Narrative:

Upon arriving at work for my normal shift, I was informed that field service was working on aircraft damage from earlier in the day. The mechanic advised me as an inspector designee that he was ready for me to inspect the completed job. I asked him if he used the proper fasteners and grip length for a class III repair, which he replied that he did. I went out to the aircraft, keep in mind that it's XA00 in the morning, working with a flashlight and the crew is in the cockpit going through their checklist preparing for the ferry flight back to ZZZ and viewed the repair from outside what I could see after final installation per company's 'general policies and procedures.' the repair had sealant installed over it and it had been painted. I viewed the repair and could see it had 3 fasteners, which still had stems in them but were short. Feeling the number of fasteners, I felt it would be fine for a ferry flight. I told the mechanic when it got to ZZZ to let the metal mechanic know about the 3 fasteners. He assured me he would. I then contacted ZZZ maintenance coordinator and informed about the 3 fasteners and asked them to be sure and stop the aircraft in ZZZ and have them checked. Upon inspection in ZZZ after aircraft had been pressurized some of the stems were gone. Upon further investigation after opening up the cargo bin side lining, the mechanic had drilled through the longeron in several places. Come to find out, the mechanic was an a&P hanger with 2 yrs of service, and not a metal mechanic. If I were in the same situation again, I would disregard the urgency to get the flight to ZZZ and open up all panels and inspect the whole completed job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD83 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE ON A MAINT FERRY WITH AN IMPROPER AND UNSAFE FUSELAGE SKIN REPAIR WHICH DAMAGED A LONGERON.

Narrative: UPON ARRIVING AT WORK FOR MY NORMAL SHIFT, I WAS INFORMED THAT FIELD SVC WAS WORKING ON ACFT DAMAGE FROM EARLIER IN THE DAY. THE MECH ADVISED ME AS AN INSPECTOR DESIGNEE THAT HE WAS READY FOR ME TO INSPECT THE COMPLETED JOB. I ASKED HIM IF HE USED THE PROPER FASTENERS AND GRIP LENGTH FOR A CLASS III REPAIR, WHICH HE REPLIED THAT HE DID. I WENT OUT TO THE ACFT, KEEP IN MIND THAT IT'S XA00 IN THE MORNING, WORKING WITH A FLASHLIGHT AND THE CREW IS IN THE COCKPIT GOING THROUGH THEIR CHKLIST PREPARING FOR THE FERRY FLT BACK TO ZZZ AND VIEWED THE REPAIR FROM OUTSIDE WHAT I COULD SEE AFTER FINAL INSTALLATION PER COMPANY'S 'GENERAL POLICIES AND PROCS.' THE REPAIR HAD SEALANT INSTALLED OVER IT AND IT HAD BEEN PAINTED. I VIEWED THE REPAIR AND COULD SEE IT HAD 3 FASTENERS, WHICH STILL HAD STEMS IN THEM BUT WERE SHORT. FEELING THE NUMBER OF FASTENERS, I FELT IT WOULD BE FINE FOR A FERRY FLT. I TOLD THE MECH WHEN IT GOT TO ZZZ TO LET THE METAL MECH KNOW ABOUT THE 3 FASTENERS. HE ASSURED ME HE WOULD. I THEN CONTACTED ZZZ MAINT COORDINATOR AND INFORMED ABOUT THE 3 FASTENERS AND ASKED THEM TO BE SURE AND STOP THE ACFT IN ZZZ AND HAVE THEM CHKED. UPON INSPECTION IN ZZZ AFTER ACFT HAD BEEN PRESSURIZED SOME OF THE STEMS WERE GONE. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION AFTER OPENING UP THE CARGO BIN SIDE LINING, THE MECH HAD DRILLED THROUGH THE LONGERON IN SEVERAL PLACES. COME TO FIND OUT, THE MECH WAS AN A&P HANGER WITH 2 YRS OF SVC, AND NOT A METAL MECH. IF I WERE IN THE SAME SIT AGAIN, I WOULD DISREGARD THE URGENCY TO GET THE FLT TO ZZZ AND OPEN UP ALL PANELS AND INSPECT THE WHOLE COMPLETED JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.