Narrative:

I was conducting IOE with a new hire first officer in an ATR42-320 and was the PF. We were expecting vectors to mem runway 36R. Mem has a new runway 36C which is still closed, and is proximal to runway 36R. Flight conditions were somewhat hazy. At approximately 10 mi from the airport we had the airport in sight and were cleared for the visual approach to runway 36R. We had briefed the approach earlier on the in-range checklist, and proceeded to run an approach checklist which included the tuning and identing of the runway 36R ILS. Due to the hazy conditions, we armed the approach and subsequently captured the localizer and GS. During the approach I disconnected the autoplt and hand flew the remainder of the approach. The visual picture experienced by both the first officer and me correlated with the instruments (ADI and HSI) and both indicated that we were lined up on the ILS and had a runway in sight directly ahead. We contacted the tower, were cleared to land, and proceeded with the landing. The visual image correlated with what was depicted on the runway diagram and the approach plate, specifically that runway 36C was displayed on the charts to have a significantly displaced threshold with respect to runway 36R&left. There were no visible indications on the runway such as closed signs, X's, men and equipment, or lack of appropriate markings to indicate that we were landing on anything other than the correct, open, and active runway. Neither myself nor my first officer at any time during or after the approach had any indication that we were not landing on the correct runway. Both I and my first officer recall normal CDI, GS, and flight director indications throughout the whole of the approach. The landing and rollout were normal and without incident. As we neared the exit to the runway, we got our first indication that something was not right. I commented that the high speed taxiway we normally exit on was closed, and my first officer stated that I could just turn left on the next 90 degree taxiway as that would take us directly to the ramp. As we taxied to the gate we both experienced feelings of confusion over what had just transpired. We could not reconcile the txwys we just used with what was expected. After arrival at the gate, and completion of the parking checklist, we discussed the arrival. We both postulated that it was possible that we had just landed on runway 36C which was closed. To clarify the situation, I contacted the tower by phone and was connected with the tower controller on duty at the time. He stated that an FAA flight check airman was performing arc approachs to runway 18C and thought they had seen an aircraft taxiing on the closed runway (runway 36C). I stated that there was some confusion on our part with regards to our taxi, and that we were unsure what had just happened. He stated that no one in the tower had watched our approach and landing or had seen anything. He said that as far as he was concerned we landed north runway 36R and that he was logging us as having landed on runway 36R and not to worry about it. He reported that technicians working on the runway 36C ILS had notified the tower that an air carrier X aircraft had landed on runway 36C. He stated that he was 'sending this downstairs,' apparently to the approach controllers to look into the matter. I queried him regarding the technicians and he stated that the technicians were there working on both runway 36C and runway 36R ILS's and were trying to certify the runway 36C ILS. I asked him if anything they were doing might have interfered with our arrival and he emphatically stated 'no!' after our return to iah, I again contacted the mem tower. This individual stated that the radar data had been looked at, and it appeared to indicate that we had in fact landed on runway 36C. He also stated that our approach track appeared to line up with runway 36C at a 5 mi final which coincides with our being established on the localizer at that time. I was told that the technicians had definitively reported to the tower that we had landed on runway 36C. It was reiterated that the technicians had in fact been working on the ILS's and that a flight check aircraft was in the area checking the approachs as well. I was told that the matter was being referred to memphis flight standards. In retrospect, both my first officer and I are somewhat bewildered over the incident. We believe that we did everything correctly, with due caution and care. We believe we followed all applicable company policies and procedures regarding visual approachs using current charts to brief the approach and identify the airport and runway environments, following and completing all checklists at the appropriate times, utilizing an ILS approach procedure to back up the approach, tuning and identing the ILS, arming and capturing the ILS localizer and GS, following the instrument cues until the runway was clearly in sight, and monitoring the instruments to confirm localizer and GS track until landing. We have no reasonable explanation to correlate our actions with the reported outcome. We have no knowledge or memory of actions or inactions that brought us to this point. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the chart the reporter had of the airport indicated a displaced threshold on runway 36C. The runway was complete with standard markings showing no displacement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LNDG ON CLOSED RWY 36C AT MEM, TN.

Narrative: I WAS CONDUCTING IOE WITH A NEW HIRE FO IN AN ATR42-320 AND WAS THE PF. WE WERE EXPECTING VECTORS TO MEM RWY 36R. MEM HAS A NEW RWY 36C WHICH IS STILL CLOSED, AND IS PROXIMAL TO RWY 36R. FLT CONDITIONS WERE SOMEWHAT HAZY. AT APPROX 10 MI FROM THE ARPT WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36R. WE HAD BRIEFED THE APCH EARLIER ON THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST, AND PROCEEDED TO RUN AN APCH CHKLIST WHICH INCLUDED THE TUNING AND IDENTING OF THE RWY 36R ILS. DUE TO THE HAZY CONDITIONS, WE ARMED THE APCH AND SUBSEQUENTLY CAPTURED THE LOC AND GS. DURING THE APCH I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND HAND FLEW THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH. THE VISUAL PICTURE EXPERIENCED BY BOTH THE FO AND ME CORRELATED WITH THE INSTS (ADI AND HSI) AND BOTH INDICATED THAT WE WERE LINED UP ON THE ILS AND HAD A RWY IN SIGHT DIRECTLY AHEAD. WE CONTACTED THE TWR, WERE CLRED TO LAND, AND PROCEEDED WITH THE LNDG. THE VISUAL IMAGE CORRELATED WITH WHAT WAS DEPICTED ON THE RWY DIAGRAM AND THE APCH PLATE, SPECIFICALLY THAT RWY 36C WAS DISPLAYED ON THE CHARTS TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANTLY DISPLACED THRESHOLD WITH RESPECT TO RWY 36R&L. THERE WERE NO VISIBLE INDICATIONS ON THE RWY SUCH AS CLOSED SIGNS, X'S, MEN AND EQUIP, OR LACK OF APPROPRIATE MARKINGS TO INDICATE THAT WE WERE LNDG ON ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE CORRECT, OPEN, AND ACTIVE RWY. NEITHER MYSELF NOR MY FO AT ANY TIME DURING OR AFTER THE APCH HAD ANY INDICATION THAT WE WERE NOT LNDG ON THE CORRECT RWY. BOTH I AND MY FO RECALL NORMAL CDI, GS, AND FLT DIRECTOR INDICATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF THE APCH. THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE NORMAL AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. AS WE NEARED THE EXIT TO THE RWY, WE GOT OUR FIRST INDICATION THAT SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT. I COMMENTED THAT THE HIGH SPD TXWY WE NORMALLY EXIT ON WAS CLOSED, AND MY FO STATED THAT I COULD JUST TURN L ON THE NEXT 90 DEG TXWY AS THAT WOULD TAKE US DIRECTLY TO THE RAMP. AS WE TAXIED TO THE GATE WE BOTH EXPERIENCED FEELINGS OF CONFUSION OVER WHAT HAD JUST TRANSPIRED. WE COULD NOT RECONCILE THE TXWYS WE JUST USED WITH WHAT WAS EXPECTED. AFTER ARR AT THE GATE, AND COMPLETION OF THE PARKING CHKLIST, WE DISCUSSED THE ARR. WE BOTH POSTULATED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT WE HAD JUST LANDED ON RWY 36C WHICH WAS CLOSED. TO CLARIFY THE SIT, I CONTACTED THE TWR BY PHONE AND WAS CONNECTED WITH THE TWR CTLR ON DUTY AT THE TIME. HE STATED THAT AN FAA FLT CHK AIRMAN WAS PERFORMING ARC APCHS TO RWY 18C AND THOUGHT THEY HAD SEEN AN ACFT TAXIING ON THE CLOSED RWY (RWY 36C). I STATED THAT THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION ON OUR PART WITH REGARDS TO OUR TAXI, AND THAT WE WERE UNSURE WHAT HAD JUST HAPPENED. HE STATED THAT NO ONE IN THE TWR HAD WATCHED OUR APCH AND LNDG OR HAD SEEN ANYTHING. HE SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED WE LANDED N RWY 36R AND THAT HE WAS LOGGING US AS HAVING LANDED ON RWY 36R AND NOT TO WORRY ABOUT IT. HE RPTED THAT TECHNICIANS WORKING ON THE RWY 36C ILS HAD NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT AN ACR X ACFT HAD LANDED ON RWY 36C. HE STATED THAT HE WAS 'SENDING THIS DOWNSTAIRS,' APPARENTLY TO THE APCH CTLRS TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER. I QUERIED HIM REGARDING THE TECHNICIANS AND HE STATED THAT THE TECHNICIANS WERE THERE WORKING ON BOTH RWY 36C AND RWY 36R ILS'S AND WERE TRYING TO CERTIFY THE RWY 36C ILS. I ASKED HIM IF ANYTHING THEY WERE DOING MIGHT HAVE INTERFERED WITH OUR ARR AND HE EMPHATICALLY STATED 'NO!' AFTER OUR RETURN TO IAH, I AGAIN CONTACTED THE MEM TWR. THIS INDIVIDUAL STATED THAT THE RADAR DATA HAD BEEN LOOKED AT, AND IT APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT WE HAD IN FACT LANDED ON RWY 36C. HE ALSO STATED THAT OUR APCH TRACK APPEARED TO LINE UP WITH RWY 36C AT A 5 MI FINAL WHICH COINCIDES WITH OUR BEING ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC AT THAT TIME. I WAS TOLD THAT THE TECHNICIANS HAD DEFINITIVELY RPTED TO THE TWR THAT WE HAD LANDED ON RWY 36C. IT WAS REITERATED THAT THE TECHNICIANS HAD IN FACT BEEN WORKING ON THE ILS'S AND THAT A FLT CHK ACFT WAS IN THE AREA CHKING THE APCHS AS WELL. I WAS TOLD THAT THE MATTER WAS BEING REFERRED TO MEMPHIS FLT STANDARDS. IN RETROSPECT, BOTH MY FO AND I ARE SOMEWHAT BEWILDERED OVER THE INCIDENT. WE BELIEVE THAT WE DID EVERYTHING CORRECTLY, WITH DUE CAUTION AND CARE. WE BELIEVE WE FOLLOWED ALL APPLICABLE COMPANY POLICIES AND PROCS REGARDING VISUAL APCHS USING CURRENT CHARTS TO BRIEF THE APCH AND IDENT THE ARPT AND RWY ENVIRONMENTS, FOLLOWING AND COMPLETING ALL CHKLISTS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIMES, UTILIZING AN ILS APCH PROC TO BACK UP THE APCH, TUNING AND IDENTING THE ILS, ARMING AND CAPTURING THE ILS LOC AND GS, FOLLOWING THE INST CUES UNTIL THE RWY WAS CLRLY IN SIGHT, AND MONITORING THE INSTS TO CONFIRM LOC AND GS TRACK UNTIL LNDG. WE HAVE NO REASONABLE EXPLANATION TO CORRELATE OUR ACTIONS WITH THE RPTED OUTCOME. WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OR MEMORY OF ACTIONS OR INACTIONS THAT BROUGHT US TO THIS POINT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CHART THE RPTR HAD OF THE ARPT INDICATED A DISPLACED THRESHOLD ON RWY 36C. THE RWY WAS COMPLETE WITH STANDARD MARKINGS SHOWING NO DISPLACEMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.