Narrative:

Flight X took off from runway 30 at lgb at XA31Z. Initial climb clearance was runway heading to 1500 ft, then left turn to 180 degree heading, climb to 3000 ft. Handoff to socal departure occurred at about 1700 ft and the controller cleared flight X to level at 4000 ft. After leveling at 4000 ft, the controller cleared flight X to climb to 7000 ft. Immediately upon initiating the climb, a TCASII contact popped up at 12 O'clock position and about 5 mi. The controller then advised flight that we had a VFR aircraft at 12 O'clock and 4500 ft, and to increase our rate of climb. At this point, flight X was at 4200 ft and climbing, and the TCASII contact turned into a traffic alert at 12 O'clock, 3 mi, and 300 ft above. Captain directed the first officer to start an immediate left turn to avoid the VFR aircraft, which we never saw because it went under the aircraft nose when we turned left. Estimated lateral separation was less than 2 mi and co-altitude. Flight X rolled out on 140 degree heading, and controller advised that we were still assigned a 180 degree heading unless responding to an RA. We advised that we had, and returned to a 180 degree heading when clear of traffic. This situation highlights a significant safety problem in that controllers are not legally responsible for separating IFR and VFR aircraft. The controller in this case had a nonchalant attitude toward the safety risk posed by the VFR aircraft and gave a climb clearance that never would have been issued if the other aircraft were on an IFR clearance. Flight X reacted to a TA, not RA, based on TCASII display and controller's corroboration of VFR aircraft location.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TFC CONFLICT BENEATH THE LAX CLASS B AIRSPACE.

Narrative: FLT X TOOK OFF FROM RWY 30 AT LGB AT XA31Z. INITIAL CLB CLRNC WAS RWY HDG TO 1500 FT, THEN L TURN TO 180 DEG HDG, CLB TO 3000 FT. HDOF TO SOCAL DEP OCCURRED AT ABOUT 1700 FT AND THE CTLR CLRED FLT X TO LEVEL AT 4000 FT. AFTER LEVELING AT 4000 FT, THE CTLR CLRED FLT X TO CLB TO 7000 FT. IMMEDIATELY UPON INITIATING THE CLB, A TCASII CONTACT POPPED UP AT 12 O'CLOCK POS AND ABOUT 5 MI. THE CTLR THEN ADVISED FLT THAT WE HAD A VFR ACFT AT 12 O'CLOCK AND 4500 FT, AND TO INCREASE OUR RATE OF CLB. AT THIS POINT, FLT X WAS AT 4200 FT AND CLBING, AND THE TCASII CONTACT TURNED INTO A TFC ALERT AT 12 O'CLOCK, 3 MI, AND 300 FT ABOVE. CAPT DIRECTED THE FO TO START AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO AVOID THE VFR ACFT, WHICH WE NEVER SAW BECAUSE IT WENT UNDER THE ACFT NOSE WHEN WE TURNED L. ESTIMATED LATERAL SEPARATION WAS LESS THAN 2 MI AND CO-ALT. FLT X ROLLED OUT ON 140 DEG HDG, AND CTLR ADVISED THAT WE WERE STILL ASSIGNED A 180 DEG HDG UNLESS RESPONDING TO AN RA. WE ADVISED THAT WE HAD, AND RETURNED TO A 180 DEG HDG WHEN CLR OF TFC. THIS SIT HIGHLIGHTS A SIGNIFICANT SAFETY PROB IN THAT CTLRS ARE NOT LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SEPARATING IFR AND VFR ACFT. THE CTLR IN THIS CASE HAD A NONCHALANT ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SAFETY RISK POSED BY THE VFR ACFT AND GAVE A CLB CLRNC THAT NEVER WOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED IF THE OTHER ACFT WERE ON AN IFR CLRNC. FLT X REACTED TO A TA, NOT RA, BASED ON TCASII DISPLAY AND CTLR'S CORROBORATION OF VFR ACFT LOCATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.