Narrative:

The problem arose due to WX, runway confign (siro) and capacity problems at ewr. WX VFR/VMC. Strong northwesterly winds at 20-23 knots gusts 30-35 KTS. Light/mod turbulence in radar pattern, 10K airspeed fluctuations common. 'Approach in use ILS 4R, circle to lnd runway 29.' after extensive vectors, we flew the approach. On approximately 2 mile final to runway 29 we saw a turbo propeller on short final. We had no prior awareness of this traffic. When this commuter ('air carrier Y') missed the turnoff at taxiway uniform, we were approximately 200-300 ft above touchdown. I decided to go around to prevent a runway incursion. During the go around, ie 5-10 seconds into it, the PNF announced, 'watch out for that airplane.' I looked up from the instruments and saw an air carrier Z B737, at 11 O'clock high, heading northeast. Instinctively, I retarded thrust slightly and leveled off, or reduced climb rate to evade the air carrier Z flight and insure the most separation possible in the conflict. We climbed to 1700 MSL per tower instructions/clearance. Subsequently, we entered a VFR pattern, following a B737 back around for another landing on runway 29. Second landing normal. After, however, we exited at taxiway bb, returning southeast bound on taxiway west, we had to yield to another B737 which had landed behind us. Lahso siro, there seems to be an apparently dangerous traffic conflict at ewr. This seems to be allowed to increase capacity within this siro confign there is minimal separation or inadequate separation of traffic on this procedure. Terminology on circle versus visual approach. As crew, we were not advised to follow or 'self space' our aircraft. Small aircraft visibility in high task load. Small aircraft not having a separate runway. TCASII equipment we received no TCAS warning or caution on aircraft Z because we were at low altitude. Use of TCASII at all altitudes needs to be considered as long as lahso/siro is allowed by ATC. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he and many other air carrier pilots operating out of ewr are concerned about the ATCT technique used to separate traffic when visual approachs are in progress. The use of cross runway simultaneous operations is dangerous when an unexpected go around, or missed approach, is made on the cross runway 29 when takeoffs are being made on runway 4L. The pilots are obligated to go around if their wind shear warning sounds off, or another aircraft has not cleared the runway in time for landing. He further stated that the FAA management has since looked into this matter and has taken action against the controllers and recommended that some changes be made to provide better separation during visual operations. Subsequent callback revealed the following information: reporter stated that he was operating a B737 and the turbo propeller still on his runway 29, causing his go around, was a low wing turbo propeller commuter. He advised that the aircraft alarmed him the most was the B737 departing runway 4L which is an intersecting runway, causing a loss of separation with his aircraft on go around. He believes that this is unacceptable since controllers, or pilots do not know when another aircraft on a crossing runway will have to make a going around, missed approach, or respond for a wind shear warning. He stated that lahso was not involved in this incident. However, siro was since it was simultaneous intersecting runway operations. He further stated that he received a memorandum through his company from the tower, substantially worded as follows: investigation of reporter's incident was concluded as the ewr procedures meet currently acceptable standards and no action is necessary or mandated. However, extra steps are being taken to brief controller crews weekly and this procedure will be a focus of manual training. They agree that this is not a preferred method of operation, but in a busy traffic environment where we ask pilots and cltrs alike to operate at peek efficiency, we can expect events such as this on occasions. His final comment was that he had advised his chief pilot that he does not want to fly into ewr until traffic control procedures are changed to assure separation and not just 'hope for it!'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CAPT COMPLAINT REGARDING EWR ATCT CTLR HANDLING OF TFC ON A VFR DAY WITH GUSTY SURFACE WINDS IN NOT PROVIDING ADEQUATE ACFT SEPARATION.

Narrative: THE PROB AROSE DUE TO WX, RWY CONFIGN (SIRO) AND CAPACITY PROBS AT EWR. WX VFR/VMC. STRONG NORTHWESTERLY WINDS AT 20-23 KNOTS GUSTS 30-35 KTS. LIGHT/MOD TURBULENCE IN RADAR PATTERN, 10K AIRSPEED FLUCTUATIONS COMMON. 'APCH IN USE ILS 4R, CIRCLE TO LND RWY 29.' AFTER EXTENSIVE VECTORS, WE FLEW THE APCH. ON APPROX 2 MILE FINAL TO RWY 29 WE SAW A TURBO PROP ON SHORT FINAL. WE HAD NO PRIOR AWARENESS OF THIS TFC. WHEN THIS COMMUTER ('ACR Y') MISSED THE TURNOFF AT TXWY UNIFORM, WE WERE APPROX 200-300 FT ABOVE TOUCHDOWN. I DECIDED TO GAR TO PREVENT A RWY INCURSION. DURING THE GAR, IE 5-10 SECS INTO IT, THE PNF ANNOUNCED, 'WATCH OUT FOR THAT AIRPLANE.' I LOOKED UP FROM THE INSTRUMENTS AND SAW AN ACR Z B737, AT 11 O'CLOCK HIGH, HEADING NE. INSTINCTIVELY, I RETARDED THRUST SLIGHTLY AND LEVELED OFF, OR REDUCED CLB RATE TO EVADE THE ACR Z FLT AND INSURE THE MOST SEPARATION POSSIBLE IN THE CONFLICT. WE CLBED TO 1700 MSL PER TWR INSTRUCTIONS/CLRNC. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE ENTERED A VFR PATTERN, FOLLOWING A B737 BACK AROUND FOR ANOTHER LNDG ON RWY 29. SECOND LNDG NORMAL. AFTER, HOWEVER, WE EXITED AT TXWY BB, RETURNING SE BOUND ON TXWY W, WE HAD TO YIELD TO ANOTHER B737 WHICH HAD LANDED BEHIND US. LAHSO SIRO, THERE SEEMS TO BE AN APPARENTLY DANGEROUS TFC CONFLICT AT EWR. THIS SEEMS TO BE ALLOWED TO INCREASE CAPACITY WITHIN THIS SIRO CONFIGN THERE IS MINIMAL SEPARATION OR INADEQUATE SEPARATION OF TFC ON THIS PROC. TERMINOLOGY ON CIRCLE VERSUS VISUAL APCH. AS CREW, WE WERE NOT ADVISED TO FOLLOW OR 'SELF SPACE' OUR ACFT. SMALL ACFT VISIBILITY IN HIGH TASK LOAD. SMALL ACFT NOT HAVING A SEPARATE RWY. TCASII EQUIP WE RECEIVED NO TCAS WARNING OR CAUTION ON ACFT Z BECAUSE WE WERE AT LOW ALTITUDE. USE OF TCASII AT ALL ALTITUDES NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED AS LONG AS LAHSO/SIRO IS ALLOWED BY ATC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE AND MANY OTHER ACR PLTS OPERATING OUT OF EWR ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ATCT TECHNIQUE USED TO SEPARATE TFC WHEN VISUAL APCHS ARE IN PROGRESS. THE USE OF CROSS RWY SIMULTANEOUS OPS IS DANGEROUS WHEN AN UNEXPECTED GAR, OR MISSED APCH, IS MADE ON THE CROSS RWY 29 WHEN TKOFS ARE BEING MADE ON RWY 4L. THE PLTS ARE OBLIGATED TO GAR IF THEIR WIND SHEAR WARNING SOUNDS OFF, OR ANOTHER ACFT HAS NOT CLRED THE RWY IN TIME FOR LNDG. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE FAA MGMNT HAS SINCE LOOKED INTO THIS MATTER AND HAS TAKEN ACTION AGAINST THE CTLRS AND RECOMMENDED THAT SOME CHANGES BE MADE TO PROVIDE BETTER SEPARATION DURING VISUAL OPS. SUBSEQUENT CALLBACK REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE WAS OPERATING A B737 AND THE TURBO PROP STILL ON HIS RWY 29, CAUSING HIS GAR, WAS A LOW WING TURBO PROP COMMUTER. HE ADVISED THAT THE ACFT ALARMED HIM THE MOST WAS THE B737 DEPARTING RWY 4L WHICH IS AN INTERSECTING RWY, CAUSING A LOSS OF SEPARATION WITH HIS ACFT ON GAR. HE BELIEVES THAT THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE SINCE CTLRS, OR PLTS DO NOT KNOW WHEN ANOTHER ACFT ON A CROSSING RWY WILL HAVE TO MAKE A GOING AROUND, MISSED APCH, OR RESPOND FOR A WIND SHEAR WARNING. HE STATED THAT LAHSO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT. HOWEVER, SIRO WAS SINCE IT WAS SIMULTANEOUS INTERSECTING RWY OPS. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE RECEIVED A MEMORANDUM THROUGH HIS COMPANY FROM THE TWR, SUBSTANTIALLY WORDED AS FOLLOWS: INVESTIGATION OF RPTR'S INCIDENT WAS CONCLUDED AS THE EWR PROCS MEET CURRENTLY ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS AND NO ACTION IS NECESSARY OR MANDATED. HOWEVER, EXTRA STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO BRIEF CTLR CREWS WEEKLY AND THIS PROC WILL BE A FOCUS OF MANUAL TRAINING. THEY AGREE THAT THIS IS NOT A PREFERRED METHOD OF OP, BUT IN A BUSY TRAFFIC ENVIRONMENT WHERE WE ASK PLTS AND CLTRS ALIKE TO OPERATE AT PEEK EFFICIENCY, WE CAN EXPECT EVENTS SUCH AS THIS ON OCCASIONS. HIS FINAL COMMENT WAS THAT HE HAD ADVISED HIS CHIEF PLT THAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO FLY INTO EWR UNTIL TFC CTL PROCS ARE CHANGED TO ASSURE SEPARATION AND NOT JUST 'HOPE FOR IT!'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.