Narrative:

I am an ATC controller at lga. On jul/xa/00 at approximately XA50 I was working the cabin attendant coordinator position when a very unsafe and potentially dangerous situation occurred. I reported the incident to the controller in charge and the acting facility manager. I was assigned the cabin attendant coordinator position. My obligations included: 1) to coordinate activities between cabin attendant coordinator, local controller and class B airspace, 2) to manage operations between lga, new york TRACON, the users and the airport operator (port authority/authorized of ny, nj). However, the most important concern of the cabin attendant coordinator is to oversee the safety of the operation. This requires scanning runways, txwys and the radar. And prudence dictates that the cabin attendant coordinator monitor the control position, frequencys, flight progress strips and the overall situation. As has become the custom at lga, I was also performing clerical entries on the departure spacing program. This activity prevented me from performing my primary duty -- ensuring safety. This was a dangerous predicament. Of late, these circumstances happen too often. On this occasion, the airport confign was: departing runway 4, and landing runway 31. The departures were turning right to a 055 degree heading, or left turn to a 360 degree heading. The ground control position were combined. The ATC specialist working ground control was certified just 1 week earlier. To his immediate right is local controller. The local controller was certified for approximately 3 weeks. The 2 most important controllers had a combined position experience of 1 month. I, working cabin attendant coordinator position, should have been standing directly behind and observing these individuals. Instead, I was performing departure space program entries. During this time the N90 departure controller screamed to me '...watch those headings, aircraft got off with right 360 degree....' because of departure space program I did not catch or notice aircraft depart and climb turning right rather than left. I did not see this on the radar nor out the tower windows. I can envision this DC9 soaring right through our runway 31 arrs. This departure space program equipment has practically no role at lga, and combining its chores with other position at the expense of safety is negligence. This is a dangerous policy, and safety is surely compromised when the cabin attendant coordinator is occupied with these computer entries. This is particularly true when mixed with relative controller inexperience.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGA TWR CAB COORDINATOR COMPLAINS ABOUT STAFFING PROB WHEN HE HAD NOT NOTICED A DEPARTING ACR DC9 TURNING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION AFTER TKOF. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO HIS ATTN BY N90 DEP CTLR COMPLAINING ABOUT POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH ARR ACFT.

Narrative: I AM AN ATC CTLR AT LGA. ON JUL/XA/00 AT APPROX XA50 I WAS WORKING THE CAB COORDINATOR POS WHEN A VERY UNSAFE AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SIT OCCURRED. I RPTED THE INCIDENT TO THE CONTROLLER IN CHARGE AND THE ACTING FACILITY MGR. I WAS ASSIGNED THE CAB COORDINATOR POS. MY OBLIGATIONS INCLUDED: 1) TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES BTWN CAB COORDINATOR, LCL CTLR AND CLASS B AIRSPACE, 2) TO MANAGE OPS BTWN LGA, NEW YORK TRACON, THE USERS AND THE ARPT OPERATOR (PORT AUTH OF NY, NJ). HOWEVER, THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCERN OF THE CAB COORDINATOR IS TO OVERSEE THE SAFETY OF THE OP. THIS REQUIRES SCANNING RWYS, TXWYS AND THE RADAR. AND PRUDENCE DICTATES THAT THE CAB COORDINATOR MONITOR THE CTL POS, FREQS, FLT PROGRESS STRIPS AND THE OVERALL SIT. AS HAS BECOME THE CUSTOM AT LGA, I WAS ALSO PERFORMING CLERICAL ENTRIES ON THE DEP SPACING PROGRAM. THIS ACTIVITY PREVENTED ME FROM PERFORMING MY PRIMARY DUTY -- ENSURING SAFETY. THIS WAS A DANGEROUS PREDICAMENT. OF LATE, THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HAPPEN TOO OFTEN. ON THIS OCCASION, THE ARPT CONFIGN WAS: DEPARTING RWY 4, AND LNDG RWY 31. THE DEPS WERE TURNING R TO A 055 DEG HDG, OR L TURN TO A 360 DEG HDG. THE GND CTL POS WERE COMBINED. THE ATC SPECIALIST WORKING GND CTL WAS CERTIFIED JUST 1 WK EARLIER. TO HIS IMMEDIATE R IS LCL CTLR. THE LCL CTLR WAS CERTIFIED FOR APPROX 3 WKS. THE 2 MOST IMPORTANT CTLRS HAD A COMBINED POS EXPERIENCE OF 1 MONTH. I, WORKING CAB COORDINATOR POS, SHOULD HAVE BEEN STANDING DIRECTLY BEHIND AND OBSERVING THESE INDIVIDUALS. INSTEAD, I WAS PERFORMING DEP SPACE PROGRAM ENTRIES. DURING THIS TIME THE N90 DEP CTLR SCREAMED TO ME '...WATCH THOSE HDGS, ACFT GOT OFF WITH R 360 DEG....' BECAUSE OF DEP SPACE PROGRAM I DID NOT CATCH OR NOTICE ACFT DEPART AND CLB TURNING R RATHER THAN L. I DID NOT SEE THIS ON THE RADAR NOR OUT THE TWR WINDOWS. I CAN ENVISION THIS DC9 SOARING RIGHT THROUGH OUR RWY 31 ARRS. THIS DEP SPACE PROGRAM EQUIP HAS PRACTICALLY NO ROLE AT LGA, AND COMBINING ITS CHORES WITH OTHER POS AT THE EXPENSE OF SAFETY IS NEGLIGENCE. THIS IS A DANGEROUS POLICY, AND SAFETY IS SURELY COMPROMISED WHEN THE CAB COORDINATOR IS OCCUPIED WITH THESE COMPUTER ENTRIES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE WHEN MIXED WITH RELATIVE CTLR INEXPERIENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.