Narrative:

While holding short and awaiting clearance for takeoff, tower instructed us to contact ground control for an 'important message.' ground controller asked from what exit point we had departed our ramp and entered taxiway V on which we were holding. Controller stated that we had been cleared to 'hold short of runway 27 (the takeoff runway) at taxiway C.' we had taxied from the ramp exit point on taxiway V, on which we were holding short for takeoff and which is the normal taxi route from that exit point to runway 27. Controller stated that he thought we had departed the ramp from a different exit point (which, if so, would have made clearance via taxiway C credible). The controller's tone was still somewhat accusative, and I felt that a point was being made when tower cleared other aircraft for takeoff before us, though we appeared to be #1 in sequence. In subsequent discussion among the crew, captain (this writer) stated that he thought he had heard 'hold short of runway 27 on taxiway V.' first officer stated that he didn't recall what he heard, and so stated that he heard 'hold short of runway 27 on taxiway C.' I think that the actual situation was as follows: 1) the ground controller mistook our stated ramp exit point and issued an inappropriate taxi routing, 2) the captain heard what he thought he should/would hear and not the actual clearance, 3) the first officer did not read back the clearance and was not paying attention, 4) the so did not speak up when he observed the captain not taxiing via the clearance. Supplemental information from acn 479267: we had taxied out to hold short on the normal route -- the one we are given 95% of the time, and the only one which makes sense for the route. I feel the root cause of this is lack of proper readback by the crew (I had the radios) and also by the fact that the frequency is very busy and hard to ask questions, etc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CARGO FLT TAXIES TO RWY 27 VIA THEIR 'NORMAL' ROUTING BUT IS CHALLENGED AT THE RWY END BY GND CTLR WHO THOUGHT HE HAD ISSUED A HOLD SHORT AT ANOTHER POINT ON THE RWY AT MEM, TN.

Narrative: WHILE HOLDING SHORT AND AWAITING CLRNC FOR TKOF, TWR INSTRUCTED US TO CONTACT GND CTL FOR AN 'IMPORTANT MESSAGE.' GND CTLR ASKED FROM WHAT EXIT POINT WE HAD DEPARTED OUR RAMP AND ENTERED TXWY V ON WHICH WE WERE HOLDING. CTLR STATED THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27 (THE TKOF RWY) AT TXWY C.' WE HAD TAXIED FROM THE RAMP EXIT POINT ON TXWY V, ON WHICH WE WERE HOLDING SHORT FOR TKOF AND WHICH IS THE NORMAL TAXI RTE FROM THAT EXIT POINT TO RWY 27. CTLR STATED THAT HE THOUGHT WE HAD DEPARTED THE RAMP FROM A DIFFERENT EXIT POINT (WHICH, IF SO, WOULD HAVE MADE CLRNC VIA TXWY C CREDIBLE). THE CTLR'S TONE WAS STILL SOMEWHAT ACCUSATIVE, AND I FELT THAT A POINT WAS BEING MADE WHEN TWR CLRED OTHER ACFT FOR TKOF BEFORE US, THOUGH WE APPEARED TO BE #1 IN SEQUENCE. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION AMONG THE CREW, CAPT (THIS WRITER) STATED THAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD HEARD 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27 ON TXWY V.' FO STATED THAT HE DIDN'T RECALL WHAT HE HEARD, AND SO STATED THAT HE HEARD 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27 ON TXWY C.' I THINK THAT THE ACTUAL SIT WAS AS FOLLOWS: 1) THE GND CTLR MISTOOK OUR STATED RAMP EXIT POINT AND ISSUED AN INAPPROPRIATE TAXI ROUTING, 2) THE CAPT HEARD WHAT HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD/WOULD HEAR AND NOT THE ACTUAL CLRNC, 3) THE FO DID NOT READ BACK THE CLRNC AND WAS NOT PAYING ATTN, 4) THE SO DID NOT SPEAK UP WHEN HE OBSERVED THE CAPT NOT TAXIING VIA THE CLRNC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 479267: WE HAD TAXIED OUT TO HOLD SHORT ON THE NORMAL RTE -- THE ONE WE ARE GIVEN 95% OF THE TIME, AND THE ONLY ONE WHICH MAKES SENSE FOR THE RTE. I FEEL THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS IS LACK OF PROPER READBACK BY THE CREW (I HAD THE RADIOS) AND ALSO BY THE FACT THAT THE FREQ IS VERY BUSY AND HARD TO ASK QUESTIONS, ETC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.