Narrative:

We were taxiing from aircraft X via taxiway charlie to runway 32L and to hold short of runway 32L at taxiway charlie. Oma was unusually busy with airline traffic and a DC9 an R135 training in the traffic pattern. The captain (PNF at the time), to expedite our departure, requested an intersection departure for runway 32L at taxiway charlie. He also asked the controller for the runway distance that would be available. Personally I feel that this was a mistake because it began to over load an already busy controller. It is the pilot's responsibility to do this in light of the present situation (I feel). The controller provided us with runway 32L distance as 5200 ft and then told us to stand by. Controller, a few moments later, told us runway 36 was 4000 ft (or so, the exact number I don't recall) and asked us if it was acceptable. This is where the confusion began. The captain thought that controller had made a mistake with the original figure of 5200 ft for runway 32L and did not catch runway 36. As for me, I knew that it was runway 36, but I did not realize that the controller, through this communication was implying that controller was changing our takeoff runway from runway 32L to 36. Anyway, we continued to wait at the intersection for 32L (as we understood it). The R135 was approaching the runway 32L for a touch and go when the controller asked him if he could accept a low approach so that controller could get us out. The R135 said no. But, the R135 then executed a low approach. This threw us all off and tower proceeded to clear us for an immediate takeoff. We then proceeded to depart runway 32L. Once we were airborne, tower told us we departed the wrong runway and proceeded to turn the R135 ahead out of our way. As I look back, this example only under scores the need for all of us to exercise extreme caution when things are busy and unusual practices are in order. For me, I have been on this route since december 2000 and I (and my previous captains) have never attempted an intersection takeoff. For the captain, he is brand new as a captain and on the route and I feel that he was pushing things (especially since there was no need to -- we were on time). I later explained this to him and I do believe that he is taking it to heart. As for ATC, I think that it would have been helpful if controller could have said 'expect 36' or something to that effect so that we would have had a clearer understanding of controller's intentions. When things are busy, we can get confused just as easily as anyone else. Much has been learned from this and hopefully all parties involved will be able to benefit from it. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said that he is quite sure that the local controller gave a proper clearance to take off on runway 36, but due to the rush of the immediate takeoff clearance and confusion of dealing with the runway available distances and the final checklists, he and his captain heard the 'expected' clearance to take off runway 32L.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WAITING FOR AN INTERSECTION TKOF WHERE TWO RWYS INTERSECTED, A FLT CREW BECOMES CONFUSED AND DEPARTS THE WRONG RWY AFTER A DISCUSSION WITH THE TWR ABOUT LENGTH AVAILABLE AND BEING DISTRACTED BY A TRAINING ACFT THAT FLEW A LOW APCH INSTEAD OF THE CLRED TOUCH AND GO.

Narrative: WE WERE TAXIING FROM ACFT X VIA TXWY CHARLIE TO RWY 32L AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32L AT TXWY CHARLIE. OMA WAS UNUSUALLY BUSY WITH AIRLINE TFC AND A DC9 AN R135 TRAINING IN THE TFC PATTERN. THE CAPT (PNF AT THE TIME), TO EXPEDITE OUR DEP, REQUESTED AN INTERSECTION DEP FOR RWY 32L AT TXWY CHARLIE. HE ALSO ASKED THE CTLR FOR THE RWY DISTANCE THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE. PERSONALLY I FEEL THAT THIS WAS A MISTAKE BECAUSE IT BEGAN TO OVER LOAD AN ALREADY BUSY CTLR. IT IS THE PLT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO DO THIS IN LIGHT OF THE PRESENT SIT (I FEEL). THE CTLR PROVIDED US WITH RWY 32L DISTANCE AS 5200 FT AND THEN TOLD US TO STAND BY. CTLR, A FEW MOMENTS LATER, TOLD US RWY 36 WAS 4000 FT (OR SO, THE EXACT NUMBER I DON'T RECALL) AND ASKED US IF IT WAS ACCEPTABLE. THIS IS WHERE THE CONFUSION BEGAN. THE CAPTAIN THOUGHT THAT CTLR HAD MADE A MISTAKE WITH THE ORIGINAL FIGURE OF 5200 FT FOR RWY 32L AND DID NOT CATCH RWY 36. AS FOR ME, I KNEW THAT IT WAS RWY 36, BUT I DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE CTLR, THROUGH THIS COMMUNICATION WAS IMPLYING THAT CTLR WAS CHANGING OUR TAKEOFF RWY FROM RWY 32L TO 36. ANYWAY, WE CONTINUED TO WAIT AT THE INTERSECTION FOR 32L (AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT). THE R135 WAS APCHING THE RWY 32L FOR A TOUCH AND GO WHEN THE CTLR ASKED HIM IF HE COULD ACCEPT A LOW APCH SO THAT CTLR COULD GET US OUT. THE R135 SAID NO. BUT, THE R135 THEN EXECUTED A LOW APCH. THIS THREW US ALL OFF AND TWR PROCEEDED TO CLR US FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO DEPART RWY 32L. ONCE WE WERE AIRBORNE, TWR TOLD US WE DEPARTED THE WRONG RWY AND PROCEEDED TO TURN THE R135 AHEAD OUT OF OUR WAY. AS I LOOK BACK, THIS EXAMPLE ONLY UNDER SCORES THE NEED FOR ALL OF US TO EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION WHEN THINGS ARE BUSY AND UNUSUAL PRACTICES ARE IN ORDER. FOR ME, I HAVE BEEN ON THIS ROUTE SINCE DECEMBER 2000 AND I (AND MY PREVIOUS CAPTAINS) HAVE NEVER ATTEMPTED AN INTERSECTION TKOF. FOR THE CAPTAIN, HE IS BRAND NEW AS A CAPTAIN AND ON THE ROUTE AND I FEEL THAT HE WAS PUSHING THINGS (ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE WAS NO NEED TO -- WE WERE ON TIME). I LATER EXPLAINED THIS TO HIM AND I DO BELIEVE THAT HE IS TAKING IT TO HEART. AS FOR ATC, I THINK THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IF CTLR COULD HAVE SAID 'EXPECT 36' OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE HAD A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF CTLR'S INTENTIONS. WHEN THINGS ARE BUSY, WE CAN GET CONFUSED JUST AS EASILY AS ANYONE ELSE. MUCH HAS BEEN LEARNED FROM THIS AND HOPEFULLY ALL PARTIES INVOLVED WILL BE ABLE TO BENEFIT FROM IT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT HE IS QUITE SURE THAT THE LOCAL CTLR GAVE A PROPER CLRNC TO TAKE OFF ON RWY 36, BUT DUE TO THE RUSH OF THE IMMEDIATE TKOF CLRNC AND CONFUSION OF DEALING WITH THE RWY AVAILABLE DISTANCES AND THE FINAL CHKLISTS, HE AND HIS CAPTAIN HEARD THE 'EXPECTED' CLRNC TO TAKE OFF RWY 32L.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.