE ZZZ2 APCH CTL AFTER DEP. THE FO CALLED ZZZ2 APCH AND ONCE AGAIN RECEIVED NO RESPONSE. ZZZ ARPT IS OUTSIDE OF ZZZ2 AIRSPACE, AND WE WERE HEADING AWAY FROM ZZZ2 SO WE KNEW BEFORE DEP THAT WE WOULDN'T ENTER THEIR AIRSPACE, BUT EVIDENTLY TO US, THEY DO CTL THE AIRSPACE OVER ZZZ. I CLIMBED THE ACFT TO 6500 FT AND LEVELED THERE TO TRY TO STAY AWAY FROM INBOUND AND OUTBOUND TFC FROM ZZZ2. WE STARTED FLYING DOWN TOWARD ZZZ1 INTERSECTION WHILE CONTINUING TO ATTEMPT CONTACT WITH ZZZ2 APCH WITHOUT RESULTS. HE TRIED THE CLRNC FREQ AGAIN. THIS TIME, SOMEONE REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD SWITCH TO A FREQ HE THEN ISSUED. THAT FREQ WAS SELECTED AND CALLED. THE CTLR SAID WE WERE OUTSIDE OF HIS AIRSPACE, AND TOLD US TO CALL ZZZ3 APCH ON A FREQ. THE CTLR WHO ANSWERED IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS A ZZZ4 CTR CTLR. HE THEN TOLD US THAT WE WERE ENTERING 'P40.' HE TOLD US TO TURN L OR R 90 DEGS. AFTER THAT, WE EVENTUALLY GOT OUR CLRNC, ALONG WITH AN ADMONISHMENT. THE CTLR THEN TOLD US THAT SOMEONE WOULD BE CONTACTING US WHEN WE GOT BACK ON THE GND. SEVERAL THINGS LED TO THIS MISTAKE ON MY PART. I HAD USED THE HIGH ALTITUDE CHART FOR PLANNING OUR RTE, AND P40 AND R-4009 DO NOT APPEAR ON THIS CHART. NOR, IS THERE ANY REASON THEY SHOULD, I SUPPOSE, SINCE THE TOP OF R-4009 IS 12500 FT, AND THE HIGH ALTITUDE CHART IS FOR 18000 FT AND ABOVE. THE ZZZ4 CTR CTLR, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, WAS IN ERROR WHEN HE STATED THAT WE HAD ENTERED P40. SINCE WE WERE AT 6500 FT MSL, IF WE DID INDEED ENTER THE CHARTED CIRCLE, IT WAS IN R-4009. IN ADDITION, ZZZ1 INTERSECTION IS INSIDE P40 OR R-4009. MY ERROR THEN, WAS IN NOT CHKING THE LOW ALTITUDE CHART. I HAD EXPECTED, OF COURSE TO PICK UP OUR CLRNC ON THE GND, OR AT LEAST, ABOVE THE ARPT. I CERTAINLY ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY ERROR, BUT ALSO, WOULDN'T IT HAVE BEEN REASONABLE FOR THE ZZZ2 APCH CTLR THAT WE TALKED TO, DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE WERE OUTSIDE HIS AIRSPACE, SINCE HE DID GET US IN RADAR CONTACT, AND SINCE WE WERE SO CLOSE TO THAT AIRSPACE, TO TAKE TEN SECONDS TO INFORM US AND GIVE US AT LEAST A SUGGESTED HEADING TO AVOID IT? DURING MY PREFLT BRIEFING, WHY WAS THERE NO MENTION OF THE CLRNC AND OVERLYING AIRSPACE FREQUENCIES BEING INOPERATIVE, OR UNMONITORED? THERE WERE NO NOTAMS ISSUED OR PUBLISHED. I BELIEVE THAT THIS INFO IS INDEED CRITICAL TO SAFETY OF FLT. SINCE THIS OCCURRENCE, WE HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE SOME OPERATIONAL CHANGES. FIRST, AT UNCONTROLLED, UNFAMILIAR ARPTS, WE WILL ALWAYS GET OUR CLRNC ON THE GND. THIS WILL ELIMINATE THE PRESSURE TO TAKE OFF VFR AND PICK UP THE CLRNC IN THE AIR. ALSO, IF THERE IS A COM PROB, WE CAN GO IN AND GET CLRNC BY TELEPHONE WITHOUT HAVING TO GO THROUGH A SHUTDOWN, AND RESTART PROC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.