Narrative:

We departed pdx on the river 6 departure, cleared by pdx departure to 15000 ft. While on a radar vector of 030 degrees, cleared to intercept J-16, then as filed. As the PNF, I loaded an intercept leg to PDT into the FMS. The predicted new course did not exactly line up with the loaded course on the HSI. I executed it and armed the LNAV. The captain intercepted that LNAV course. I looked at the map to confirm the right course into PDT and re-input that into the FMS. I told the captain that the actual airway was now a little to the left. He then got out his map and manually tuned his VHF navigation radio to btg and course outbound and selected VOR on his HSI to confirm this information. We then got an altitude warning. The captain immediately recovered the aircraft to 15000 ft. The aircraft reached a peak altitude of 15700 ft during the recovery. Pdx departure said nothing about the deviation to us. Contributing factors: while I had my map out and loading the FMS I did not make the required 1000 ft below our assigned altitude callout. 2 pilots navigating at the same time. We both had our maps out and up, looking at them. No one concentrating solely on flying the aircraft. The captain should have continued to fly the aircraft and I should have been the one tuning the VHF navigation radio to confirm the FMS course. The other was that we were using normal climb power instead of climb 2 power to try to climb quickly out of the turbulence we encountered below 10000 ft. Our vertical velocity was in excess of 4000 FPM. That was why it took so long to stop the climb and recover. With both of us heads down navigating we let the aircraft get away from us.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 FLT OVERSHOOTS THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WHILE BOTH PLTS ARE CHKING THEIR CHARTS FOR A POSSIBLE COURSE ERROR IN THEIR FMC ON A RIVER 6 DEP FROM PDX, OR.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED PDX ON THE RIVER 6 DEP, CLRED BY PDX DEP TO 15000 FT. WHILE ON A RADAR VECTOR OF 030 DEGS, CLRED TO INTERCEPT J-16, THEN AS FILED. AS THE PNF, I LOADED AN INTERCEPT LEG TO PDT INTO THE FMS. THE PREDICTED NEW COURSE DID NOT EXACTLY LINE UP WITH THE LOADED COURSE ON THE HSI. I EXECUTED IT AND ARMED THE LNAV. THE CAPT INTERCEPTED THAT LNAV COURSE. I LOOKED AT THE MAP TO CONFIRM THE RIGHT COURSE INTO PDT AND RE-INPUT THAT INTO THE FMS. I TOLD THE CAPT THAT THE ACTUAL AIRWAY WAS NOW A LITTLE TO THE L. HE THEN GOT OUT HIS MAP AND MANUALLY TUNED HIS VHF NAV RADIO TO BTG AND COURSE OUTBOUND AND SELECTED VOR ON HIS HSI TO CONFIRM THIS INFO. WE THEN GOT AN ALT WARNING. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY RECOVERED THE ACFT TO 15000 FT. THE ACFT REACHED A PEAK ALT OF 15700 FT DURING THE RECOVERY. PDX DEP SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE DEV TO US. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: WHILE I HAD MY MAP OUT AND LOADING THE FMS I DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED 1000 FT BELOW OUR ASSIGNED ALT CALLOUT. 2 PLTS NAVING AT THE SAME TIME. WE BOTH HAD OUR MAPS OUT AND UP, LOOKING AT THEM. NO ONE CONCENTRATING SOLELY ON FLYING THE ACFT. THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT AND I SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE ONE TUNING THE VHF NAV RADIO TO CONFIRM THE FMS COURSE. THE OTHER WAS THAT WE WERE USING NORMAL CLB PWR INSTEAD OF CLB 2 PWR TO TRY TO CLB QUICKLY OUT OF THE TURB WE ENCOUNTERED BELOW 10000 FT. OUR VERTICAL VELOCITY WAS IN EXCESS OF 4000 FPM. THAT WAS WHY IT TOOK SO LONG TO STOP THE CLB AND RECOVER. WITH BOTH OF US HEADS DOWN NAVING WE LET THE ACFT GET AWAY FROM US.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.