B777 crew descended below the GS inside the OM.

Attributes
ACN	497950
Time
Date	200101
Day	Sun
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : lax.airport
State Reference	CA
Altitude	msl bound lower : 500 msl bound upper : 3500
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : sct.tracon tower : lax.tower
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	ils localizer only : 25l
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	arrival star : civet.civet 4
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 140 flight time total : 17000 flight time type : 480
ASRS Report	497950
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine
Events
Anomaly	altitude deviation : overshoot altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies non adherence : clearance other anomaly other anomaly other
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment : gpws other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Aircraft Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Arrival to lax from paris (cdg). After 10 hour flight, first officer briefed arrival and approach to lax. Visual conditions clear, but hazy. Briefing adequate, but hurried. Socal approach cleared us 'after fuelr, cleared ILS runway 25L, maintain 250 KTS.' first part of approach routine using all runway 25L stepdown altitudes. First officer (PF) held 250 KTS to approximately 13-14 DME (too long). Socal said '190 KTS to lima, call lax tower on 120.95.' first officer began slowing and attempted to maintain descent profile. He disconnected autoplt and autothrottles, with flaps 1 degree, gear was lowered at 210 KTS. Just inside lima (FAF), we descended below GS -- enough to activate GPWS GS warning. I told him to level off. He did, slowed, captured GS with flight director, completed approach and landing. Stabilized at 500 ft AGL (SOP requirement), but not at 1000 ft AGL (my requirement). Problems: 1) communications -- briefing too short and hurried. Breakdown as we tried to slow and maintain the descent profile. 2) SOP -- MCP discipline. PF makes MCP changes with autoplt and autothrottles connected. When he disconnected, he continued to make those changes as I talked to tower and approach (I did not correct him!). I made some MCP changes as well. Too many hands turning knobs -- not SOP for our company. 3) cockpit management -- I allowed a very experienced first officer to lead us into a potentially dangerous scenario. We did not get dangerously low, but we were too low. Clear breakdown on my part. Lack of SOP for first officer.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 CREW DSNDED BELOW THE GS INSIDE THE OM.

Narrative: ARR TO LAX FROM PARIS (CDG). AFTER 10 HR FLT, FO BRIEFED ARR AND APCH TO LAX. VISUAL CONDITIONS CLR, BUT HAZY. BRIEFING ADEQUATE, BUT HURRIED. SOCAL APCH CLRED US 'AFTER FUELR, CLRED ILS RWY 25L, MAINTAIN 250 KTS.' FIRST PART OF APCH ROUTINE USING ALL RWY 25L STEPDOWN ALTS. FO (PF) HELD 250 KTS TO APPROX 13-14 DME (TOO LONG). SOCAL SAID '190 KTS TO LIMA, CALL LAX TWR ON 120.95.' FO BEGAN SLOWING AND ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN DSCNT PROFILE. HE DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES, WITH FLAPS 1 DEG, GEAR WAS LOWERED AT 210 KTS. JUST INSIDE LIMA (FAF), WE DSNDED BELOW GS -- ENOUGH TO ACTIVATE GPWS GS WARNING. I TOLD HIM TO LEVEL OFF. HE DID, SLOWED, CAPTURED GS WITH FLT DIRECTOR, COMPLETED APCH AND LNDG. STABILIZED AT 500 FT AGL (SOP REQUIREMENT), BUT NOT AT 1000 FT AGL (MY REQUIREMENT). PROBS: 1) COMS -- BRIEFING TOO SHORT AND HURRIED. BREAKDOWN AS WE TRIED TO SLOW AND MAINTAIN THE DSCNT PROFILE. 2) SOP -- MCP DISCIPLINE. PF MAKES MCP CHANGES WITH AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES CONNECTED. WHEN HE DISCONNECTED, HE CONTINUED TO MAKE THOSE CHANGES AS I TALKED TO TWR AND APCH (I DID NOT CORRECT HIM!). I MADE SOME MCP CHANGES AS WELL. TOO MANY HANDS TURNING KNOBS -- NOT SOP FOR OUR COMPANY. 3) COCKPIT MGMNT -- I ALLOWED A VERY EXPERIENCED FO TO LEAD US INTO A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SCENARIO. WE DID NOT GET DANGEROUSLY LOW, BUT WE WERE TOO LOW. CLR BREAKDOWN ON MY PART. LACK OF SOP FOR FO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.