Narrative:

I control airspace above 8000 ft, arrival controller was controling 7000 ft and below. Jump aircraft checked on my frequency, climbing out of 7000 ft, said arrival controller was too busy to work him. I radar idented jump aircraft and asked for 2 min advisory before paradrops. Jump aircraft climbed to 14000 ft and gave 2 min advisory. I called arrival controller with 2 min advisory. Arrival controller pointed out traffic (aircraft #2) 15 mi northwest of drop zone, sebound descending out of 7000 ft for 6000 ft. I advised jump aircraft of traffic and of additional traffic north of drop zone, sebound, a C550. Jump aircraft saw C550, but did not see HS25 (aircraft #2). Jump aircraft released jumpers. I called HS25 traffic again. Originally, HS25 traffic was sebound and appeared to be heading close to but south of the jump zone. Then HS25 had turned eastbound and was heading for jump zone. I called traffic 5 mi west of jump zone, eastbound. Jump aircraft then saw HS25 and said he (HS25) was headed to drop zone and asked me to tell arrival controller to turn HS25 to right. I yelled across room to arrival controller, but too late. HS25 reported close call with the skydivers. Had I known HS25 would turn east, I would not have let jump aircraft release jumpers. Next time, I will tell jump aircraft to also personally advise arrival controller on arrival frequency prior to releasing jumpers. Jump aircraft can then get better advisories about arrival traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: N90 CTLR IS UNABLE TO EFFECT TIMELY INTRAFAC PARADROP COORD AND CPR JET CONFLICTS WITH JUMP ZONE PARACHUTISTS.

Narrative: I CTL AIRSPACE ABOVE 8000 FT, ARR CTLR WAS CTLING 7000 FT AND BELOW. JUMP ACFT CHKED ON MY FREQ, CLBING OUT OF 7000 FT, SAID ARR CTLR WAS TOO BUSY TO WORK HIM. I RADAR IDENTED JUMP ACFT AND ASKED FOR 2 MIN ADVISORY BEFORE PARADROPS. JUMP ACFT CLBED TO 14000 FT AND GAVE 2 MIN ADVISORY. I CALLED ARR CTLR WITH 2 MIN ADVISORY. ARR CTLR POINTED OUT TFC (ACFT #2) 15 MI NW OF DROP ZONE, SEBOUND DSNDING OUT OF 7000 FT FOR 6000 FT. I ADVISED JUMP ACFT OF TFC AND OF ADDITIONAL TFC N OF DROP ZONE, SEBOUND, A C550. JUMP ACFT SAW C550, BUT DID NOT SEE HS25 (ACFT #2). JUMP ACFT RELEASED JUMPERS. I CALLED HS25 TFC AGAIN. ORIGINALLY, HS25 TFC WAS SEBOUND AND APPEARED TO BE HDG CLOSE TO BUT S OF THE JUMP ZONE. THEN HS25 HAD TURNED EBOUND AND WAS HDG FOR JUMP ZONE. I CALLED TFC 5 MI W OF JUMP ZONE, EBOUND. JUMP ACFT THEN SAW HS25 AND SAID HE (HS25) WAS HEADED TO DROP ZONE AND ASKED ME TO TELL ARR CTLR TO TURN HS25 TO R. I YELLED ACROSS ROOM TO ARR CTLR, BUT TOO LATE. HS25 RPTED CLOSE CALL WITH THE SKYDIVERS. HAD I KNOWN HS25 WOULD TURN E, I WOULD NOT HAVE LET JUMP ACFT RELEASE JUMPERS. NEXT TIME, I WILL TELL JUMP ACFT TO ALSO PERSONALLY ADVISE ARR CTLR ON ARR FREQ PRIOR TO RELEASING JUMPERS. JUMP ACFT CAN THEN GET BETTER ADVISORIES ABOUT ARR TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.