Narrative:

During the pre takeoff flow, I was interrupted by a question from the captain. The captain knew I had worked with fire fighting aircraft (3 yrs) and asked about a smoke jumper otter being cleared to take off. I explained what smoke jumper aircraft did. He asked about the larger aircraft, and I briefly described what tankers do. As I was talking, tower then cleared us for 'immediate takeoff,' adding 'the smoke jumper will be turning out left ahead of you,' and 'you'll also have aircraft X on 5 mi final behind you.' the captain said we'd make a rolling takeoff and called for 'below the line' (that portion of the before takeoff check, done when taking the active). I never went back to complete my flow and left the APU running on takeoff. Climbing through 17000 ft, the fire warning horn sounded. The captain said, 'what's this?' the first officer said, 'we haven't got any lights or indications of fire up here.' I checked the engine gauges, the so panel, and reached for the horn cutout on the APU panel, and noticed immediately I had left the APU on. I told the captain what I had done, and asked if he wanted me to 'pull the handle and discharge the bottle.' he said yes, but 'get out the red tabs and follow the checklist.' I did this. The captain filed a flight safety report with our flight safety department and I am due to debrief with them. I allowed my flow to be interrupted, failed to go back to finish it, and did not catch my omission with a checklist during an expeditious departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 CREW HAD AN APU FIRE WARNING IN ZDV CLASS E AIRSPACE.

Narrative: DURING THE PRE TKOF FLOW, I WAS INTERRUPTED BY A QUESTION FROM THE CAPT. THE CAPT KNEW I HAD WORKED WITH FIRE FIGHTING ACFT (3 YRS) AND ASKED ABOUT A SMOKE JUMPER OTTER BEING CLRED TO TAKE OFF. I EXPLAINED WHAT SMOKE JUMPER ACFT DID. HE ASKED ABOUT THE LARGER ACFT, AND I BRIEFLY DESCRIBED WHAT TANKERS DO. AS I WAS TALKING, TWR THEN CLRED US FOR 'IMMEDIATE TKOF,' ADDING 'THE SMOKE JUMPER WILL BE TURNING OUT L AHEAD OF YOU,' AND 'YOU'LL ALSO HAVE ACFT X ON 5 MI FINAL BEHIND YOU.' THE CAPT SAID WE'D MAKE A ROLLING TKOF AND CALLED FOR 'BELOW THE LINE' (THAT PORTION OF THE BEFORE TKOF CHK, DONE WHEN TAKING THE ACTIVE). I NEVER WENT BACK TO COMPLETE MY FLOW AND LEFT THE APU RUNNING ON TKOF. CLBING THROUGH 17000 FT, THE FIRE WARNING HORN SOUNDED. THE CAPT SAID, 'WHAT'S THIS?' THE FO SAID, 'WE HAVEN'T GOT ANY LIGHTS OR INDICATIONS OF FIRE UP HERE.' I CHKED THE ENG GAUGES, THE SO PANEL, AND REACHED FOR THE HORN CUTOUT ON THE APU PANEL, AND NOTICED IMMEDIATELY I HAD LEFT THE APU ON. I TOLD THE CAPT WHAT I HAD DONE, AND ASKED IF HE WANTED ME TO 'PULL THE HANDLE AND DISCHARGE THE BOTTLE.' HE SAID YES, BUT 'GET OUT THE RED TABS AND FOLLOW THE CHKLIST.' I DID THIS. THE CAPT FILED A FLT SAFETY RPT WITH OUR FLT SAFETY DEPT AND I AM DUE TO DEBRIEF WITH THEM. I ALLOWED MY FLOW TO BE INTERRUPTED, FAILED TO GO BACK TO FINISH IT, AND DID NOT CATCH MY OMISSION WITH A CHKLIST DURING AN EXPEDITIOUS DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.