Narrative:

Aircraft X had responded to a single vehicle rollover accident on the interstate. We departed the scene with 1 patient en route to hospital. Approximately 19 NM southeast of ZZZ, I established initial radio contact with ZZZ approach, acknowledging ATIS and requesting lifeguard priority for hospital. Approach immediately assigned a mode C squawk. Approximately 15 NM southeast of ZZZ, the approach controller advised that we were radar contact and cleared us direct to hospital. Our altitude at this time was 1500 ft MSL based on the altimeter setting provided by ATIS, with a 140 KIAS ground speed indicated by GPS. We were heading approximately 310 degrees. Approximately 10 NM southeast of ZZZ, the approach controller queried if we intended to 'cross over the ZZZ airport.' I advised the approach controller that we could accept a midfield crossing if necessary. The controller advised me to 'expect midfield crossing due to high traffic volume.' I then acknowledged this. Approximately 2.5 NM southeast of ZZZ, the approach controller cleared us to 'cross midfield direct to hospital.' the controller advised that he had an aircraft on approach for runway 17L and an aircraft on approach for runway 17R, as well as 1 aircraft 'about to take off on runway 17R.' as I neared runway 17L, I initiated a descent to 1300 ft MSL. At that time, I could see an aircraft that was on about a 4 mi final for runway 17L as well as an additional aircraft slowly vacating runway 17L. I could also see an air carrier Z jet which was taxiing into takeoff position on runway 17R, as well as 1 aircraft on about a 6 mi final for runway 17R. I acknowledged having visual contact with the stated traffic. After crossing the east runway, I started to adjust my course slightly left in order to bisect the west runway since I judged this to be the safest point of crossing. Air carrier Z had taxied into position and held on the runway for such duration that I initially thought he may have been given 'position and hold' instructions by tower to facilitate our runway crossing. As I started this left course correction, the air carrier Z jet which had been holding in position started his takeoff roll. I rolled level immediately having some concern that the point of rotation of the air carrier Z jet might place him in a climb toward our projected point of runway crossing. I looked to the right and could see an aircraft on approach, which had advanced to an approximately 3 mi final. I looked again to the left and witnessed the air carrier Z jet rotate. Since air carrier Z had rotated well to our left (south) and in front of us, his climb out was no longer a factor. As I looked forward, my crew member yelled 'down, down, down!' I placed the aircraft in a dive at the same time observing a B737 to our immediate right heading directly toward us. I started a left turn away from the boeing, but then rolled level as I judged the turn might place the rotor system of our helicopter closer in proximity to the advancing boeing. The B737 at my initial sighting was approximately 300 ft away, at our altitude in a climbing right turn. The B737 passed directly overhead with what I estimate to be 150 ft of vertical separation. It appeared that the B737 had increased his right turn rate between my initial observance and his passing overhead, leading me to question whether the B737 had initiated evasive action. I immediately called ZZZ approach, however, did not receive a reply. I made a total of 3 calls to ZZZ approach before receiving an answer which consisted of 'aircraft X radar service terminated, squawk VFR, have a good flight.' the controller who had answered and issued this instruction was a different controller than the one who had been handling us until that point. I explained to the controller that I needed to 'landline' him upon arrival at hospital. Initially, he did not understand my request, but eventually understood my need to speak to him by telephone. The controller provided a telephone number. We continued our flight to hospital without incident. There was no injury to crew or passenger as a result of our evasive maneuver. After landing, I attempted to call the telephone number given, but could not get through due to a busy signal. I immediately called the aircraft X chief pilot and reported the near midair collision. He immediately contacted the shift supervisor at the ZZZ ATC facility to relate the incident. I subsequently spoke to the tower supervisor after returning to our base approximately 1 hour later. I informed him that I had to take evasive action to avoid a possible collision and reviewed the events as I knew them. The tower supervisor indicated that to his knowledge the air carrier Y, B737, crew was unaware of the near midair collision as they had not reported sighting our helicopter at all, and had not initiated any evasive action. The supervisor indicated that both the tower and approach controllers involved were unaware that an near midair collision had occurred, and that the TCASII in the air carrier Y B737 and in the ATC facility had not given warning of the conflict. The supervisor had already reviewed the audio tapes of the incident and indicated that in his judgement, the ATC facility was completely at fault for the traffic conflict. He stated that I was in no way responsible for the near midair collision, therefore, no enforcement action would be pursued. He indicated that he was initiating a 'quality assurance review' to review the incident, and as a result of this process, aircraft X company would be informed of their findings. After thorough discussion with the tower supervisor and postflt review with my crew, I would like to offer the following as possible contributing factors to the incident: 1) operational error by ZZZ ATC for not completing a formal handoff of aircraft X from the approach controller to the tower controller. If a handoff had been executed, rather than a pointout between the 2 controllers, then communication between conflicting aircraft would have been facilitated. The pointout is a common practice by ZZZ ATC, the efficacy of which is questionable, due to conflicting traffic being on different frequencys. 2) operational error by ZZZ ATC for inadequate spacing of arriving traffic. 3) operational error by ZZZ ATC for providing 'lifeguard priority' in name only without any actual priority being given to the lifeguard aircraft. 4) controller error by ZZZ tower for improper traffic call to the air carrier Y B737 after go around instruction had been given. Tower controller advised air carrier Y of 'helicopter traffic crossing left to right, below you, not a factor,' when in fact both aircraft were at the same altitude and converging. 5) operational error by ZZZ ATC for changing controllers and combining radar east and radar west position during the critical moments preceding aircraft confliction. 6) controller error by ZZZ approach for not advising aircraft X of the go around issued to the air carrier Y B737. 7) controller error by ZZZ approach for not advising aircraft X that there were actually 2 aircraft rather than 1 aircraft on approach for the west runway 17R. 8) controller error by ZZZ ATC for terminating radar service immediately after crossed the west runway. There was still the departing air carrier Z jet in a climbing right turn and the air carrier Y B737 in a climbing right turn creating the continued threat of confliction with. 9) aircraft design of bell 206l3 which limits forward visibility at the aircraft's 10 O'clock and 2 O'clock position due to a 6-7 inch wide door frame. A target must become fairly large and therefore quite close before this no longer obscures the target. Remedy is for pilot to not only turn the head, but also rock forward and aft in the seat to see around this obstruction. 10) equipment failure of traffic collision avoidance system to alert ATC and air carrier crew of aircraft proximity. 11) pilot error by air carrier Y B737 crew for not observing the aircraft X helicopter, particularly after being made aware of our presence by the tower controller. 12) pilot error on my part for not observing the air carrier Y B737 before it became a hazard. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated the facility changed their procedure in handling helicopter traffic crossing the airport by requiring the approach controller to make a handoff to the tower. He said that recently he has noticed the facility going back to their old ways of doing things and approach control is again only making pointouts to the local controller. Because he only told the tower supervisor he had to take evasive action to avoid the B737 and did not request to file a report, the incident was never classified as an near midair collision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEDICAL HELI RECEIVING RADAR SVC AND LIFEGUARD PRIORITY BY ZZZ APCH HAS AN NMAC OVER THE ZZZ ARPT WITH A B737 ON A GAR.

Narrative: ACFT X HAD RESPONDED TO A SINGLE VEHICLE ROLLOVER ACCIDENT ON THE INTERSTATE. WE DEPARTED THE SCENE WITH 1 PATIENT ENRTE TO HOSPITAL. APPROX 19 NM SE OF ZZZ, I ESTABLISHED INITIAL RADIO CONTACT WITH ZZZ APCH, ACKNOWLEDGING ATIS AND REQUESTING LIFEGUARD PRIORITY FOR HOSPITAL. APCH IMMEDIATELY ASSIGNED A MODE C SQUAWK. APPROX 15 NM SE OF ZZZ, THE APCH CTLR ADVISED THAT WE WERE RADAR CONTACT AND CLRED US DIRECT TO HOSPITAL. OUR ALT AT THIS TIME WAS 1500 FT MSL BASED ON THE ALTIMETER SETTING PROVIDED BY ATIS, WITH A 140 KIAS GND SPD INDICATED BY GPS. WE WERE HDG APPROX 310 DEGS. APPROX 10 NM SE OF ZZZ, THE APCH CTLR QUERIED IF WE INTENDED TO 'CROSS OVER THE ZZZ ARPT.' I ADVISED THE APCH CTLR THAT WE COULD ACCEPT A MIDFIELD XING IF NECESSARY. THE CTLR ADVISED ME TO 'EXPECT MIDFIELD XING DUE TO HIGH TFC VOLUME.' I THEN ACKNOWLEDGED THIS. APPROX 2.5 NM SE OF ZZZ, THE APCH CTLR CLRED US TO 'CROSS MIDFIELD DIRECT TO HOSPITAL.' THE CTLR ADVISED THAT HE HAD AN ACFT ON APCH FOR RWY 17L AND AN ACFT ON APCH FOR RWY 17R, AS WELL AS 1 ACFT 'ABOUT TO TAKE OFF ON RWY 17R.' AS I NEARED RWY 17L, I INITIATED A DSCNT TO 1300 FT MSL. AT THAT TIME, I COULD SEE AN ACFT THAT WAS ON ABOUT A 4 MI FINAL FOR RWY 17L AS WELL AS AN ADDITIONAL ACFT SLOWLY VACATING RWY 17L. I COULD ALSO SEE AN ACR Z JET WHICH WAS TAXIING INTO TKOF POS ON RWY 17R, AS WELL AS 1 ACFT ON ABOUT A 6 MI FINAL FOR RWY 17R. I ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE STATED TFC. AFTER XING THE E RWY, I STARTED TO ADJUST MY COURSE SLIGHTLY L IN ORDER TO BISECT THE W RWY SINCE I JUDGED THIS TO BE THE SAFEST POINT OF XING. ACR Z HAD TAXIED INTO POS AND HELD ON THE RWY FOR SUCH DURATION THAT I INITIALLY THOUGHT HE MAY HAVE BEEN GIVEN 'POS AND HOLD' INSTRUCTIONS BY TWR TO FACILITATE OUR RWY XING. AS I STARTED THIS L COURSE CORRECTION, THE ACR Z JET WHICH HAD BEEN HOLDING IN POS STARTED HIS TKOF ROLL. I ROLLED LEVEL IMMEDIATELY HAVING SOME CONCERN THAT THE POINT OF ROTATION OF THE ACR Z JET MIGHT PLACE HIM IN A CLB TOWARD OUR PROJECTED POINT OF RWY XING. I LOOKED TO THE R AND COULD SEE AN ACFT ON APCH, WHICH HAD ADVANCED TO AN APPROX 3 MI FINAL. I LOOKED AGAIN TO THE L AND WITNESSED THE ACR Z JET ROTATE. SINCE ACR Z HAD ROTATED WELL TO OUR L (S) AND IN FRONT OF US, HIS CLBOUT WAS NO LONGER A FACTOR. AS I LOOKED FORWARD, MY CREW MEMBER YELLED 'DOWN, DOWN, DOWN!' I PLACED THE ACFT IN A DIVE AT THE SAME TIME OBSERVING A B737 TO OUR IMMEDIATE R HDG DIRECTLY TOWARD US. I STARTED A L TURN AWAY FROM THE BOEING, BUT THEN ROLLED LEVEL AS I JUDGED THE TURN MIGHT PLACE THE ROTOR SYS OF OUR HELI CLOSER IN PROX TO THE ADVANCING BOEING. THE B737 AT MY INITIAL SIGHTING WAS APPROX 300 FT AWAY, AT OUR ALT IN A CLBING R TURN. THE B737 PASSED DIRECTLY OVERHEAD WITH WHAT I ESTIMATE TO BE 150 FT OF VERT SEPARATION. IT APPEARED THAT THE B737 HAD INCREASED HIS R TURN RATE BTWN MY INITIAL OBSERVANCE AND HIS PASSING OVERHEAD, LEADING ME TO QUESTION WHETHER THE B737 HAD INITIATED EVASIVE ACTION. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED ZZZ APCH, HOWEVER, DID NOT RECEIVE A REPLY. I MADE A TOTAL OF 3 CALLS TO ZZZ APCH BEFORE RECEIVING AN ANSWER WHICH CONSISTED OF 'ACFT X RADAR SVC TERMINATED, SQUAWK VFR, HAVE A GOOD FLT.' THE CTLR WHO HAD ANSWERED AND ISSUED THIS INSTRUCTION WAS A DIFFERENT CTLR THAN THE ONE WHO HAD BEEN HANDLING US UNTIL THAT POINT. I EXPLAINED TO THE CTLR THAT I NEEDED TO 'LANDLINE' HIM UPON ARR AT HOSPITAL. INITIALLY, HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND MY REQUEST, BUT EVENTUALLY UNDERSTOOD MY NEED TO SPEAK TO HIM BY TELEPHONE. THE CTLR PROVIDED A TELEPHONE NUMBER. WE CONTINUED OUR FLT TO HOSPITAL WITHOUT INCIDENT. THERE WAS NO INJURY TO CREW OR PAX AS A RESULT OF OUR EVASIVE MANEUVER. AFTER LNDG, I ATTEMPTED TO CALL THE TELEPHONE NUMBER GIVEN, BUT COULD NOT GET THROUGH DUE TO A BUSY SIGNAL. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE ACFT X CHIEF PLT AND RPTED THE NMAC. HE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED THE SHIFT SUPVR AT THE ZZZ ATC FACILITY TO RELATE THE INCIDENT. I SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE TO THE TWR SUPVR AFTER RETURNING TO OUR BASE APPROX 1 HR LATER. I INFORMED HIM THAT I HAD TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION TO AVOID A POSSIBLE COLLISION AND REVIEWED THE EVENTS AS I KNEW THEM. THE TWR SUPVR INDICATED THAT TO HIS KNOWLEDGE THE ACR Y, B737, CREW WAS UNAWARE OF THE NMAC AS THEY HAD NOT RPTED SIGHTING OUR HELI AT ALL, AND HAD NOT INITIATED ANY EVASIVE ACTION. THE SUPVR INDICATED THAT BOTH THE TWR AND APCH CTLRS INVOLVED WERE UNAWARE THAT AN NMAC HAD OCCURRED, AND THAT THE TCASII IN THE ACR Y B737 AND IN THE ATC FACILITY HAD NOT GIVEN WARNING OF THE CONFLICT. THE SUPVR HAD ALREADY REVIEWED THE AUDIO TAPES OF THE INCIDENT AND INDICATED THAT IN HIS JUDGEMENT, THE ATC FACILITY WAS COMPLETELY AT FAULT FOR THE TFC CONFLICT. HE STATED THAT I WAS IN NO WAY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NMAC, THEREFORE, NO ENFORCEMENT ACTION WOULD BE PURSUED. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS INITIATING A 'QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW' TO REVIEW THE INCIDENT, AND AS A RESULT OF THIS PROCESS, ACFT X COMPANY WOULD BE INFORMED OF THEIR FINDINGS. AFTER THOROUGH DISCUSSION WITH THE TWR SUPVR AND POSTFLT REVIEW WITH MY CREW, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE INCIDENT: 1) OPERROR BY ZZZ ATC FOR NOT COMPLETING A FORMAL HDOF OF ACFT X FROM THE APCH CTLR TO THE TWR CTLR. IF A HDOF HAD BEEN EXECUTED, RATHER THAN A POINTOUT BTWN THE 2 CTLRS, THEN COM BTWN CONFLICTING ACFT WOULD HAVE BEEN FACILITATED. THE POINTOUT IS A COMMON PRACTICE BY ZZZ ATC, THE EFFICACY OF WHICH IS QUESTIONABLE, DUE TO CONFLICTING TFC BEING ON DIFFERENT FREQS. 2) OPERROR BY ZZZ ATC FOR INADEQUATE SPACING OF ARRIVING TFC. 3) OPERROR BY ZZZ ATC FOR PROVIDING 'LIFEGUARD PRIORITY' IN NAME ONLY WITHOUT ANY ACTUAL PRIORITY BEING GIVEN TO THE LIFEGUARD ACFT. 4) CTLR ERROR BY ZZZ TWR FOR IMPROPER TFC CALL TO THE ACR Y B737 AFTER GAR INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN GIVEN. TWR CTLR ADVISED ACR Y OF 'HELI TFC XING L TO R, BELOW YOU, NOT A FACTOR,' WHEN IN FACT BOTH ACFT WERE AT THE SAME ALT AND CONVERGING. 5) OPERROR BY ZZZ ATC FOR CHANGING CTLRS AND COMBINING RADAR E AND RADAR W POS DURING THE CRITICAL MOMENTS PRECEDING ACFT CONFLICTION. 6) CTLR ERROR BY ZZZ APCH FOR NOT ADVISING ACFT X OF THE GAR ISSUED TO THE ACR Y B737. 7) CTLR ERROR BY ZZZ APCH FOR NOT ADVISING ACFT X THAT THERE WERE ACTUALLY 2 ACFT RATHER THAN 1 ACFT ON APCH FOR THE W RWY 17R. 8) CTLR ERROR BY ZZZ ATC FOR TERMINATING RADAR SVC IMMEDIATELY AFTER CROSSED THE W RWY. THERE WAS STILL THE DEPARTING ACR Z JET IN A CLBING R TURN AND THE ACR Y B737 IN A CLBING R TURN CREATING THE CONTINUED THREAT OF CONFLICTION WITH. 9) ACFT DESIGN OF BELL 206L3 WHICH LIMITS FORWARD VISIBILITY AT THE ACFT'S 10 O'CLOCK AND 2 O'CLOCK POS DUE TO A 6-7 INCH WIDE DOOR FRAME. A TARGET MUST BECOME FAIRLY LARGE AND THEREFORE QUITE CLOSE BEFORE THIS NO LONGER OBSCURES THE TARGET. REMEDY IS FOR PLT TO NOT ONLY TURN THE HEAD, BUT ALSO ROCK FORWARD AND AFT IN THE SEAT TO SEE AROUND THIS OBSTRUCTION. 10) EQUIP FAILURE OF TFC COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYS TO ALERT ATC AND ACR CREW OF ACFT PROX. 11) PLT ERROR BY ACR Y B737 CREW FOR NOT OBSERVING THE ACFT X HELI, PARTICULARLY AFTER BEING MADE AWARE OF OUR PRESENCE BY THE TWR CTLR. 12) PLT ERROR ON MY PART FOR NOT OBSERVING THE ACR Y B737 BEFORE IT BECAME A HAZARD. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE FACILITY CHANGED THEIR PROC IN HANDLING HELI TFC XING THE ARPT BY REQUIRING THE APCH CTLR TO MAKE A HDOF TO THE TWR. HE SAID THAT RECENTLY HE HAS NOTICED THE FACILITY GOING BACK TO THEIR OLD WAYS OF DOING THINGS AND APCH CTL IS AGAIN ONLY MAKING POINTOUTS TO THE LCL CTLR. BECAUSE HE ONLY TOLD THE TWR SUPVR HE HAD TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION TO AVOID THE B737 AND DID NOT REQUEST TO FILE A RPT, THE INCIDENT WAS NEVER CLASSIFIED AS AN NMAC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.