Narrative:

While climbing at FL300 there was a muffled explosion accompanied by the airplane yawing and #1 engine instrument indications rolling back. Oil quantity was zero. I idented failure of the #1 engine (left). We told ATC we had an engine failure and needed to stop our climb. We prepared for drift down to single engine cruise altitude and completed the engine failure checklist. I declared an emergency with ATC and requested clearance to chs where we conducted an uneventful single engine landing. My first officer was a new hire and was on his first IOE trip. Our company schedules a qualified first officer to accompany the crew on these trips, and he was of assistance in the cockpit. The professionalism of ZJX and chs approach/tower was highly commendable and greatly reduced our workload in the cockpit. As a result of this experience, I believe that training focused on engine failure during the en route phase of flight would enhance a flight crew's situational analysis and prioritization of tasks required to get the airplane safely to the nearest suitable airport. We receive intensive training on engine failure during the takeoff evolution and subsequent single engine landing and as a result the actual approach and landing on this flight was virtually a routine evolution. My highest workload was encountered while assessing the risks associated with having only 1 engine operating, at night, over water 90 mi from land with 128 passenger and crew on board. What is safer? Maintain altitude till over land, or expediting descent and minimizing time in the air with only 1 engine? I personally intend to do more in-depth study on driftdown procedures and performance and large aircraft glide performance in the event that last engine fails.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A TWIN ENG ACR FLT EXPERIENCED AN INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN AT FL300 90 MI OFFSHORE DURING A NIGHT OP SE OF CHS, SC.

Narrative: WHILE CLBING AT FL300 THERE WAS A MUFFLED EXPLOSION ACCOMPANIED BY THE AIRPLANE YAWING AND #1 ENG INST INDICATIONS ROLLING BACK. OIL QUANTITY WAS ZERO. I IDENTED FAILURE OF THE #1 ENG (L). WE TOLD ATC WE HAD AN ENG FAILURE AND NEEDED TO STOP OUR CLB. WE PREPARED FOR DRIFT DOWN TO SINGLE ENG CRUISE ALT AND COMPLETED THE ENG FAILURE CHKLIST. I DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC AND REQUESTED CLRNC TO CHS WHERE WE CONDUCTED AN UNEVENTFUL SINGLE ENG LNDG. MY FO WAS A NEW HIRE AND WAS ON HIS FIRST IOE TRIP. OUR COMPANY SCHEDULES A QUALIFIED FO TO ACCOMPANY THE CREW ON THESE TRIPS, AND HE WAS OF ASSISTANCE IN THE COCKPIT. THE PROFESSIONALISM OF ZJX AND CHS APCH/TWR WAS HIGHLY COMMENDABLE AND GREATLY REDUCED OUR WORKLOAD IN THE COCKPIT. AS A RESULT OF THIS EXPERIENCE, I BELIEVE THAT TRAINING FOCUSED ON ENG FAILURE DURING THE ENRTE PHASE OF FLT WOULD ENHANCE A FLC'S SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS AND PRIORITIZATION OF TASKS REQUIRED TO GET THE AIRPLANE SAFELY TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. WE RECEIVE INTENSIVE TRAINING ON ENG FAILURE DURING THE TKOF EVOLUTION AND SUBSEQUENT SINGLE ENG LNDG AND AS A RESULT THE ACTUAL APCH AND LNDG ON THIS FLT WAS VIRTUALLY A ROUTINE EVOLUTION. MY HIGHEST WORKLOAD WAS ENCOUNTERED WHILE ASSESSING THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH HAVING ONLY 1 ENG OPERATING, AT NIGHT, OVER WATER 90 MI FROM LAND WITH 128 PAX AND CREW ON BOARD. WHAT IS SAFER? MAINTAIN ALT TILL OVER LAND, OR EXPEDITING DSCNT AND MINIMIZING TIME IN THE AIR WITH ONLY 1 ENG? I PERSONALLY INTEND TO DO MORE IN-DEPTH STUDY ON DRIFTDOWN PROCS AND PERFORMANCE AND LARGE ACFT GLIDE PERFORMANCE IN THE EVENT THAT LAST ENG FAILS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.