Narrative:

After departing fat, we were cleared direct to sfo. The flight was uneventful until we contacted the local approach controllers. After a few turns and changes in altitude, we were then cleared for the quiet bridge visual. This procedure requires the pilot to fly via the sfo 095 degree radial until reaching 6 DME. At that point, the pilot is then required to intercept the final approach course to runway 28L or runway 28R. We were cleared the quiet bridge visual runway 28R. I am not familiar with the king air, but have over 6500 hours flying large turboprops and jets for the airlines. The pilot never reviewed nor asked to review the bridge visual, so I was under the impression he knew the procedure. The pilot claimed he was very familiar with san francisco international airport. For my own reference, I had set the localizer frequency and CDI on the copilot's side to the sfo ILS runway 28R. We initially were on the sfo 095 degree radial, but within mins, found ourselves south of the sfo 095 degree radial and the localizer to runway 28R. I was first to notice our position and quickly queried the pilot. He then realized his position and adjusted the aircraft's flight path to intercept the proper course. At some point thereafter, the tower cleared us to land on runway 28L. There were several factors that led to this incident. First, the pilot never reviewed nor asked to review the quiet bridge visual approach. Second, the pilot, during the approach, was trying to load a new flight plan into the GPS during a critical phase of flight. The autoplt was turned on and flying the aircraft. After landing, the pilot stated he was in heading mode which would explain why the aircraft drifted off of the 095 degree radial. I believe the error made was directly related to the pilot's lack of attention to flying the aircraft during this phase of flight. Third, there was a B747 4.5 mi ahead of us and the concern for wake turbulence and the proper separation consumed most of my attention. During a visual approach, if the pilot states he has the preceding aircraft in sight, he is responsible for his own wake turbulence separation. This incident reflects how important good operating procedures are and how human factors often lead to mistakes that can lead to problems. The pilot should also insist upon reviewing all charted procedures, especially into large metropolitan airports. As an observer, I could have been insistent on reviewing the procedure which could help in sits such as this. Because the pilot was also a personal friend with a lot of experience, I was under the impression he was in complete control of the situation. Never assume anything. Complacency is a recipe for disaster.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE30 PLT, WHILE FLYING THE QUIET BRIDGE VISUAL TO SFO, DEVIATED FROM THE PUBLISHED PROC, DRIFTING S OF INTENDED COURSE.

Narrative: AFTER DEPARTING FAT, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO SFO. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL WE CONTACTED THE LCL APCH CTLRS. AFTER A FEW TURNS AND CHANGES IN ALT, WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR THE QUIET BRIDGE VISUAL. THIS PROC REQUIRES THE PLT TO FLY VIA THE SFO 095 DEG RADIAL UNTIL REACHING 6 DME. AT THAT POINT, THE PLT IS THEN REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE TO RWY 28L OR RWY 28R. WE WERE CLRED THE QUIET BRIDGE VISUAL RWY 28R. I AM NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE KING AIR, BUT HAVE OVER 6500 HRS FLYING LARGE TURBOPROPS AND JETS FOR THE AIRLINES. THE PLT NEVER REVIEWED NOR ASKED TO REVIEW THE BRIDGE VISUAL, SO I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION HE KNEW THE PROC. THE PLT CLAIMED HE WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH SAN FRANCISCO INTL ARPT. FOR MY OWN REF, I HAD SET THE LOC FREQ AND CDI ON THE COPLT'S SIDE TO THE SFO ILS RWY 28R. WE INITIALLY WERE ON THE SFO 095 DEG RADIAL, BUT WITHIN MINS, FOUND OURSELVES S OF THE SFO 095 DEG RADIAL AND THE LOC TO RWY 28R. I WAS FIRST TO NOTICE OUR POS AND QUICKLY QUERIED THE PLT. HE THEN REALIZED HIS POS AND ADJUSTED THE ACFT'S FLT PATH TO INTERCEPT THE PROPER COURSE. AT SOME POINT THEREAFTER, THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 28L. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT LED TO THIS INCIDENT. FIRST, THE PLT NEVER REVIEWED NOR ASKED TO REVIEW THE QUIET BRIDGE VISUAL APCH. SECOND, THE PLT, DURING THE APCH, WAS TRYING TO LOAD A NEW FLT PLAN INTO THE GPS DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. THE AUTOPLT WAS TURNED ON AND FLYING THE ACFT. AFTER LNDG, THE PLT STATED HE WAS IN HDG MODE WHICH WOULD EXPLAIN WHY THE ACFT DRIFTED OFF OF THE 095 DEG RADIAL. I BELIEVE THE ERROR MADE WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE PLT'S LACK OF ATTN TO FLYING THE ACFT DURING THIS PHASE OF FLT. THIRD, THERE WAS A B747 4.5 MI AHEAD OF US AND THE CONCERN FOR WAKE TURB AND THE PROPER SEPARATION CONSUMED MOST OF MY ATTN. DURING A VISUAL APCH, IF THE PLT STATES HE HAS THE PRECEDING ACFT IN SIGHT, HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OWN WAKE TURB SEPARATION. THIS INCIDENT REFLECTS HOW IMPORTANT GOOD OPERATING PROCS ARE AND HOW HUMAN FACTORS OFTEN LEAD TO MISTAKES THAT CAN LEAD TO PROBS. THE PLT SHOULD ALSO INSIST UPON REVIEWING ALL CHARTED PROCS, ESPECIALLY INTO LARGE METRO ARPTS. AS AN OBSERVER, I COULD HAVE BEEN INSISTENT ON REVIEWING THE PROC WHICH COULD HELP IN SITS SUCH AS THIS. BECAUSE THE PLT WAS ALSO A PERSONAL FRIEND WITH A LOT OF EXPERIENCE, I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION HE WAS IN COMPLETE CTL OF THE SIT. NEVER ASSUME ANYTHING. COMPLACENCY IS A RECIPE FOR DISASTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.