Narrative:

I was told by jacksonville approach to expect the ILS runway 32 approach. Jacksonville approach vectored me to the ILS runway 32 approach. I was cleared ILS 32 approach and told to contact the tower at craig field. I contacted the tower. I came out of the clouds about 1300 ft MSL and made the tower aware that I had a visual. Tower told me to contact 2 mi final for runway 32. I called tower and informed 2 mi out. Tower came on frequency, gave my callsign, hesitated and replied 'enter right downwind for runway 5.' approximately 1 min, if that, tower changed and said 'enter right downwind for runway 23.' at this point it was the third last min change. I have been in a couple of times but not very familiar, all these changes made it very confusing. They let me descend to about 600 ft MSL before changing their mind. I still continued on in a climb -- I had not crossed over runway 23 yet to enter downwind. Over the numbers 23, tower called and said 'turn right.' I just got a visual on another aircraft in right downwind for runway 23, so I turned left and climbed immediately, called tower and told them I was deviating left for traffic. Tower replied 'ok, just follow that aircraft in on right downwind for runway 23,' as if it was no big deal that he almost turned me into the aircraft. I landed shaken up. I contacted ground and taxied about 30 ft onto the ramp. I told ground I was taxiing to ramp. I thought he ok'ed it, but he was talking to another aircraft. I realize I should have confirmed with ground. 2 hours later, after moving my aircraft, the tower contacted me by telephone and informed me that I had 2 violations for not entering a right downwind for runway 23 immediately, which I found impossible to do under normal circumstances. I feel very upset over this incident. I think this could have been avoided if there had been a little more separation of aircraft and tower would understand that a pilot changing from landing confign to a climb, while trying to change 3 different approachs, is just too much. I don't feel like I came up short on my end. I studied the approachs and airport information. I prepared for the approach and getting there it seemed like a fly by the seat of your pants type operation. Supplemental information from acn 536732: I was doing touch-and-goes with my commercial student under the control of craig tower in r-hand closed traffic for runway 23. After reporting our position, my student inaccurately reported we were 'past midfield for touch-and-go.' we were actually further downwind 'past the numbers.' we idented a C210 flying at our altitude no more than 1/4 mi from us, flying perpendicular to our flight path. I had heard no mention of any aircraft to fly a pattern for runway 14 and craig had been landing runway 23 all morning. We also received no TA. He made no indication of visual contact with us, nor any hint of a change in course. Tower frequency was too congested with calls to ask for clarification of the traffic, so I had to decide on evasive action. I applied full power to overshoot him. We missed by around 400 ft. We made a full stop and contacted tower for clarification of the traffic. We found out that the traffic was approaching from the south, that had been instructed to make a right turn to enter the left downwind for runway 23. The tower controller had also explained that this pilot individual routinely gave them trouble in the air. This could have been prevented had the tower provided an advisory that he had an aircraft that would be crossing my flight path. My student should have reported more accurately his position. I corrected my student's habit of inaccurately reporting his position in the pattern. Collision avoidance is always the responsibility of the pilots, but perhaps we got too lax in the traffic pattern of a twred airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC IN CTLED TFC PATTERN AT CRG BY A CARGO C210 AND A C172 IN CLOSED PATTERN MAKING TOUCH-AND-GO TKOF AND LNDGS. EACH ACFT OBSERVED THE OTHER AND TOOK EVASIVE ACTION.

Narrative: I WAS TOLD BY JACKSONVILLE APCH TO EXPECT THE ILS RWY 32 APCH. JACKSONVILLE APCH VECTORED ME TO THE ILS RWY 32 APCH. I WAS CLRED ILS 32 APCH AND TOLD TO CONTACT THE TWR AT CRAIG FIELD. I CONTACTED THE TWR. I CAME OUT OF THE CLOUDS ABOUT 1300 FT MSL AND MADE THE TWR AWARE THAT I HAD A VISUAL. TWR TOLD ME TO CONTACT 2 MI FINAL FOR RWY 32. I CALLED TWR AND INFORMED 2 MI OUT. TWR CAME ON FREQ, GAVE MY CALLSIGN, HESITATED AND REPLIED 'ENTER R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 5.' APPROX 1 MIN, IF THAT, TWR CHANGED AND SAID 'ENTER R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 23.' AT THIS POINT IT WAS THE THIRD LAST MIN CHANGE. I HAVE BEEN IN A COUPLE OF TIMES BUT NOT VERY FAMILIAR, ALL THESE CHANGES MADE IT VERY CONFUSING. THEY LET ME DSND TO ABOUT 600 FT MSL BEFORE CHANGING THEIR MIND. I STILL CONTINUED ON IN A CLB -- I HAD NOT CROSSED OVER RWY 23 YET TO ENTER DOWNWIND. OVER THE NUMBERS 23, TWR CALLED AND SAID 'TURN R.' I JUST GOT A VISUAL ON ANOTHER ACFT IN R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 23, SO I TURNED L AND CLBED IMMEDIATELY, CALLED TWR AND TOLD THEM I WAS DEVIATING L FOR TFC. TWR REPLIED 'OK, JUST FOLLOW THAT ACFT IN ON R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 23,' AS IF IT WAS NO BIG DEAL THAT HE ALMOST TURNED ME INTO THE ACFT. I LANDED SHAKEN UP. I CONTACTED GND AND TAXIED ABOUT 30 FT ONTO THE RAMP. I TOLD GND I WAS TAXIING TO RAMP. I THOUGHT HE OK'ED IT, BUT HE WAS TALKING TO ANOTHER ACFT. I REALIZE I SHOULD HAVE CONFIRMED WITH GND. 2 HRS LATER, AFTER MOVING MY ACFT, THE TWR CONTACTED ME BY TELEPHONE AND INFORMED ME THAT I HAD 2 VIOLATIONS FOR NOT ENTERING A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 23 IMMEDIATELY, WHICH I FOUND IMPOSSIBLE TO DO UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. I FEEL VERY UPSET OVER THIS INCIDENT. I THINK THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THERE HAD BEEN A LITTLE MORE SEPARATION OF ACFT AND TWR WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT A PLT CHANGING FROM LNDG CONFIGN TO A CLB, WHILE TRYING TO CHANGE 3 DIFFERENT APCHS, IS JUST TOO MUCH. I DON'T FEEL LIKE I CAME UP SHORT ON MY END. I STUDIED THE APCHS AND ARPT INFO. I PREPARED FOR THE APCH AND GETTING THERE IT SEEMED LIKE A FLY BY THE SEAT OF YOUR PANTS TYPE OP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 536732: I WAS DOING TOUCH-AND-GOES WITH MY COMMERCIAL STUDENT UNDER THE CTL OF CRAIG TWR IN R-HAND CLOSED TFC FOR RWY 23. AFTER RPTING OUR POS, MY STUDENT INACCURATELY RPTED WE WERE 'PAST MIDFIELD FOR TOUCH-AND-GO.' WE WERE ACTUALLY FURTHER DOWNWIND 'PAST THE NUMBERS.' WE IDENTED A C210 FLYING AT OUR ALT NO MORE THAN 1/4 MI FROM US, FLYING PERPENDICULAR TO OUR FLT PATH. I HAD HEARD NO MENTION OF ANY ACFT TO FLY A PATTERN FOR RWY 14 AND CRAIG HAD BEEN LNDG RWY 23 ALL MORNING. WE ALSO RECEIVED NO TA. HE MADE NO INDICATION OF VISUAL CONTACT WITH US, NOR ANY HINT OF A CHANGE IN COURSE. TWR FREQ WAS TOO CONGESTED WITH CALLS TO ASK FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE TFC, SO I HAD TO DECIDE ON EVASIVE ACTION. I APPLIED FULL PWR TO OVERSHOOT HIM. WE MISSED BY AROUND 400 FT. WE MADE A FULL STOP AND CONTACTED TWR FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE TFC. WE FOUND OUT THAT THE TFC WAS APCHING FROM THE S, THAT HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A R TURN TO ENTER THE L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 23. THE TWR CTLR HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THIS PLT INDIVIDUAL ROUTINELY GAVE THEM TROUBLE IN THE AIR. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD THE TWR PROVIDED AN ADVISORY THAT HE HAD AN ACFT THAT WOULD BE XING MY FLT PATH. MY STUDENT SHOULD HAVE RPTED MORE ACCURATELY HIS POS. I CORRECTED MY STUDENT'S HABIT OF INACCURATELY RPTING HIS POS IN THE PATTERN. COLLISION AVOIDANCE IS ALWAYS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PLTS, BUT PERHAPS WE GOT TOO LAX IN THE TFC PATTERN OF A TWRED ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.