Narrative:

We started our descent to 13000 ft to cross zoomn intersection on time. We had a little tailwind and I was concerned about being down early enough to make the approach to runway 3 with the RVR down to 3500 ft at the time. I briefed the approach late, which put us behind in recognizing that they were vectoring us in pretty tight. I had the boards up and we leveled good. I got concerned about ice build-up on the boards so I brought them back in and speed crept up. We joined the localizer and I started slowing as rapidly as I could. We caught the GS at flaps 15 degrees. We continued to try to configure as to be set up the approach. The captain stated we needed to do something so I suggested we go around. He agreed, but also suggested he felt we were close to being set up so we continued the final. Flaps were set below 1000 ft and in retrospect that's my hard point for going around if not ready and set up for the task at hand. The approach was conducted on the autoplt per company procedures and landing was normal. When the descent started I was behind. I should have briefed the approach earlier, a more aggressive descent to make sure I was down to 4000 ft and slowing by 30 mi out. When I arrived at the 1000 ft call not fully configured, we should have gone around or asked for a 360 degree turn in order to slow and re-establish on final. The captain and I sat down together and reviewed the events of this situation. We discussed in depth what decision and actions could have been made to prevent this from happening again. I let this man down today by not planning properly and here I situation with wounded pride and a bruised ego. From this I have gained in my own personal decision making and preparation skills to better handle these types sits in the future. Supplemental information from acn 531416: I should not have made the statement I made when he wanted to go around. I should have encouraged him to do so. And I certainly should have directed a go around when I saw we had missed the 1000 ft call and did not have flaps 40 degrees. We thoroughly debriefed the flight, particularly the reasons that led us to get behind and the criteria for stabilized approachs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B733 CREW, ON APCH TO GEG, GOT BEHIND THE ACFT, NOT BEING FULLY CONFIGURED BY 1000 FT.

Narrative: WE STARTED OUR DSCNT TO 13000 FT TO CROSS ZOOMN INTXN ON TIME. WE HAD A LITTLE TAILWIND AND I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT BEING DOWN EARLY ENOUGH TO MAKE THE APCH TO RWY 3 WITH THE RVR DOWN TO 3500 FT AT THE TIME. I BRIEFED THE APCH LATE, WHICH PUT US BEHIND IN RECOGNIZING THAT THEY WERE VECTORING US IN PRETTY TIGHT. I HAD THE BOARDS UP AND WE LEVELED GOOD. I GOT CONCERNED ABOUT ICE BUILD-UP ON THE BOARDS SO I BROUGHT THEM BACK IN AND SPD CREPT UP. WE JOINED THE LOC AND I STARTED SLOWING AS RAPIDLY AS I COULD. WE CAUGHT THE GS AT FLAPS 15 DEGS. WE CONTINUED TO TRY TO CONFIGURE AS TO BE SET UP THE APCH. THE CAPT STATED WE NEEDED TO DO SOMETHING SO I SUGGESTED WE GO AROUND. HE AGREED, BUT ALSO SUGGESTED HE FELT WE WERE CLOSE TO BEING SET UP SO WE CONTINUED THE FINAL. FLAPS WERE SET BELOW 1000 FT AND IN RETROSPECT THAT'S MY HARD POINT FOR GOING AROUND IF NOT READY AND SET UP FOR THE TASK AT HAND. THE APCH WAS CONDUCTED ON THE AUTOPLT PER COMPANY PROCS AND LNDG WAS NORMAL. WHEN THE DSCNT STARTED I WAS BEHIND. I SHOULD HAVE BRIEFED THE APCH EARLIER, A MORE AGGRESSIVE DSCNT TO MAKE SURE I WAS DOWN TO 4000 FT AND SLOWING BY 30 MI OUT. WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE 1000 FT CALL NOT FULLY CONFIGURED, WE SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND OR ASKED FOR A 360 DEG TURN IN ORDER TO SLOW AND RE-ESTABLISH ON FINAL. THE CAPT AND I SAT DOWN TOGETHER AND REVIEWED THE EVENTS OF THIS SIT. WE DISCUSSED IN DEPTH WHAT DECISION AND ACTIONS COULD HAVE BEEN MADE TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN. I LET THIS MAN DOWN TODAY BY NOT PLANNING PROPERLY AND HERE I SIT WITH WOUNDED PRIDE AND A BRUISED EGO. FROM THIS I HAVE GAINED IN MY OWN PERSONAL DECISION MAKING AND PREPARATION SKILLS TO BETTER HANDLE THESE TYPES SITS IN THE FUTURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 531416: I SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE THE STATEMENT I MADE WHEN HE WANTED TO GO AROUND. I SHOULD HAVE ENCOURAGED HIM TO DO SO. AND I CERTAINLY SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A GAR WHEN I SAW WE HAD MISSED THE 1000 FT CALL AND DID NOT HAVE FLAPS 40 DEGS. WE THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED THE FLT, PARTICULARLY THE REASONS THAT LED US TO GET BEHIND AND THE CRITERIA FOR STABILIZED APCHS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.