Narrative:

On this date, we may have taken off with less than the prescribed number of flight attendants. The facts are as follows: while briefing the lead flight attendant, I was told that 1 flight attendant had not yet arrived, that scheduling had been called and that she was on the way and would be at the aircraft by departure time. Just prior to takeoff, the lead flight attendant notified me that the missing flight attendant had not arrived as expected. Due to confusion and workload at pushback, she had just noticed that she in fact was not on board. Then I was told that there was a qualified flight attendant riding on the cabin jump seat, who agreed to performing the safety duties and that we were ok to go. I checked the flight operations manual and saw we needed 6 flight attendants. We had 6, so we took off. Later, we determined that this jump seat flight attendant may not have been legal, time-wise, for this leg. We continued to our destination, as I could see no jeopardy of safety. If a mistake had been made, we still had 6 qualified flight attendants. If I had known we were short a flight attendant, I definitely would not have taken off. However, I knew that using a deadheading or jump seating flight attendant had been approved for use in similar sits in the past, I felt we were legal and safe to go under this situation. Supplemental information from acn 496214: we felt that we were legal, and departed for slc. Supplemental information from acn 496256: as the dispatcher assigned to a flight in dec/00, a B767-300 from atl to slc, I was advised at approximately liftoff time by crew rerte that the flight was short staffed by 1 flight attendant per FARS. I was also advised that there should be a deadheading flight attendant on board who could be used to work the flight. Approximately 1 hour 20 mins after takeoff, the crew sent a message back via ACARS that the deadhead flight attendant could not be located. The crew responded that they had 5 working the flight, plus 1 jump seat flight attendant. After further research with crew rerte, I confirmed that the jump seat flight attendant was not legal to work, but that there were 2 other flight attendants scheduled to be riding jump seat, either one of which would be legal to work. I again passed this information to the crew to try to confirm that at least 1 was in fact on board and available. Captain could not confirm this, so at that time I directed the flight to land in den in order to reduce the time in the air without the proper flight attendant staffing required for emergency procedures. Captain did not concur, stating that he saw no difference in landing in den over slc, that 'a landing was a landing' and didn't feel it was necessary to unduly inconvenience the passenger. I restated my wish for him to land at den, we could put on an additional flight attendant, and reduce any further risk of inadequate staffing during any unforeseen emergency between den and slc. I stated that if we could not concur on the short landing in den, that he would then be operating under his 'emergency authority/authorized' to continue the flight. His last communication via ACARS stated that he felt it was as safe to continue to slc and would continue. I also believe a driving force was the captain's reluctance to be in a position of explaining the early landing to the passenger, that our airlines had made a mistake which needed correcting. At departure time in atl, we were in a freezing rain WX event. There were many delays due to long queues for deicing. This added delay and late operation, may have contributed to the captain's reluctance to land short at den. I also believe the captain may not have a clear concept of the joint authority/authorized concept between captain and dispatcher. This would include that when there is no mutual concurrence on the plan of action, and that if the captain continues flight without that joint concurrence, that he is in fact exercising his emergency authority/authorized. This may be a training issue for flight operations. Although the captain has final authority/authorized in the conduct of his flight, the authority/authorized granted by far to a dispatcher to initiate, conduct and/or terminate a flight, does not appear to be clear in the mind of many of our pilots.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MULTIPLE PLT AND DISPATCHER RPTS, B767-300, ATL-SLC. IN BRIEFING, PURSER TOLD CAPT THAT THEY WERE MISSING 1 CABIN ATTENDANT FOR FAA MINIMUM, CONVERTED TAXI JUMP SEATER TO WORK, TIME ILLEGAL. CAPT DEFIED DISPATCHER TO DIVERT TO DEN FOR LEGAL CABIN ATTENDANT.

Narrative: ON THIS DATE, WE MAY HAVE TAKEN OFF WITH LESS THAN THE PRESCRIBED NUMBER OF FLT ATTENDANTS. THE FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: WHILE BRIEFING THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT, I WAS TOLD THAT 1 FLT ATTENDANT HAD NOT YET ARRIVED, THAT SCHEDULING HAD BEEN CALLED AND THAT SHE WAS ON THE WAY AND WOULD BE AT THE ACFT BY DEP TIME. JUST PRIOR TO TKOF, THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT NOTIFIED ME THAT THE MISSING FLT ATTENDANT HAD NOT ARRIVED AS EXPECTED. DUE TO CONFUSION AND WORKLOAD AT PUSHBACK, SHE HAD JUST NOTICED THAT SHE IN FACT WAS NOT ON BOARD. THEN I WAS TOLD THAT THERE WAS A QUALIFIED FLT ATTENDANT RIDING ON THE CABIN JUMP SEAT, WHO AGREED TO PERFORMING THE SAFETY DUTIES AND THAT WE WERE OK TO GO. I CHKED THE FLT OPS MANUAL AND SAW WE NEEDED 6 FLT ATTENDANTS. WE HAD 6, SO WE TOOK OFF. LATER, WE DETERMINED THAT THIS JUMP SEAT FLT ATTENDANT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN LEGAL, TIME-WISE, FOR THIS LEG. WE CONTINUED TO OUR DEST, AS I COULD SEE NO JEOPARDY OF SAFETY. IF A MISTAKE HAD BEEN MADE, WE STILL HAD 6 QUALIFIED FLT ATTENDANTS. IF I HAD KNOWN WE WERE SHORT A FLT ATTENDANT, I DEFINITELY WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN OFF. HOWEVER, I KNEW THAT USING A DEADHEADING OR JUMP SEATING FLT ATTENDANT HAD BEEN APPROVED FOR USE IN SIMILAR SITS IN THE PAST, I FELT WE WERE LEGAL AND SAFE TO GO UNDER THIS SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 496214: WE FELT THAT WE WERE LEGAL, AND DEPARTED FOR SLC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 496256: AS THE DISPATCHER ASSIGNED TO A FLT IN DEC/00, A B767-300 FROM ATL TO SLC, I WAS ADVISED AT APPROX LIFTOFF TIME BY CREW RERTE THAT THE FLT WAS SHORT STAFFED BY 1 FLT ATTENDANT PER FARS. I WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DEADHEADING FLT ATTENDANT ON BOARD WHO COULD BE USED TO WORK THE FLT. APPROX 1 HR 20 MINS AFTER TKOF, THE CREW SENT A MESSAGE BACK VIA ACARS THAT THE DEADHEAD FLT ATTENDANT COULD NOT BE LOCATED. THE CREW RESPONDED THAT THEY HAD 5 WORKING THE FLT, PLUS 1 JUMP SEAT FLT ATTENDANT. AFTER FURTHER RESEARCH WITH CREW RERTE, I CONFIRMED THAT THE JUMP SEAT FLT ATTENDANT WAS NOT LEGAL TO WORK, BUT THAT THERE WERE 2 OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS SCHEDULED TO BE RIDING JUMP SEAT, EITHER ONE OF WHICH WOULD BE LEGAL TO WORK. I AGAIN PASSED THIS INFO TO THE CREW TO TRY TO CONFIRM THAT AT LEAST 1 WAS IN FACT ON BOARD AND AVAILABLE. CAPT COULD NOT CONFIRM THIS, SO AT THAT TIME I DIRECTED THE FLT TO LAND IN DEN IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE TIME IN THE AIR WITHOUT THE PROPER FLT ATTENDANT STAFFING REQUIRED FOR EMER PROCS. CAPT DID NOT CONCUR, STATING THAT HE SAW NO DIFFERENCE IN LNDG IN DEN OVER SLC, THAT 'A LNDG WAS A LNDG' AND DIDN'T FEEL IT WAS NECESSARY TO UNDULY INCONVENIENCE THE PAX. I RESTATED MY WISH FOR HIM TO LAND AT DEN, WE COULD PUT ON AN ADDITIONAL FLT ATTENDANT, AND REDUCE ANY FURTHER RISK OF INADEQUATE STAFFING DURING ANY UNFORESEEN EMER BTWN DEN AND SLC. I STATED THAT IF WE COULD NOT CONCUR ON THE SHORT LNDG IN DEN, THAT HE WOULD THEN BE OPERATING UNDER HIS 'EMER AUTH' TO CONTINUE THE FLT. HIS LAST COM VIA ACARS STATED THAT HE FELT IT WAS AS SAFE TO CONTINUE TO SLC AND WOULD CONTINUE. I ALSO BELIEVE A DRIVING FORCE WAS THE CAPT'S RELUCTANCE TO BE IN A POS OF EXPLAINING THE EARLY LNDG TO THE PAX, THAT OUR AIRLINES HAD MADE A MISTAKE WHICH NEEDED CORRECTING. AT DEP TIME IN ATL, WE WERE IN A FREEZING RAIN WX EVENT. THERE WERE MANY DELAYS DUE TO LONG QUEUES FOR DEICING. THIS ADDED DELAY AND LATE OP, MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE CAPT'S RELUCTANCE TO LAND SHORT AT DEN. I ALSO BELIEVE THE CAPT MAY NOT HAVE A CLR CONCEPT OF THE JOINT AUTH CONCEPT BTWN CAPT AND DISPATCHER. THIS WOULD INCLUDE THAT WHEN THERE IS NO MUTUAL CONCURRENCE ON THE PLAN OF ACTION, AND THAT IF THE CAPT CONTINUES FLT WITHOUT THAT JOINT CONCURRENCE, THAT HE IS IN FACT EXERCISING HIS EMER AUTH. THIS MAY BE A TRAINING ISSUE FOR FLT OPS. ALTHOUGH THE CAPT HAS FINAL AUTH IN THE CONDUCT OF HIS FLT, THE AUTH GRANTED BY FAR TO A DISPATCHER TO INITIATE, CONDUCT AND/OR TERMINATE A FLT, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE CLR IN THE MIND OF MANY OF OUR PLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.