Narrative:

I am an a&P mechanic working for air carrier X airlines. Aircraft X came to ZZZ feb/sat/02 for a k-chk. While accomplishing the lube job on the horizontal jack screw for the stabilizer, a technician observed what he thought was wear on the screw assembly of the jack screw. He made a write-up for that suspected problem. The plane stayed on the ground until feb/mon/02 when maintenance manager approached me to go and evaluate the problem. The reason I was approached was that while I have been employed at air carrier X, I became a shop trained [designated inspector] for the B737 horizontal stabilizer jack screw. ZZZ management supplied me with an authority/authorized shop joint document manual to inspect the jack screw personally. I inspected the jack screw and found it to be svcable. I informed air carrier X, ZZZ manager and ZZZ foreman that I found jack screw to be svcable per ZZZ shop joint document, but that I was unable to release the jack screw back into service because my qualification as a designated inspector was moved in my training records to an inactive file. A shop joint document is not an approved manual for a line mechanic to sign off a write-up with. After some consultation, ZZZ management came to the conclusion that my dst qualification would be moved to an active file and that I could sign off the jack screw problem. I signed off the jack screw and went home with the assurance that everything would be handled. I later found out local ZZZ management did not activate my qualification, therefore, making me not legal to release the jack screw back into service using a shop joint document since I am a line mechanic. I feel I was deceived by air carrier X ZZZ management in order to get a plane back into service. I feel the jack screw is svcable per air carrier X joint document.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 WAS RETURNED TO SVC IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HORIZ STABILIZER JACK SCREW INSPECTION MADE BY AN UNQUALIFIED TECHNICIAN.

Narrative: I AM AN A&P MECH WORKING FOR ACR X AIRLINES. ACFT X CAME TO ZZZ FEB/SAT/02 FOR A K-CHK. WHILE ACCOMPLISHING THE LUBE JOB ON THE HORIZ JACK SCREW FOR THE STABILIZER, A TECHNICIAN OBSERVED WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS WEAR ON THE SCREW ASSEMBLY OF THE JACK SCREW. HE MADE A WRITE-UP FOR THAT SUSPECTED PROB. THE PLANE STAYED ON THE GND UNTIL FEB/MON/02 WHEN MAINT MGR APCHED ME TO GO AND EVALUATE THE PROB. THE REASON I WAS APCHED WAS THAT WHILE I HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED AT ACR X, I BECAME A SHOP TRAINED [DESIGNATED INSPECTOR] FOR THE B737 HORIZ STABILIZER JACK SCREW. ZZZ MGMNT SUPPLIED ME WITH AN AUTH SHOP JOINT DOCUMENT MANUAL TO INSPECT THE JACK SCREW PERSONALLY. I INSPECTED THE JACK SCREW AND FOUND IT TO BE SVCABLE. I INFORMED ACR X, ZZZ MGR AND ZZZ FOREMAN THAT I FOUND JACK SCREW TO BE SVCABLE PER ZZZ SHOP JOINT DOCUMENT, BUT THAT I WAS UNABLE TO RELEASE THE JACK SCREW BACK INTO SVC BECAUSE MY QUALIFICATION AS A DESIGNATED INSPECTOR WAS MOVED IN MY TRAINING RECORDS TO AN INACTIVE FILE. A SHOP JOINT DOCUMENT IS NOT AN APPROVED MANUAL FOR A LINE MECH TO SIGN OFF A WRITE-UP WITH. AFTER SOME CONSULTATION, ZZZ MGMNT CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT MY DST QUALIFICATION WOULD BE MOVED TO AN ACTIVE FILE AND THAT I COULD SIGN OFF THE JACK SCREW PROB. I SIGNED OFF THE JACK SCREW AND WENT HOME WITH THE ASSURANCE THAT EVERYTHING WOULD BE HANDLED. I LATER FOUND OUT LCL ZZZ MGMNT DID NOT ACTIVATE MY QUALIFICATION, THEREFORE, MAKING ME NOT LEGAL TO RELEASE THE JACK SCREW BACK INTO SVC USING A SHOP JOINT DOCUMENT SINCE I AM A LINE MECH. I FEEL I WAS DECEIVED BY ACR X ZZZ MGMNT IN ORDER TO GET A PLANE BACK INTO SVC. I FEEL THE JACK SCREW IS SVCABLE PER ACR X JOINT DOCUMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.