Narrative:

I was the PF flying the aircraft this leg. Early into the takeoff roll on runway 16, we received a confign warning. I called for the abort and began the low-speed abort process. While rolling out, I pressed forward on the fuel condition levers to confirm that they had slid back from 100 degrees (full) position. This is a common cause of configuration warnings on the J41. Once clear of the runway, I increased the friction control on condition levers to maximum to insure they wouldn't slide back again. We notified the tower and requested taxi to runway 16. We called our company operations and there was no reply. We sent an ACARS message to our dispatch and advised of the abort. Once in our base, after an uneventful second takeoff, I reported the abort to the chief pilot's office. The chief pilot was concerned that I did not follow a recently issued file instructing crews to contact dispatch and maintenance before attempting a second takeoff, even in a non-maintenance related abort, such as a configuration alert. There is a statement in the same file that says 'sometimes, maintenance may need to determine if an aircraft system operated outside of parameters.' as this was a normal system operation, I felt no need to have contacted maintenance, as the confign system operated correctly. According to the chief pilot's office the FAA has mandated the new post-abort dispatch-maintenance conference prior to a second takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A J-4100 CAPT RPTED THAT HE VIOLATED A COMPANY RULE BY TAKING OFF, WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH MAINT AFTER AN ABORTED TKOF.

Narrative: I WAS THE PF FLYING THE ACFT THIS LEG. EARLY INTO THE TKOF ROLL ON RWY 16, WE RECEIVED A CONFIGN WARNING. I CALLED FOR THE ABORT AND BEGAN THE LOW-SPD ABORT PROCESS. WHILE ROLLING OUT, I PRESSED FORWARD ON THE FUEL CONDITION LEVERS TO CONFIRM THAT THEY HAD SLID BACK FROM 100 DEGS (FULL) POS. THIS IS A COMMON CAUSE OF CONFIG WARNINGS ON THE J41. ONCE CLR OF THE RWY, I INCREASED THE FRICTION CTL ON CONDITION LEVERS TO MAX TO INSURE THEY WOULDN'T SLIDE BACK AGAIN. WE NOTIFIED THE TWR AND REQUESTED TAXI TO RWY 16. WE CALLED OUR COMPANY OPS AND THERE WAS NO REPLY. WE SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO OUR DISPATCH AND ADVISED OF THE ABORT. ONCE IN OUR BASE, AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL SECOND TKOF, I RPTED THE ABORT TO THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE. THE CHIEF PLT WAS CONCERNED THAT I DID NOT FOLLOW A RECENTLY ISSUED FILE INSTRUCTING CREWS TO CONTACT DISPATCH AND MAINT BEFORE ATTEMPTING A SECOND TKOF, EVEN IN A NON-MAINT RELATED ABORT, SUCH AS A CONFIG ALERT. THERE IS A STATEMENT IN THE SAME FILE THAT SAYS 'SOMETIMES, MAINT MAY NEED TO DETERMINE IF AN ACFT SYS OPERATED OUTSIDE OF PARAMETERS.' AS THIS WAS A NORMAL SYS OP, I FELT NO NEED TO HAVE CONTACTED MAINT, AS THE CONFIGN SYS OPERATED CORRECTLY. ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE THE FAA HAS MANDATED THE NEW POST-ABORT DISPATCH-MAINT CONFERENCE PRIOR TO A SECOND TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.