Narrative:

During landing roll and below 60 KIAS, control of the aircraft passed from the first officer to the captain on high speed taxiway T. ILS approach to runway 28R was in use due to the presence of a marine layer over the field and south bay. Because of this condition, runway 28L was being used on a very limited basis, and previous arrs were being given clrncs to cross runway 28L during their landing roll. I (the captain) checked the arrival and departure ends of runway 28L and saw no traffic. I proceeded to cross runway 28L. After crossing, the first officer contacted ground and we were cleared to taxi to the gate. After crossing runway 28L, neither pilot could remember receiving a specific clearance to cross the runway. After parking at the gate, the first officer and I debriefed the situation. It was determined that after the first officer xferred control, he began to review the approach. I accepted control of aircraft and was also thinking back to the approach. This lack of vigilance and task at hand contributed to the error. As difficult as it may be at the time, self critique and review should be done after the aircraft is parked and the engines shut down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 CAPT RPTED THAT HE AND HIS FO STARTED TO DEBRIEF THEIR APCH DURING THE TAXI, WHICH CAUSED THEM TO FORGET IF THEY HAD RECEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY.

Narrative: DURING LNDG ROLL AND BELOW 60 KIAS, CTL OF THE ACFT PASSED FROM THE FO TO THE CAPT ON HIGH SPD TXWY T. ILS APCH TO RWY 28R WAS IN USE DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF A MARINE LAYER OVER THE FIELD AND SOUTH BAY. BECAUSE OF THIS CONDITION, RWY 28L WAS BEING USED ON A VERY LIMITED BASIS, AND PREVIOUS ARRS WERE BEING GIVEN CLRNCS TO CROSS RWY 28L DURING THEIR LNDG ROLL. I (THE CAPT) CHKED THE ARR AND DEP ENDS OF RWY 28L AND SAW NO TFC. I PROCEEDED TO CROSS RWY 28L. AFTER XING, THE FO CONTACTED GND AND WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO THE GATE. AFTER XING RWY 28L, NEITHER PLT COULD REMEMBER RECEIVING A SPECIFIC CLRNC TO CROSS THE RWY. AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE, THE FO AND I DEBRIEFED THE SIT. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AFTER THE FO XFERRED CTL, HE BEGAN TO REVIEW THE APCH. I ACCEPTED CTL OF ACFT AND WAS ALSO THINKING BACK TO THE APCH. THIS LACK OF VIGILANCE AND TASK AT HAND CONTRIBUTED TO THE ERROR. AS DIFFICULT AS IT MAY BE AT THE TIME, SELF CRITIQUE AND REVIEW SHOULD BE DONE AFTER THE ACFT IS PARKED AND THE ENGS SHUT DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.