Narrative:

We were climbing out of lax to FL230 on a direct route to gates. The first officer was flying and I had started on the howgozit flight plan. ZLA (135.5) called us as we were passing about 13000 ft and told us to stop the climb at 15000 ft. The first officer complied and engaged the autoplt prior to leveloff. Lax then called, informing us of traffic, 11 O'clock position and 20 mi at 16000 ft. I picked up the traffic visually and switching to the 40 mi scale on the navigation data display, confirmed traffic 1000 ft above and a little more than 5 mi left of our direct course to gates. I called 'traffic in sight,' and ZLA immediately came back with a 'maintain visual contact, climb to FL230.' I read back the clearance, but both the first officer and I were hesitant to start the climb until we had a clrer picture of the situation. We had that gut feeling that something was not right. I was not aware at the time that the conflicting traffic (air carrier Y inbound to lax) was going direct to vtu which was behind us and to our right. I had assumed that we were on parallel courses and that the traffic would pass to our left since no vectors were given. At about 15 mi it became apparent to us that we were on converging courses and the first officer requested to remain at 15000 ft until the traffic cleared. ZLA replied that it was too late for that, and that aircraft Y had already started their descent, which was verified on our TCASII display. The traffic at that point was 10 mi, 12 O'clock position, 600 ft above, descending. The first officer immediately disconnected the autoplt, started a left turn and a rapid climb with about 12 degrees anu attitude. After we were established in the climb, we received an RA to descend, but we were through level altitude before we could respond. The traffic passed below and to our right. I am not sure of the distance since we were on the 40 mi navigation scale and it was pitch black outside, but it was certainly uncomfortable and most likely inside the MSA and distance requirements. I believe that the clearance given to resume climb was improper and unsafe. I cannot ever recall receiving such a clearance as this without proper vectors or separation given. We had very little time to make an evaluation of the clearance, and we were given too little information to make that evaluation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: VISUAL SEPARATION IS ASSIGNED AND ACCEPTED DURING NIGHT OVERWATER OP UNDER RADAR CTL. LESS THAN ADEQUATE SEPARATION RESULTED IN AN EVASIVE MANEUVER AND TCASII RA.

Narrative: WE WERE CLBING OUT OF LAX TO FL230 ON A DIRECT RTE TO GATES. THE FO WAS FLYING AND I HAD STARTED ON THE HOWGOZIT FLT PLAN. ZLA (135.5) CALLED US AS WE WERE PASSING ABOUT 13000 FT AND TOLD US TO STOP THE CLB AT 15000 FT. THE FO COMPLIED AND ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT PRIOR TO LEVELOFF. LAX THEN CALLED, INFORMING US OF TFC, 11 O'CLOCK POS AND 20 MI AT 16000 FT. I PICKED UP THE TFC VISUALLY AND SWITCHING TO THE 40 MI SCALE ON THE NAV DATA DISPLAY, CONFIRMED TFC 1000 FT ABOVE AND A LITTLE MORE THAN 5 MI L OF OUR DIRECT COURSE TO GATES. I CALLED 'TFC IN SIGHT,' AND ZLA IMMEDIATELY CAME BACK WITH A 'MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT, CLB TO FL230.' I READ BACK THE CLRNC, BUT BOTH THE FO AND I WERE HESITANT TO START THE CLB UNTIL WE HAD A CLRER PICTURE OF THE SIT. WE HAD THAT GUT FEELING THAT SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT. I WAS NOT AWARE AT THE TIME THAT THE CONFLICTING TFC (ACR Y INBOUND TO LAX) WAS GOING DIRECT TO VTU WHICH WAS BEHIND US AND TO OUR R. I HAD ASSUMED THAT WE WERE ON PARALLEL COURSES AND THAT THE TFC WOULD PASS TO OUR L SINCE NO VECTORS WERE GIVEN. AT ABOUT 15 MI IT BECAME APPARENT TO US THAT WE WERE ON CONVERGING COURSES AND THE FO REQUESTED TO REMAIN AT 15000 FT UNTIL THE TFC CLRED. ZLA REPLIED THAT IT WAS TOO LATE FOR THAT, AND THAT ACFT Y HAD ALREADY STARTED THEIR DSCNT, WHICH WAS VERIFIED ON OUR TCASII DISPLAY. THE TFC AT THAT POINT WAS 10 MI, 12 O'CLOCK POS, 600 FT ABOVE, DSNDING. THE FO IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT, STARTED A L TURN AND A RAPID CLB WITH ABOUT 12 DEGS ANU ATTITUDE. AFTER WE WERE ESTABLISHED IN THE CLB, WE RECEIVED AN RA TO DSND, BUT WE WERE THROUGH LEVEL ALT BEFORE WE COULD RESPOND. THE TFC PASSED BELOW AND TO OUR R. I AM NOT SURE OF THE DISTANCE SINCE WE WERE ON THE 40 MI NAV SCALE AND IT WAS PITCH BLACK OUTSIDE, BUT IT WAS CERTAINLY UNCOMFORTABLE AND MOST LIKELY INSIDE THE MSA AND DISTANCE REQUIREMENTS. I BELIEVE THAT THE CLRNC GIVEN TO RESUME CLB WAS IMPROPER AND UNSAFE. I CANNOT EVER RECALL RECEIVING SUCH A CLRNC AS THIS WITHOUT PROPER VECTORS OR SEPARATION GIVEN. WE HAD VERY LITTLE TIME TO MAKE AN EVALUATION OF THE CLRNC, AND WE WERE GIVEN TOO LITTLE INFO TO MAKE THAT EVALUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.