Narrative:

At approximately XA45, I was working the sjs (R-57) position when several targets transited my airspace and the sgj (R-58) sector without any pointout or call for handoff. I was briefed in my relief briefing that the plk north MOA was hot at 15000 ft and below. It was also posted on the status board. At some point after taking over the sector, satcs C and satcs D informed me that sealord might request the north and south MOA up to FL230 or FL300, but mentioned that they were hesitant to give it up at those altitudes because of deviations on mco departures. There was never any mention of an altitude reservation to the MOA. At close to XA45, atcs B, who was working the R-58 position (sgj), called sealord to inquire about aircraft codes that were in rainbow foxtrot, airspace that he owned. I don't know the whole conversation that went on between him and sealord, but he did tell them that they needed to call him with pointouts if those aircraft would be in his airspace. After a few mins, sealord proceeded to allow more aircraft to enter R-58's airspace without a call. Atcs B was forced to call them back to effect coordination to separate one of his aircraft. The altitude reservation, which transits sgj's sector and sjs's sector, and links to the plk north and south MOA, was never mentioned to him nor myself. Without much warning, several targets transited to the MOA via the altitude reservation, all squawking non discrete codes. I was then told by satcs C to show the MOA active up to FL240. Sealord, when asked about their aircraft being IFR or VFR, sounded confused and promised to call back. A couple of mins later, they called back and said their aircraft were VFR. I did witness some of their targets at IFR altitudes (level at 17000 ft), however. A short time later, my relief plugged in to relieve me. Right about this time, I had to call sealord to ask about an aircraft that appeared to spill out of the MOA. I told them that they needed to call me any time that happens. They sounded very unsure of what was going on, as they did most of the time throughout this episode. This particular aircraft then transited back to the warning area, through sjs's airspace and sgj's airspace, again with no pointout or other warning, also on a non discrete code. This aircraft transited level at 17000 ft. This was a very frustrating session in which I told satcs C that I was operating under article 65. Atcs B deserves recognition for a 'save' in which he pointed out conflicting traffic to sealord, essentially doing the job that was tasked to them. Supplemental information from acn 487489: I (atcs C) was working sgj sector (R58) at ZJX. I had an aircraft climbing to FL200 on a 160 degree heading, which was taking the aircraft towards rainbow F. I noticed 2 aircraft squawking XXXX in rainbow F. I asked my supervisor if rainbow F was still ours as I was briefed, and he said yes. I then called sealord to check out what was going on. The controller said that they were trying to get rainbow F and by the way I have a pointout. I referenced the traffic I had in rainbow F. About 3 mins later, I noticed a XXXX code about 2 mi east of dab, maneuvering at FL240. I called sealord to find out if they knew the code and to see if they knew what the aircraft was doing. I had my aircraft climbing and heading towards the unknown XXXX code. The controller said they were trying to get a hold of it. I tried to find out if their aircraft was climbing or descending. The controller didn't know. I then noticed the XXXX code descending so I kept my aircraft climbing. The XXXX code headed back towards sealord's airspace. A few mins later, my supervisor told me rainbow F was going hot. A few mins after that I noticed numerous aircraft on XXXX codes exiting rainbow F heading wbound. I got a call from sealord wanting the transit area. I told them I wasn't the person to talk to and to call my supervisor. Sealord told me that the mission desk told them to call the sector. I told them that they had to call my supervisor. There was no 10 min warning or anything. I watched numerous XXXX codes at IFR and VFR altitudes transit from the warning areas to the palatka MOA's without any pointout from sealord. I also saw aircraft spilling outof the palatka MOA's. R57 had to call sealord about an XXXX code at 17000 ft heading eastbound. They told him the aircraft was VFR. I saw numerous aircraft heading back to the warning areas but sealord made no attempt to point any aircraft out. This is a situation that was totally out of control and should never have happened.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZJX CTLR OBSERVES FACSFAX JAX MILFAC ACFT SPILL OUT OF RELEASED AIRSPACE AND CONFLICT WITH ZJX ACR.

Narrative: AT APPROX XA45, I WAS WORKING THE SJS (R-57) POS WHEN SEVERAL TARGETS TRANSITED MY AIRSPACE AND THE SGJ (R-58) SECTOR WITHOUT ANY POINTOUT OR CALL FOR HDOF. I WAS BRIEFED IN MY RELIEF BRIEFING THAT THE PLK N MOA WAS HOT AT 15000 FT AND BELOW. IT WAS ALSO POSTED ON THE STATUS BOARD. AT SOME POINT AFTER TAKING OVER THE SECTOR, SATCS C AND SATCS D INFORMED ME THAT SEALORD MIGHT REQUEST THE N AND S MOA UP TO FL230 OR FL300, BUT MENTIONED THAT THEY WERE HESITANT TO GIVE IT UP AT THOSE ALTS BECAUSE OF DEVS ON MCO DEPS. THERE WAS NEVER ANY MENTION OF AN ALT RESERVATION TO THE MOA. AT CLOSE TO XA45, ATCS B, WHO WAS WORKING THE R-58 POS (SGJ), CALLED SEALORD TO INQUIRE ABOUT ACFT CODES THAT WERE IN RAINBOW FOXTROT, AIRSPACE THAT HE OWNED. I DON'T KNOW THE WHOLE CONVERSATION THAT WENT ON BTWN HIM AND SEALORD, BUT HE DID TELL THEM THAT THEY NEEDED TO CALL HIM WITH POINTOUTS IF THOSE ACFT WOULD BE IN HIS AIRSPACE. AFTER A FEW MINS, SEALORD PROCEEDED TO ALLOW MORE ACFT TO ENTER R-58'S AIRSPACE WITHOUT A CALL. ATCS B WAS FORCED TO CALL THEM BACK TO EFFECT COORD TO SEPARATE ONE OF HIS ACFT. THE ALT RESERVATION, WHICH TRANSITS SGJ'S SECTOR AND SJS'S SECTOR, AND LINKS TO THE PLK N AND S MOA, WAS NEVER MENTIONED TO HIM NOR MYSELF. WITHOUT MUCH WARNING, SEVERAL TARGETS TRANSITED TO THE MOA VIA THE ALT RESERVATION, ALL SQUAWKING NON DISCRETE CODES. I WAS THEN TOLD BY SATCS C TO SHOW THE MOA ACTIVE UP TO FL240. SEALORD, WHEN ASKED ABOUT THEIR ACFT BEING IFR OR VFR, SOUNDED CONFUSED AND PROMISED TO CALL BACK. A COUPLE OF MINS LATER, THEY CALLED BACK AND SAID THEIR ACFT WERE VFR. I DID WITNESS SOME OF THEIR TARGETS AT IFR ALTS (LEVEL AT 17000 FT), HOWEVER. A SHORT TIME LATER, MY RELIEF PLUGGED IN TO RELIEVE ME. RIGHT ABOUT THIS TIME, I HAD TO CALL SEALORD TO ASK ABOUT AN ACFT THAT APPEARED TO SPILL OUT OF THE MOA. I TOLD THEM THAT THEY NEEDED TO CALL ME ANY TIME THAT HAPPENS. THEY SOUNDED VERY UNSURE OF WHAT WAS GOING ON, AS THEY DID MOST OF THE TIME THROUGHOUT THIS EPISODE. THIS PARTICULAR ACFT THEN TRANSITED BACK TO THE WARNING AREA, THROUGH SJS'S AIRSPACE AND SGJ'S AIRSPACE, AGAIN WITH NO POINTOUT OR OTHER WARNING, ALSO ON A NON DISCRETE CODE. THIS ACFT TRANSITED LEVEL AT 17000 FT. THIS WAS A VERY FRUSTRATING SESSION IN WHICH I TOLD SATCS C THAT I WAS OPERATING UNDER ARTICLE 65. ATCS B DESERVES RECOGNITION FOR A 'SAVE' IN WHICH HE POINTED OUT CONFLICTING TFC TO SEALORD, ESSENTIALLY DOING THE JOB THAT WAS TASKED TO THEM. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 487489: I (ATCS C) WAS WORKING SGJ SECTOR (R58) AT ZJX. I HAD AN ACFT CLBING TO FL200 ON A 160 DEG HDG, WHICH WAS TAKING THE ACFT TOWARDS RAINBOW F. I NOTICED 2 ACFT SQUAWKING XXXX IN RAINBOW F. I ASKED MY SUPVR IF RAINBOW F WAS STILL OURS AS I WAS BRIEFED, AND HE SAID YES. I THEN CALLED SEALORD TO CHK OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. THE CTLR SAID THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO GET RAINBOW F AND BY THE WAY I HAVE A POINTOUT. I REFED THE TFC I HAD IN RAINBOW F. ABOUT 3 MINS LATER, I NOTICED A XXXX CODE ABOUT 2 MI E OF DAB, MANEUVERING AT FL240. I CALLED SEALORD TO FIND OUT IF THEY KNEW THE CODE AND TO SEE IF THEY KNEW WHAT THE ACFT WAS DOING. I HAD MY ACFT CLBING AND HDG TOWARDS THE UNKNOWN XXXX CODE. THE CTLR SAID THEY WERE TRYING TO GET A HOLD OF IT. I TRIED TO FIND OUT IF THEIR ACFT WAS CLBING OR DSNDING. THE CTLR DIDN'T KNOW. I THEN NOTICED THE XXXX CODE DSNDING SO I KEPT MY ACFT CLBING. THE XXXX CODE HEADED BACK TOWARDS SEALORD'S AIRSPACE. A FEW MINS LATER, MY SUPVR TOLD ME RAINBOW F WAS GOING HOT. A FEW MINS AFTER THAT I NOTICED NUMEROUS ACFT ON XXXX CODES EXITING RAINBOW F HDG WBOUND. I GOT A CALL FROM SEALORD WANTING THE TRANSIT AREA. I TOLD THEM I WASN'T THE PERSON TO TALK TO AND TO CALL MY SUPVR. SEALORD TOLD ME THAT THE MISSION DESK TOLD THEM TO CALL THE SECTOR. I TOLD THEM THAT THEY HAD TO CALL MY SUPVR. THERE WAS NO 10 MIN WARNING OR ANYTHING. I WATCHED NUMEROUS XXXX CODES AT IFR AND VFR ALTS TRANSIT FROM THE WARNING AREAS TO THE PALATKA MOA'S WITHOUT ANY POINTOUT FROM SEALORD. I ALSO SAW ACFT SPILLING OUTOF THE PALATKA MOA'S. R57 HAD TO CALL SEALORD ABOUT AN XXXX CODE AT 17000 FT HDG EBOUND. THEY TOLD HIM THE ACFT WAS VFR. I SAW NUMEROUS ACFT HDG BACK TO THE WARNING AREAS BUT SEALORD MADE NO ATTEMPT TO POINT ANY ACFT OUT. THIS IS A SIT THAT WAS TOTALLY OUT OF CTL AND SHOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.