Narrative:

First officer's leg. First officer's takeoff. Sjc 8 de. Clearance was climb to 5000 ft with tower amended clearance to 3000 ft. Immediately upon switching to departure control, we heard a conversation with the controller mentioning traffic at 3000 ft near sjc VOR. Our clearance on climb (given to us by tower) was to 3000 ft. As soon as I was permitted on frequency, I checked in with bay departure calling out 'climbing through 1800 ft for 3000 ft.' following the SID, at 1.8 DME, the first officer began his turn to heading 110 degrees at 25 degree bank angle to complete the turn within 4 NM. 1/2 way around the turn, the controller told the traffic that we would be climbing above their altitude, then gave us climb clearance to 15000 ft. Immediately the TCASII alerted 'traffic' followed immediately with 'descend, descend.' the first officer pushed forward abruptly on the controls attempting to follow its guidance at an estimated negative 1/2 g-force. Simultaneously, the first officer began screaming something about the controller and the traffic, while we were in a 30 degree banked descent. At the same time the RA alerted, I had caught sight of the traffic -- a light aircraft at 3-4 mi distance. The radio conversations were busy and I ws trying to pay attention to what was being said as I saw our traffic. After the first officer calmed down, I calmly told the first officer to continue the climb and notified ATC of the RA. I -- due to the first officer's talking, the radio, and the TCASII alert all at once -- was not heard by the first officer, as I said to him 'traffic in sight and no factor, continue climbing.' instead, he descended towards a lower cloud deck around 2500 ft. Later I briefed the first officer that his maneuver was too aggressive and abrupt. He was not smooth at all. At the same time the TCAS sounded, I caught sight of the traffic at 3 mi visually. In my judgement, if we had continued in our turn and climbing (as cleared) the traffic would have been passing away from us and below our altitude and no factor. But since the first officer delayed his climb for a second or two, the TCASII took control of the situation. We ended up with an uncomfortable descent when we should have climbed out with no conflicts. Passenger were given an explanation as to what happened on the PA system by me twice -- once during climb out, and after gate arrival in phx. The departure requires a turn at 1.8 DME from sjc and that the turn be completed within 4 NM of sjc. This SID is restrictive and is unsafe due to the fact that commercial aircraft are heaviest at this point of flight and forced to fly slow in order to comply with the SID restr. Adding a 3000 ft hold-down altitude along with that tight turn and traffic at 3000 ft closes the margins for safety further. Supplemental information from acn 509476: upon departure out of sjc, tower told us to level at 3000 ft instead of the usual 5000 ft. During climb, I heard another aircraft report at 3000 ft and that aircraft was told by ATC to look for MD80 traffic (us) that would climb above them. I expressed my concern to the captain about both of us at the same altitude, but was told he knew we were leveling instead of climbing. As we made the required turn, a target came into view on TCASII at approximately 11-12 O'clock position, at our altitude. The target then moved inside the 3 mi ring and became a TA, followed by a 'descend' RA of approximately 2500 FPM. I abruptly -- too abruptly it seems -- pitched down and descended to 2500 ft or so. At the same time this is happening the captain says he got the aircraft in sight and was issued a climb clearance by ATC. I was not aware of either event until well after the fact. I was told I totally overreacted to a non collision situation. I don't know how to descend smoothly in an emergency, and don't know how TCASII works and when to ignore RA commands. I was also told I had no idea what ATC was doing either, even though what they did generated an RA that I asked about before it even happened.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 CREW, FLYING AN AMENDED SID, RESPONDED TO A 'DSND' RA FROM TCASII.

Narrative: FO'S LEG. FO'S TKOF. SJC 8 DE. CLRNC WAS CLB TO 5000 FT WITH TWR AMENDED CLRNC TO 3000 FT. IMMEDIATELY UPON SWITCHING TO DEP CTL, WE HEARD A CONVERSATION WITH THE CTLR MENTIONING TFC AT 3000 FT NEAR SJC VOR. OUR CLRNC ON CLB (GIVEN TO US BY TWR) WAS TO 3000 FT. AS SOON AS I WAS PERMITTED ON FREQ, I CHKED IN WITH BAY DEP CALLING OUT 'CLBING THROUGH 1800 FT FOR 3000 FT.' FOLLOWING THE SID, AT 1.8 DME, THE FO BEGAN HIS TURN TO HDG 110 DEGS AT 25 DEG BANK ANGLE TO COMPLETE THE TURN WITHIN 4 NM. 1/2 WAY AROUND THE TURN, THE CTLR TOLD THE TFC THAT WE WOULD BE CLBING ABOVE THEIR ALT, THEN GAVE US CLB CLRNC TO 15000 FT. IMMEDIATELY THE TCASII ALERTED 'TFC' FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY WITH 'DSND, DSND.' THE FO PUSHED FORWARD ABRUPTLY ON THE CTLS ATTEMPTING TO FOLLOW ITS GUIDANCE AT AN ESTIMATED NEGATIVE 1/2 G-FORCE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE FO BEGAN SCREAMING SOMETHING ABOUT THE CTLR AND THE TFC, WHILE WE WERE IN A 30 DEG BANKED DSCNT. AT THE SAME TIME THE RA ALERTED, I HAD CAUGHT SIGHT OF THE TFC -- A LIGHT ACFT AT 3-4 MI DISTANCE. THE RADIO CONVERSATIONS WERE BUSY AND I WS TRYING TO PAY ATTN TO WHAT WAS BEING SAID AS I SAW OUR TFC. AFTER THE FO CALMED DOWN, I CALMLY TOLD THE FO TO CONTINUE THE CLB AND NOTIFIED ATC OF THE RA. I -- DUE TO THE FO'S TALKING, THE RADIO, AND THE TCASII ALERT ALL AT ONCE -- WAS NOT HEARD BY THE FO, AS I SAID TO HIM 'TFC IN SIGHT AND NO FACTOR, CONTINUE CLBING.' INSTEAD, HE DSNDED TOWARDS A LOWER CLOUD DECK AROUND 2500 FT. LATER I BRIEFED THE FO THAT HIS MANEUVER WAS TOO AGGRESSIVE AND ABRUPT. HE WAS NOT SMOOTH AT ALL. AT THE SAME TIME THE TCAS SOUNDED, I CAUGHT SIGHT OF THE TFC AT 3 MI VISUALLY. IN MY JUDGEMENT, IF WE HAD CONTINUED IN OUR TURN AND CLBING (AS CLRED) THE TFC WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSING AWAY FROM US AND BELOW OUR ALT AND NO FACTOR. BUT SINCE THE FO DELAYED HIS CLB FOR A SECOND OR TWO, THE TCASII TOOK CTL OF THE SIT. WE ENDED UP WITH AN UNCOMFORTABLE DSCNT WHEN WE SHOULD HAVE CLBED OUT WITH NO CONFLICTS. PAX WERE GIVEN AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHAT HAPPENED ON THE PA SYS BY ME TWICE -- ONCE DURING CLBOUT, AND AFTER GATE ARR IN PHX. THE DEP REQUIRES A TURN AT 1.8 DME FROM SJC AND THAT THE TURN BE COMPLETED WITHIN 4 NM OF SJC. THIS SID IS RESTRICTIVE AND IS UNSAFE DUE TO THE FACT THAT COMMERCIAL ACFT ARE HEAVIEST AT THIS POINT OF FLT AND FORCED TO FLY SLOW IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE SID RESTR. ADDING A 3000 FT HOLD-DOWN ALT ALONG WITH THAT TIGHT TURN AND TFC AT 3000 FT CLOSES THE MARGINS FOR SAFETY FURTHER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 509476: UPON DEP OUT OF SJC, TWR TOLD US TO LEVEL AT 3000 FT INSTEAD OF THE USUAL 5000 FT. DURING CLB, I HEARD ANOTHER ACFT RPT AT 3000 FT AND THAT ACFT WAS TOLD BY ATC TO LOOK FOR MD80 TFC (US) THAT WOULD CLB ABOVE THEM. I EXPRESSED MY CONCERN TO THE CAPT ABOUT BOTH OF US AT THE SAME ALT, BUT WAS TOLD HE KNEW WE WERE LEVELING INSTEAD OF CLBING. AS WE MADE THE REQUIRED TURN, A TARGET CAME INTO VIEW ON TCASII AT APPROX 11-12 O'CLOCK POS, AT OUR ALT. THE TARGET THEN MOVED INSIDE THE 3 MI RING AND BECAME A TA, FOLLOWED BY A 'DSND' RA OF APPROX 2500 FPM. I ABRUPTLY -- TOO ABRUPTLY IT SEEMS -- PITCHED DOWN AND DSNDED TO 2500 FT OR SO. AT THE SAME TIME THIS IS HAPPENING THE CAPT SAYS HE GOT THE ACFT IN SIGHT AND WAS ISSUED A CLB CLRNC BY ATC. I WAS NOT AWARE OF EITHER EVENT UNTIL WELL AFTER THE FACT. I WAS TOLD I TOTALLY OVERREACTED TO A NON COLLISION SIT. I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DSND SMOOTHLY IN AN EMER, AND DON'T KNOW HOW TCASII WORKS AND WHEN TO IGNORE RA COMMANDS. I WAS ALSO TOLD I HAD NO IDEA WHAT ATC WAS DOING EITHER, EVEN THOUGH WHAT THEY DID GENERATED AN RA THAT I ASKED ABOUT BEFORE IT EVEN HAPPENED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.