Narrative:

A B737 on landing roll for runway 7R, a B737 on departure roll for runway 7L. I told the landing aircraft to 'turn left, taxi via east, hold short of runway 7L at F9.' the problem with this instruction was taxiway 'east' is actually on the other side of runway 7L. The F9 intersection is between the runways on taxiway foxtrot. The pilot read back, 'roger crossing runway 7L.' I immediately told the B737 to stop. Aircraft stopped with the nose wheel across the hold bars, the departure off 7L became airborne prior to the intersection. I believe the human performance considerations that played an integral factor, other than the obvious of me stating the wrong taxiway, the pilot for the crossing aircraft exited the runway fast and read back the wrong instructions in regards to crossing the other runway. There seemed to be some hesitation in his voice, in retrospect. If there was a doubt, the aircraft should have stopped immediately after clearing runway 7R and asked me to repeat the instructions. From my standpoint as a controller, to prevent such a recurrence, it is imperative that when instructions are given, there is no room for interpretation. Supplemental information from acn 498939: while taxiing off 07R we were told to continue, right turn on echo, hold short at F9. The clearance didn't sound right, so I asked the first officer to clarify that we were cleared to cross 07L. When the first officer queried tower I was already applying the brakes because I could see a B737 with its lights on and looking like it might be on takeoff roll. By the time the aircraft stopped we were beyond the hold short line but well short of the runway 07L side boundaries. The B737 was indeed taking off and was 200-300 ft in the air when he passed our position. There was no close call, no actual runway incursion, and no conflict -- just a miss communicated clearance by tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLC INITIATE BRAKING ACTION TO STOP XING RWY 7L AS PHX LC RECOGNIZES DEPING ACFT CONFLICT.

Narrative: A B737 ON LNDG ROLL FOR RWY 7R, A B737 ON DEPARTURE ROLL FOR RWY 7L. I TOLD THE LNDG ACFT TO 'TURN L, TAXI VIA E, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L AT F9.' THE PROB WITH THIS INSTRUCTION WAS TXWY 'E' IS ACTUALLY ON THE OTHER SIDE OF RWY 7L. THE F9 INTXN IS BTWN THE RWYS ON TXWY FOXTROT. THE PLT READ BACK, 'ROGER XING RWY 7L.' I IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE B737 TO STOP. ACFT STOPPED WITH THE NOSE WHEEL ACROSS THE HOLD BARS, THE DEP OFF 7L BECAME AIRBORNE PRIOR TO THE INTXN. I BELIEVE THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS THAT PLAYED AN INTEGRAL FACTOR, OTHER THAN THE OBVIOUS OF ME STATING THE WRONG TXWY, THE PLT FOR THE XING ACFT EXITED THE RWY FAST AND READ BACK THE WRONG INSTRUCTIONS IN REGARDS TO XING THE OTHER RWY. THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME HESITATION IN HIS VOICE, IN RETROSPECT. IF THERE WAS A DOUBT, THE ACFT SHOULD HAVE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY AFTER CLEARING RWY 7R AND ASKED ME TO REPEAT THE INSTRUCTIONS. FROM MY STANDPOINT AS A CTLR, TO PREVENT SUCH A RECURRENCE, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WHEN INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 498939: WHILE TAXIING OFF 07R WE WERE TOLD TO CONTINUE, R TURN ON ECHO, HOLD SHORT AT F9. THE CLRNC DIDN'T SOUND RIGHT, SO I ASKED THE FO TO CLARIFY THAT WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS 07L. WHEN THE FO QUERIED TWR I WAS ALREADY APPLYING THE BRAKES BECAUSE I COULD SEE A B737 WITH ITS LIGHTS ON AND LOOKING LIKE IT MIGHT BE ON TKOF ROLL. BY THE TIME THE ACFT STOPPED WE WERE BEYOND THE HOLD SHORT LINE BUT WELL SHORT OF THE RWY 07L SIDE BOUNDARIES. THE B737 WAS INDEED TAKING OFF AND WAS 200-300 FT IN THE AIR WHEN HE PASSED OUR POSITION. THERE WAS NO CLOSE CALL, NO ACTUAL RWY INCURSION, AND NO CONFLICT -- JUST A MISS COMMUNICATED CLRNC BY TWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.