Narrative:

An orientation flight was conducted from fxe to mlb and back to fxe. An IFR flight plan had been filed by the PIC from mlb to fxe. The pilot had flown this aircraft several times in the past and had been flying more sophisticated equipment, specifically a beech 1900 under far part 121 rules. I was flying to get him reacquainted with the piper aztec PA23-250. During engine start, we felt pressured to depart as soon as possible. In order to share the workload, I agreed to handle the radio communications during taxi. Since we were unfamiliar with the airport, we requested progressive taxi instructions to the active runway for our IFR departure. We received the taxi instructions, which the PIC also heard and acknowledged through the interphone system. As we got close to the runway (about 25 ft), I informed him that we were approaching the runway 4/taxiway C intersection and suggested that we start slowing down to stop. He acknowledged by indicating that we were cleared to taxi to runway 4. At this point, I indicated that we were approaching the actual runway 4. I pleaded with him to slow down and stop the airplane since it appeared we were about to cross the runway. His response was that 'we were cleared to taxi to runway 4.' after this response, I shouted that we needed to stop the aircraft immediately. Instinctively, I tried pressing on the brake pedals. I retarded the throttles in a vain attempt at stopping the aircraft while trying to turn away. However, the right side pilot position has only rudder pedals and no toe-brakes. Consequently, despite my pleading with the PIC, retarding the throttles, and pressing persistently on non existent brakes from the right seat, the aircraft taxied onto the active runway 4. At this point the PIC in the left seat tried to stop the aircraft in the middle of the runway when he realized he was on a runway and not a taxiway. Rather than situation there and take the chance an aircraft might land on top of us, and noting that the taxiway in front of us was clear, I proceeded to add power to continue taxiing to get out of harms way if indeed it was there. We managed to reach the other taxiway and made a 180 degree turn. Once our run-up was completed and we departed mlb, it was noted by the PIC and I that there was some serious confusion. He stated several times that I was handling the radios and didn't understand why this had happened. I agreed and informed him of the clearance which he had previously stated he understood, yet he had not adhered to my request to stop the aircraft when we were approaching the runway. Contributing factors to the event were unfamiliarity with the field and misunderstanding of the taxi instructions by the PIC. Furthermore, absolute awareness must be maintained when approaching any intersection. Despite my best efforts at preventing the incident, I am now embarrassed but ever so wiser and more vigilant. I will not trust anyone in the left seat regardless of their past experience and/or familiarity with the aircraft. Had the PIC listened to me and stopped the aircraft, or at least slowed down -- or at the very least queried me -- this whole incident could have been avoided. I should have been even more assertive to get the point across that we were approaching the active runway. After careful reflection, I now realize the importance of dual control brakes in a training environment. Although this was not technically a training flight, this event could have been completely avoided if the aircraft had been fitted with dual brakes so that I could have reverted from an observer to a contributing pilot. My actions were futile, since I could not take command of the aircraft at the most critical point.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OBSERVER CHALLENGES PIC ABOUT RWY AWARENESS AS HE INCURS RWY DURING TRAINING SESSION.

Narrative: AN ORIENTATION FLT WAS CONDUCTED FROM FXE TO MLB AND BACK TO FXE. AN IFR FLT PLAN HAD BEEN FILED BY THE PIC FROM MLB TO FXE. THE PLT HAD FLOWN THIS ACFT SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST AND HAD BEEN FLYING MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIP, SPECIFICALLY A BEECH 1900 UNDER FAR PART 121 RULES. I WAS FLYING TO GET HIM REACQUAINTED WITH THE PIPER AZTEC PA23-250. DURING ENG START, WE FELT PRESSURED TO DEPART ASAP. IN ORDER TO SHARE THE WORKLOAD, I AGREED TO HANDLE THE RADIO COMS DURING TAXI. SINCE WE WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT, WE REQUESTED PROGRESSIVE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ACTIVE RWY FOR OUR IFR DEP. WE RECEIVED THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH THE PIC ALSO HEARD AND ACKNOWLEDGED THROUGH THE INTERPHONE SYS. AS WE GOT CLOSE TO THE RWY (ABOUT 25 FT), I INFORMED HIM THAT WE WERE APCHING THE RWY 4/TXWY C INTXN AND SUGGESTED THAT WE START SLOWING DOWN TO STOP. HE ACKNOWLEDGED BY INDICATING THAT WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 4. AT THIS POINT, I INDICATED THAT WE WERE APCHING THE ACTUAL RWY 4. I PLEADED WITH HIM TO SLOW DOWN AND STOP THE AIRPLANE SINCE IT APPEARED WE WERE ABOUT TO CROSS THE RWY. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT 'WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 4.' AFTER THIS RESPONSE, I SHOUTED THAT WE NEEDED TO STOP THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY. INSTINCTIVELY, I TRIED PRESSING ON THE BRAKE PEDALS. I RETARDED THE THROTTLES IN A VAIN ATTEMPT AT STOPPING THE ACFT WHILE TRYING TO TURN AWAY. HOWEVER, THE R SIDE PLT POS HAS ONLY RUDDER PEDALS AND NO TOE-BRAKES. CONSEQUENTLY, DESPITE MY PLEADING WITH THE PIC, RETARDING THE THROTTLES, AND PRESSING PERSISTENTLY ON NON EXISTENT BRAKES FROM THE R SEAT, THE ACFT TAXIED ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY 4. AT THIS POINT THE PIC IN THE L SEAT TRIED TO STOP THE ACFT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RWY WHEN HE REALIZED HE WAS ON A RWY AND NOT A TXWY. RATHER THAN SIT THERE AND TAKE THE CHANCE AN ACFT MIGHT LAND ON TOP OF US, AND NOTING THAT THE TXWY IN FRONT OF US WAS CLR, I PROCEEDED TO ADD PWR TO CONTINUE TAXIING TO GET OUT OF HARMS WAY IF INDEED IT WAS THERE. WE MANAGED TO REACH THE OTHER TXWY AND MADE A 180 DEG TURN. ONCE OUR RUN-UP WAS COMPLETED AND WE DEPARTED MLB, IT WAS NOTED BY THE PIC AND I THAT THERE WAS SOME SERIOUS CONFUSION. HE STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT I WAS HANDLING THE RADIOS AND DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THIS HAD HAPPENED. I AGREED AND INFORMED HIM OF THE CLRNC WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED HE UNDERSTOOD, YET HE HAD NOT ADHERED TO MY REQUEST TO STOP THE ACFT WHEN WE WERE APCHING THE RWY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE EVENT WERE UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE FIELD AND MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS BY THE PIC. FURTHERMORE, ABSOLUTE AWARENESS MUST BE MAINTAINED WHEN APCHING ANY INTXN. DESPITE MY BEST EFFORTS AT PREVENTING THE INCIDENT, I AM NOW EMBARRASSED BUT EVER SO WISER AND MORE VIGILANT. I WILL NOT TRUST ANYONE IN THE L SEAT REGARDLESS OF THEIR PAST EXPERIENCE AND/OR FAMILIARITY WITH THE ACFT. HAD THE PIC LISTENED TO ME AND STOPPED THE ACFT, OR AT LEAST SLOWED DOWN -- OR AT THE VERY LEAST QUERIED ME -- THIS WHOLE INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE ASSERTIVE TO GET THE POINT ACROSS THAT WE WERE APCHING THE ACTIVE RWY. AFTER CAREFUL REFLECTION, I NOW REALIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF DUAL CTL BRAKES IN A TRAINING ENVIRONMENT. ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT TECHNICALLY A TRAINING FLT, THIS EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY AVOIDED IF THE ACFT HAD BEEN FITTED WITH DUAL BRAKES SO THAT I COULD HAVE REVERTED FROM AN OBSERVER TO A CONTRIBUTING PLT. MY ACTIONS WERE FUTILE, SINCE I COULD NOT TAKE COMMAND OF THE ACFT AT THE MOST CRITICAL POINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.