Narrative:

Approaching jfk after an all night flight from lax we were told to expect ILS runway 4R. FMC was programmed for ILS runway 4R. ILS tuned in and idented, and approach briefing completed. While on vectors for ILS runway 4R, approach told us to expect ILS runway 4L. I hurriedly reprogrammed FMC for ILS runway 4L and had the captain verify it. ILS was tuned for ILS runway 4L but in retrospect was not idented by either of us. Approach cleared us for the ILS runway 4L. Shortly thereafter, I noticed that the flight directors nor autoplt had intercepted the runway 4L localizer even though the localizer tracking function of the autoplt had been armed. I informed the captain who then disconnected the autoplt and turned back to the right to intercept the localizer for runway 4L. Approach switched us to jfk tower which when I checked in asked us if we wanted to go back to approach control. I strongly suspect tower asked us this because we were so far to the left of the runway 4L localizer. Captain responded, no we didn't want to go back to approach.' at this point he attempted to intercept the runway 4L localizer with approximately 30-40 degree intercept angle at the FAF. He did not anticipate localizer interception and flew back through it to the right side of the approach course. At this time I became concerned because approachs to ILS runway 4R were also in progress. Then he started to do a rapid series of s-turns across the localizer attempting to intercept it. I stated several times that I was very uncomfortable with what he was doing but he ignored me. At this point we were 2 mi from the approach end of runway 4L in IMC, performing s-turns, landing flaps not configured, when he realized the GS needle was pegged at the bottom of the scale (ie, we were way high approximately 1400 ft MSL). He then placed the plane in a 1500 FPM descent to attempt to capture the GS. I again stated I was uncomfortable with the situation and told him twice to go around. He still ignored me! At 800 ft AGL the GPWS went off saying 'sink rate, sink rate, pull up, pull up.' I again told him to go around and was reaching for the throttle and yoke to go around when he finally said he was going around. I have never been so scared on an airplane as I was on this approach! I was so scared I could barely tell tower we were going around. We were subsequently given vectors for the ILS runway 4. In the meantime, we both tried to identify the ILS runway 4L and received only static. We both suspected due to the erratic (ie, quickly moving GS and localizer) signals and lack of identify on ILS runway 4L that the ILS runway 22R was the operating NAVAID for the runway. Also, a B747-400 on approach for ILS runway 4L went around for unknown reasons. In any case, we had a normal approach and landing from the ILS runway 4R approach. I did not discuss with the captain his incredibly dangerous actions because I was so scared and stunned afterwards. How could a 30+ yr veteran of the airline, now a captain, do such a thing? I don't know -- pride? Ego? At screwing up an approach? I even told him numerous times I was not comfortable and finally told him at least twice to go around, but yet he ignored me! I have found that pilots (capts) hired before the advent of CRM skills tend to ignore first officer's, have a know-it-all attitude, and are disdainful of CRM. Often, these same pilots' egos far outrun their flying abilities. At first, I wasn't but now I will talk to auths about this even if I suffer censure and possible retribution from other senior pilots for reporting him. How should this have been prevented: 1) I should have idented the ILS runway 4L NAVAID. 2) captain should have performed the missed approach and I should have insisted strenuously that he do so when we first flew through the localizer. 3) pilots like the captain should lose their jobs if they ignore their first officer's and endanger the lives of their passenger so blatantly! People like him don't deserve our trust and respect.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LAST MIN RWY CHANGE, FAILURE TO IDENT NEW ILS FREQ, AND CRM BREAKDOWN LEADS TO AN UNSTABILIZED APCH TO JFK, NY, FOLLOWED BY A MISSED APCH.

Narrative: APCHING JFK AFTER AN ALL NIGHT FLT FROM LAX WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT ILS RWY 4R. FMC WAS PROGRAMMED FOR ILS RWY 4R. ILS TUNED IN AND IDENTED, AND APCH BRIEFING COMPLETED. WHILE ON VECTORS FOR ILS RWY 4R, APCH TOLD US TO EXPECT ILS RWY 4L. I HURRIEDLY REPROGRAMMED FMC FOR ILS RWY 4L AND HAD THE CAPT VERIFY IT. ILS WAS TUNED FOR ILS RWY 4L BUT IN RETROSPECT WAS NOT IDENTED BY EITHER OF US. APCH CLRED US FOR THE ILS RWY 4L. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I NOTICED THAT THE FLT DIRECTORS NOR AUTOPLT HAD INTERCEPTED THE RWY 4L LOC EVEN THOUGH THE LOC TRACKING FUNCTION OF THE AUTOPLT HAD BEEN ARMED. I INFORMED THE CAPT WHO THEN DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND TURNED BACK TO THE R TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR RWY 4L. APCH SWITCHED US TO JFK TWR WHICH WHEN I CHKED IN ASKED US IF WE WANTED TO GO BACK TO APCH CTL. I STRONGLY SUSPECT TWR ASKED US THIS BECAUSE WE WERE SO FAR TO THE L OF THE RWY 4L LOC. CAPT RESPONDED, NO WE DIDN'T WANT TO GO BACK TO APCH.' AT THIS POINT HE ATTEMPTED TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 4L LOC WITH APPROX 30-40 DEG INTERCEPT ANGLE AT THE FAF. HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE LOC INTERCEPTION AND FLEW BACK THROUGH IT TO THE R SIDE OF THE APCH COURSE. AT THIS TIME I BECAME CONCERNED BECAUSE APCHS TO ILS RWY 4R WERE ALSO IN PROGRESS. THEN HE STARTED TO DO A RAPID SERIES OF S-TURNS ACROSS THE LOC ATTEMPTING TO INTERCEPT IT. I STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT I WAS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH WHAT HE WAS DOING BUT HE IGNORED ME. AT THIS POINT WE WERE 2 MI FROM THE APCH END OF RWY 4L IN IMC, PERFORMING S-TURNS, LNDG FLAPS NOT CONFIGURED, WHEN HE REALIZED THE GS NEEDLE WAS PEGGED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SCALE (IE, WE WERE WAY HIGH APPROX 1400 FT MSL). HE THEN PLACED THE PLANE IN A 1500 FPM DSCNT TO ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE GS. I AGAIN STATED I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SIT AND TOLD HIM TWICE TO GO AROUND. HE STILL IGNORED ME! AT 800 FT AGL THE GPWS WENT OFF SAYING 'SINK RATE, SINK RATE, PULL UP, PULL UP.' I AGAIN TOLD HIM TO GO AROUND AND WAS REACHING FOR THE THROTTLE AND YOKE TO GO AROUND WHEN HE FINALLY SAID HE WAS GOING AROUND. I HAVE NEVER BEEN SO SCARED ON AN AIRPLANE AS I WAS ON THIS APCH! I WAS SO SCARED I COULD BARELY TELL TWR WE WERE GOING AROUND. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN VECTORS FOR THE ILS RWY 4. IN THE MEANTIME, WE BOTH TRIED TO IDENT THE ILS RWY 4L AND RECEIVED ONLY STATIC. WE BOTH SUSPECTED DUE TO THE ERRATIC (IE, QUICKLY MOVING GS AND LOC) SIGNALS AND LACK OF IDENT ON ILS RWY 4L THAT THE ILS RWY 22R WAS THE OPERATING NAVAID FOR THE RWY. ALSO, A B747-400 ON APCH FOR ILS RWY 4L WENT AROUND FOR UNKNOWN REASONS. IN ANY CASE, WE HAD A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG FROM THE ILS RWY 4R APCH. I DID NOT DISCUSS WITH THE CAPT HIS INCREDIBLY DANGEROUS ACTIONS BECAUSE I WAS SO SCARED AND STUNNED AFTERWARDS. HOW COULD A 30+ YR VETERAN OF THE AIRLINE, NOW A CAPT, DO SUCH A THING? I DON'T KNOW -- PRIDE? EGO? AT SCREWING UP AN APCH? I EVEN TOLD HIM NUMEROUS TIMES I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE AND FINALLY TOLD HIM AT LEAST TWICE TO GO AROUND, BUT YET HE IGNORED ME! I HAVE FOUND THAT PLTS (CAPTS) HIRED BEFORE THE ADVENT OF CRM SKILLS TEND TO IGNORE FO'S, HAVE A KNOW-IT-ALL ATTITUDE, AND ARE DISDAINFUL OF CRM. OFTEN, THESE SAME PLTS' EGOS FAR OUTRUN THEIR FLYING ABILITIES. AT FIRST, I WASN'T BUT NOW I WILL TALK TO AUTHS ABOUT THIS EVEN IF I SUFFER CENSURE AND POSSIBLE RETRIBUTION FROM OTHER SENIOR PLTS FOR RPTING HIM. HOW SHOULD THIS HAVE BEEN PREVENTED: 1) I SHOULD HAVE IDENTED THE ILS RWY 4L NAVAID. 2) CAPT SHOULD HAVE PERFORMED THE MISSED APCH AND I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED STRENUOUSLY THAT HE DO SO WHEN WE FIRST FLEW THROUGH THE LOC. 3) PLTS LIKE THE CAPT SHOULD LOSE THEIR JOBS IF THEY IGNORE THEIR FO'S AND ENDANGER THE LIVES OF THEIR PAX SO BLATANTLY! PEOPLE LIKE HIM DON'T DESERVE OUR TRUST AND RESPECT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.