Narrative:

Air carrier X in ZZZ for a scheduled B2 check. The l-hand inboard aft flap lower bonded skin was found delaminated at the outboard end from the spar aft 7.25 inches and 4 inches inboard from the edge. This area of delamination is in the critical area as defined by srm and the air carrier X general process manual 6-0-2-49. This damage was repaired as described in air carrier X gnmm 1-0-1-24 with the notation in the aircraft electronic logbook that the repair was out of limits per the preceding specification and needed air carrier X engineering support to be approved. Air carrier X engineering provided information in conflict with the current air carrier X maintenance procedures published by air carrier X. The result is that the aircraft was not repaired in compliance with approved information as required per far part 43 and part 121. I was required to accomplish the work of this repair by the on-duty foreman at ZZZ1 and did so with the understanding that air carrier X engineering would provide approved engineering variation authority/authorized or that the aircraft would be ferried non-revenue to a location capable of doing the repairs per approved specifications. This was not accomplished and a technically unairworthy aircraft was released by the station maintenance manager. This is a very common problem and I previously addressed the problem with management knowing that I would eventually be forced to accomplish this type repair. Specifically, damage larger than allowed for injection repair and damage in critical area not allowed to be repaired per the standard repair, ie, gnmm 1-0-1-24 injection.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH AN UNAPPROVED REPAIR ACCOMPLISHED TO THE L INBOARD TRAILING EDGE FLAP LOWER SKIN.

Narrative: ACR X IN ZZZ FOR A SCHEDULED B2 CHK. THE L-HAND INBOARD AFT FLAP LOWER BONDED SKIN WAS FOUND DELAMINATED AT THE OUTBOARD END FROM THE SPAR AFT 7.25 INCHES AND 4 INCHES INBOARD FROM THE EDGE. THIS AREA OF DELAMINATION IS IN THE CRITICAL AREA AS DEFINED BY SRM AND THE ACR X GENERAL PROCESS MANUAL 6-0-2-49. THIS DAMAGE WAS REPAIRED AS DESCRIBED IN ACR X GNMM 1-0-1-24 WITH THE NOTATION IN THE ACFT ELECTRONIC LOGBOOK THAT THE REPAIR WAS OUT OF LIMITS PER THE PRECEDING SPEC AND NEEDED ACR X ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO BE APPROVED. ACR X ENGINEERING PROVIDED INFO IN CONFLICT WITH THE CURRENT ACR X MAINT PROCS PUBLISHED BY ACR X. THE RESULT IS THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT REPAIRED IN COMPLIANCE WITH APPROVED INFO AS REQUIRED PER FAR PART 43 AND PART 121. I WAS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH THE WORK OF THIS REPAIR BY THE ON-DUTY FOREMAN AT ZZZ1 AND DID SO WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ACR X ENGINEERING WOULD PROVIDE APPROVED ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH OR THAT THE ACFT WOULD BE FERRIED NON-REVENUE TO A LOCATION CAPABLE OF DOING THE REPAIRS PER APPROVED SPECS. THIS WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED AND A TECHNICALLY UNAIRWORTHY ACFT WAS RELEASED BY THE STATION MAINT MGR. THIS IS A VERY COMMON PROB AND I PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED THE PROB WITH MGMNT KNOWING THAT I WOULD EVENTUALLY BE FORCED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TYPE REPAIR. SPECIFICALLY, DAMAGE LARGER THAN ALLOWED FOR INJECTION REPAIR AND DAMAGE IN CRITICAL AREA NOT ALLOWED TO BE REPAIRED PER THE STANDARD REPAIR, IE, GNMM 1-0-1-24 INJECTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.