Narrative:

Both flight crew members fatigued. We were in the 11TH hour of a 13 hour duty day. En route deviations for thunderstorms were a factor all day long. Flight was scheduled to be from iah to lbb. Approaching the lbb area, ATIS was approximately 7 scattered, 12 broken, 3 mi visibility, wind 080 degrees, at 12 KTS. Told to expect and crew briefed ILS runway 17R. While at 5000 ft, ATC announced runway lights for runway 17R just went OTS. (First officer was flying) ATC told us to plan for VOR-DME runway 8. We xferred controls and first officer briefs the approach. We xfer controls back. I consult the approach plate and realize that this is in fact an RNAV approach, not approved in our operations specifications. ATC, after being so informed, now suggests VOR a approach. We again xfer controls, rebrief, and xfer back. Fatigue, feelings of being rushed, etc (fuel concerns) are factors in the cockpit. WX now reported at 1000 ft, 3 mi, winds 080 degrees at approximately 20 KTS. An air carrier in front of us reports a missed approach (rain showers in the area). The first officer does not fly a very good approach and I call for him to execute a missed approach prior to the missed approach. As we fly over the airport and for a time afterwards, I can see the runway and when ATC suggests the ILS runway 17R circle to land runway 8, this sound like a good idea. We prepare for another approach. Once again, the first officer struggles with this approach. We break out of the clouds with the airport in sight and begin the circling maneuver. The wind is now very strong out of the east. As we circle and descend towards runway 8, the bank angle, rate of descent, etc, become such that, in my opinion, the safety of the flight is in doubt. I take the controls and land the aircraft. Many mistakes were made on this flight in addition to pure stick and rudder flying. Preflight and in-flight planning and decision making are foremost. We should have diverted to the alternate. Though I blame myself for these errors, I believe that fatigue played a strong role.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN E145 CREW, ARRIVING LBB, IN WX, HAVING EXPERIENCED NUMEROUS RWY CHANGES, EXECUTED A GAR WHEN APCH BECAME QUESTIONABLE.

Narrative: BOTH FLC MEMBERS FATIGUED. WE WERE IN THE 11TH HR OF A 13 HR DUTY DAY. ENRTE DEVS FOR TSTMS WERE A FACTOR ALL DAY LONG. FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO BE FROM IAH TO LBB. APCHING THE LBB AREA, ATIS WAS APPROX 7 SCATTERED, 12 BROKEN, 3 MI VISIBILITY, WIND 080 DEGS, AT 12 KTS. TOLD TO EXPECT AND CREW BRIEFED ILS RWY 17R. WHILE AT 5000 FT, ATC ANNOUNCED RWY LIGHTS FOR RWY 17R JUST WENT OTS. (FO WAS FLYING) ATC TOLD US TO PLAN FOR VOR-DME RWY 8. WE XFERRED CTLS AND FO BRIEFS THE APCH. WE XFER CTLS BACK. I CONSULT THE APCH PLATE AND REALIZE THAT THIS IS IN FACT AN RNAV APCH, NOT APPROVED IN OUR OPS SPECS. ATC, AFTER BEING SO INFORMED, NOW SUGGESTS VOR A APCH. WE AGAIN XFER CTLS, REBRIEF, AND XFER BACK. FATIGUE, FEELINGS OF BEING RUSHED, ETC (FUEL CONCERNS) ARE FACTORS IN THE COCKPIT. WX NOW RPTED AT 1000 FT, 3 MI, WINDS 080 DEGS AT APPROX 20 KTS. AN ACR IN FRONT OF US RPTS A MISSED APCH (RAIN SHOWERS IN THE AREA). THE FO DOES NOT FLY A VERY GOOD APCH AND I CALL FOR HIM TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH PRIOR TO THE MISSED APCH. AS WE FLY OVER THE ARPT AND FOR A TIME AFTERWARDS, I CAN SEE THE RWY AND WHEN ATC SUGGESTS THE ILS RWY 17R CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 8, THIS SOUND LIKE A GOOD IDEA. WE PREPARE FOR ANOTHER APCH. ONCE AGAIN, THE FO STRUGGLES WITH THIS APCH. WE BREAK OUT OF THE CLOUDS WITH THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND BEGIN THE CIRCLING MANEUVER. THE WIND IS NOW VERY STRONG OUT OF THE E. AS WE CIRCLE AND DSND TOWARDS RWY 8, THE BANK ANGLE, RATE OF DSCNT, ETC, BECOME SUCH THAT, IN MY OPINION, THE SAFETY OF THE FLT IS IN DOUBT. I TAKE THE CTLS AND LAND THE ACFT. MANY MISTAKES WERE MADE ON THIS FLT IN ADDITION TO PURE STICK AND RUDDER FLYING. PREFLT AND INFLT PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING ARE FOREMOST. WE SHOULD HAVE DIVERTED TO THE ALTERNATE. THOUGH I BLAME MYSELF FOR THESE ERRORS, I BELIEVE THAT FATIGUE PLAYED A STRONG ROLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.