Narrative:

This incident took place on oct/tue/00 at XA43Z. Air carrier abcd was a repositioning flight after a weekend air show at alliance ft worth airport. The flight was scheduled to fly from afw to dfw without cargo, then load cargo and proceed to mem. The aircraft and cockpit had been open to the public during the air show, so each crew member was especially thorough during preflight preparation. The flight from afw to dfw is approximately 10 mins, but it would be extremely busy. Prior to taxi, the crew briefed both the departure from afw, as well as the approach to dfw. As the flight engineer, I was concerned that I would not have time to complete all my duties prior to landing, so the captain directed that I complete a landing data card on the ground at afw, using predicted fuel burn to calculate landing weight and balance. The aircraft was very light (for a DC10), with a ZFW (zero fuel weight) of 221820 pounds and takeoff fuel of 27500 pounds. Takeoff gross weight was 249320 pounds. I do not recall the exact V1 or vr, but it would be relatively low due to the low gross weight. While completing the before takeoff checklist, I decided it might be a good idea to turn on the forward boost pumps in each tank, usually done during the in-range checklist. I thought this would be a good way to reduce the number of tasks I would have to complete during the short flight, and enable me to have more time to assist the crew in looking for traffic and monitoring the approach. I turned on the pumps, and I announced my intentions to the crew. There was no objection. During the takeoff roll, everything was normal up to the 80 KT callout. Approaching 100 KTS, the master caution light and fuel cue lights came on, and the rejected takeoff was immediately initiated by the captain. As soon as the caution light came on, I scanned my panel to determine the problem, and realized immediately that it was caused by the forward boost pumps. Because the fuel load was so light, less than 10000 pounds per tank, the fuel had been forced aft by inertia during the takeoff roll, uncovering the forward boost pumps, and triggering the master caution. I immediately realized what had happened, but by the time I could verbalize my conclusion, the rejected takeoff was already in progress. The rest of the rejected takeoff was by the book, and we returned to the ramp for the required brake cooling and maintenance checks. We discussed what happened, and I took full responsibility for my error. The captain stated that with the V1 and vr so low, he felt he did not have much time to analyze the situation, and that, combined with the knowledge that the plane had just come out of an air show, precipitated his instantaneous decision to reject the takeoff. The rejected takeoff was my fault, because I tried to get ahead of my checklists and reduce my workload during the short flight. The captain and first officer performed all their duties admirably, and after the brake cooling was complete, the flts to dfw and mem were completed without incident, albeit a bit late. This experience has taught me that even though the afm may not say why a procedure should be done a certain way, there is an underlying reason. If I had waited until the proper time to turn on the forward boost pumps, the rejected takeoff would not have happened. I consider myself a very professional aviator and perfectionist, and I am ashamed by the stupidity of this mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC10 CREW HAD AN ABORTED TKOF AT AFW.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON OCT/TUE/00 AT XA43Z. ACR ABCD WAS A REPOSITIONING FLT AFTER A WEEKEND AIR SHOW AT ALLIANCE FT WORTH ARPT. THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY FROM AFW TO DFW WITHOUT CARGO, THEN LOAD CARGO AND PROCEED TO MEM. THE ACFT AND COCKPIT HAD BEEN OPEN TO THE PUBLIC DURING THE AIR SHOW, SO EACH CREW MEMBER WAS ESPECIALLY THOROUGH DURING PREFLT PREPARATION. THE FLT FROM AFW TO DFW IS APPROX 10 MINS, BUT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY BUSY. PRIOR TO TAXI, THE CREW BRIEFED BOTH THE DEP FROM AFW, AS WELL AS THE APCH TO DFW. AS THE FE, I WAS CONCERNED THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE TIME TO COMPLETE ALL MY DUTIES PRIOR TO LNDG, SO THE CAPT DIRECTED THAT I COMPLETE A LNDG DATA CARD ON THE GND AT AFW, USING PREDICTED FUEL BURN TO CALCULATE LNDG WT AND BAL. THE ACFT WAS VERY LIGHT (FOR A DC10), WITH A ZFW (ZERO FUEL WT) OF 221820 LBS AND TKOF FUEL OF 27500 LBS. TKOF GROSS WT WAS 249320 LBS. I DO NOT RECALL THE EXACT V1 OR VR, BUT IT WOULD BE RELATIVELY LOW DUE TO THE LOW GROSS WT. WHILE COMPLETING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, I DECIDED IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO TURN ON THE FORWARD BOOST PUMPS IN EACH TANK, USUALLY DONE DURING THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST. I THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD WAY TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TASKS I WOULD HAVE TO COMPLETE DURING THE SHORT FLT, AND ENABLE ME TO HAVE MORE TIME TO ASSIST THE CREW IN LOOKING FOR TFC AND MONITORING THE APCH. I TURNED ON THE PUMPS, AND I ANNOUNCED MY INTENTIONS TO THE CREW. THERE WAS NO OBJECTION. DURING THE TKOF ROLL, EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL UP TO THE 80 KT CALLOUT. APCHING 100 KTS, THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT AND FUEL CUE LIGHTS CAME ON, AND THE REJECTED TKOF WAS IMMEDIATELY INITIATED BY THE CAPT. AS SOON AS THE CAUTION LIGHT CAME ON, I SCANNED MY PANEL TO DETERMINE THE PROB, AND REALIZED IMMEDIATELY THAT IT WAS CAUSED BY THE FORWARD BOOST PUMPS. BECAUSE THE FUEL LOAD WAS SO LIGHT, LESS THAN 10000 LBS PER TANK, THE FUEL HAD BEEN FORCED AFT BY INERTIA DURING THE TKOF ROLL, UNCOVERING THE FORWARD BOOST PUMPS, AND TRIGGERING THE MASTER CAUTION. I IMMEDIATELY REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED, BUT BY THE TIME I COULD VERBALIZE MY CONCLUSION, THE REJECTED TKOF WAS ALREADY IN PROGRESS. THE REST OF THE REJECTED TKOF WAS BY THE BOOK, AND WE RETURNED TO THE RAMP FOR THE REQUIRED BRAKE COOLING AND MAINT CHKS. WE DISCUSSED WHAT HAPPENED, AND I TOOK FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY ERROR. THE CAPT STATED THAT WITH THE V1 AND VR SO LOW, HE FELT HE DID NOT HAVE MUCH TIME TO ANALYZE THE SIT, AND THAT, COMBINED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PLANE HAD JUST COME OUT OF AN AIR SHOW, PRECIPITATED HIS INSTANTANEOUS DECISION TO REJECT THE TKOF. THE REJECTED TKOF WAS MY FAULT, BECAUSE I TRIED TO GET AHEAD OF MY CHKLISTS AND REDUCE MY WORKLOAD DURING THE SHORT FLT. THE CAPT AND FO PERFORMED ALL THEIR DUTIES ADMIRABLY, AND AFTER THE BRAKE COOLING WAS COMPLETE, THE FLTS TO DFW AND MEM WERE COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT, ALBEIT A BIT LATE. THIS EXPERIENCE HAS TAUGHT ME THAT EVEN THOUGH THE AFM MAY NOT SAY WHY A PROC SHOULD BE DONE A CERTAIN WAY, THERE IS AN UNDERLYING REASON. IF I HAD WAITED UNTIL THE PROPER TIME TO TURN ON THE FORWARD BOOST PUMPS, THE REJECTED TKOF WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. I CONSIDER MYSELF A VERY PROFESSIONAL AVIATOR AND PERFECTIONIST, AND I AM ASHAMED BY THE STUPIDITY OF THIS MISTAKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.