Narrative:

I was on a training flight to familiarize and meet the requirements to act as sic of an MU300. I have several thousand hours in a lear jet, but no experience in an MU300. I met with the chief pilot in the morning of the training flight and conducted an extensive review of training manuals given to me several days before. After reviewing the information in the manuals we conducted a very thorough preflight inspection. This took several hours to accomplish. The chief pilot asked ATC for vectors to the ILS to runway 31 at foe. The controller vectored us to the localizer, but inside the marker above the GS. As I descended to the runway, we conducted the landing check. Because we were high, we did a low approach to a miss. After the first approach we were vectored for another ILS by the controller. Again we were turned on the localizer inside the marker above the GS. I told the chief pilot what the controller was doing and that we were too high. I pulled the power to idle and started a descent to the runway. I told the chief pilot that we were too high and should go around. He stated that he would put out approach flaps and speed brakes so we could descend to the GS. My attention was diverted to watching the chief pilot and attempting to capture the GS. When we were on the GS the chief pilot told me that he would put out landing flaps and in doing so the speed brakes would automatically stow. After this was executed, we were flaring for landing when the chief pilot saw the landing gear had not been extended. As he reached for the landing gear handle I applied full power and pitched the aircraft up initiating a go around. We weren't sure whether we had contacted the runway. The gear extended, but had an indication that the inboard gear doors were still open. This was confirmed by the tower as we did a fly by. We elected to return to mkc. While en route we conducted the emergency stow procedure for the gear doors without success. We couldn't determine if the aircraft had any damage as the aircraft was flying normally. We conducted another fly by at mkc. The tower stated that the gear appeared to be down and locked. But a gear door was also down. The landing was normal and we taxied to the hangar. A visual inspection of the aircraft showed that we had barely contacted the runway. The FAA issued a ferry permit to fly the aircraft to lincoln, northeast, to be repaired. I feel this incident happened because of following reasons: 1) we should have taken more time reviewing the cockpit procedures. 2) not completing a written checklist for every segment of the flight. 3) because of my lower time (30 mins) in this aircraft the gear control and other instruments were in a location that were unfamiliar to me. 4) I was distracted by the deploying of the speed brakes so close to the ground. This would not have been a procedure I would have used in the aircraft I had been flying. 5) I feel I should have stated I was uneasy with the high approach given to us by ATC and should have gone around. 6) I believe the use of noise canceling headsets muted the sound of the gear warning horn to the point that no one heard the warning when landing flaps were selected. 7) on this aircraft the gear warning consisted of only aural, not visual and aural as is the case on later aircraft of this model. Supplemental information from acn 472156: I put my new pilot in the left seat, and I took the right seat with the intention of performing sic duties as well as instructor. While getting back on the glide path and explaining to the new pilot what I was doing, I missed the before landing checklist. So after the 50 ft call I was trying to quickly catch up. Instinctively I looked over at the gear lights and to my horror they were not green. Realizing the wheels were not down I immediately grabbed the gear handle as I yelled, 'the gear's not down.' as the plane was climbing, the gear was extending. As the gear cycle ended we were indicating nose and left main extended and gear doors in transit. I switched bulbs -- left gear with the right gear and got 3 green lights. However the gear door in-transit light remained on. I concluded we in fact had contacted the runway. I have little experience training in this type of aircraft. Even though I ama very experienced pilot and a former flight instructor, I should have been better prepared for this mission or had someone else do the training. I should have spent more time briefing and more time with cockpit familiarization. We probably should not have flown the day of the incident. The WX was VFR, but a cold front had passed during the morning and it was windy and gusty. Even though the approach was 'doable' I should have declared a missed approach and requested an extended downwind to give us more time to get set up for landing. I should have briefed my extra crew member more specifically what I wanted him to do to help. The gear warning horn should be wired into the headsets. It is speaker only and while I believe it was working, none of us remember hearing it. Supplemental information from acn 472307: at the 50 ft call, the copilot was still reading the checklist, and at that point, it was determined the landing gear was not down. The copilot called this out, and immediate action was taken by the PF, applying full power for a go around. At the same time, the copilot placed the gear selector switch down, which caused damage to the gear doors. My summation of this incident as a flight instructor is that the rushed approach at forbes put the flight crew at a high stress level to accomplish the before-landing checklist. As a flight instructor, I would insist on a stabilized approach so that the checklist can be fully complied with in a timely manner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MU300 DIAMOND JET FLC ALMOST LANDS WITH THE GEAR RETRACTED. ACFT'S GEAR DOORS CONTACT THE RWY AS CREW PERFORMS A GAR AFTER MAKING A HIGH, FAST APCH TO RWY 31 AT FOE, KS.

Narrative: I WAS ON A TRAINING FLT TO FAMILIARIZE AND MEET THE REQUIREMENTS TO ACT AS SIC OF AN MU300. I HAVE SEVERAL THOUSAND HRS IN A LEAR JET, BUT NO EXPERIENCE IN AN MU300. I MET WITH THE CHIEF PLT IN THE MORNING OF THE TRAINING FLT AND CONDUCTED AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF TRAINING MANUALS GIVEN TO ME SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE. AFTER REVIEWING THE INFO IN THE MANUALS WE CONDUCTED A VERY THOROUGH PREFLT INSPECTION. THIS TOOK SEVERAL HRS TO ACCOMPLISH. THE CHIEF PLT ASKED ATC FOR VECTORS TO THE ILS TO RWY 31 AT FOE. THE CTLR VECTORED US TO THE LOC, BUT INSIDE THE MARKER ABOVE THE GS. AS I DSNDED TO THE RWY, WE CONDUCTED THE LNDG CHK. BECAUSE WE WERE HIGH, WE DID A LOW APCH TO A MISS. AFTER THE FIRST APCH WE WERE VECTORED FOR ANOTHER ILS BY THE CTLR. AGAIN WE WERE TURNED ON THE LOC INSIDE THE MARKER ABOVE THE GS. I TOLD THE CHIEF PLT WHAT THE CTLR WAS DOING AND THAT WE WERE TOO HIGH. I PULLED THE PWR TO IDLE AND STARTED A DSCNT TO THE RWY. I TOLD THE CHIEF PLT THAT WE WERE TOO HIGH AND SHOULD GO AROUND. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD PUT OUT APCH FLAPS AND SPD BRAKES SO WE COULD DSND TO THE GS. MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED TO WATCHING THE CHIEF PLT AND ATTEMPTING TO CAPTURE THE GS. WHEN WE WERE ON THE GS THE CHIEF PLT TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD PUT OUT LNDG FLAPS AND IN DOING SO THE SPD BRAKES WOULD AUTOMATICALLY STOW. AFTER THIS WAS EXECUTED, WE WERE FLARING FOR LNDG WHEN THE CHIEF PLT SAW THE LNDG GEAR HAD NOT BEEN EXTENDED. AS HE REACHED FOR THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE I APPLIED FULL PWR AND PITCHED THE ACFT UP INITIATING A GAR. WE WEREN'T SURE WHETHER WE HAD CONTACTED THE RWY. THE GEAR EXTENDED, BUT HAD AN INDICATION THAT THE INBOARD GEAR DOORS WERE STILL OPEN. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY THE TWR AS WE DID A FLY BY. WE ELECTED TO RETURN TO MKC. WHILE ENRTE WE CONDUCTED THE EMER STOW PROC FOR THE GEAR DOORS WITHOUT SUCCESS. WE COULDN'T DETERMINE IF THE ACFT HAD ANY DAMAGE AS THE ACFT WAS FLYING NORMALLY. WE CONDUCTED ANOTHER FLY BY AT MKC. THE TWR STATED THAT THE GEAR APPEARED TO BE DOWN AND LOCKED. BUT A GEAR DOOR WAS ALSO DOWN. THE LNDG WAS NORMAL AND WE TAXIED TO THE HANGAR. A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ACFT SHOWED THAT WE HAD BARELY CONTACTED THE RWY. THE FAA ISSUED A FERRY PERMIT TO FLY THE ACFT TO LINCOLN, NE, TO BE REPAIRED. I FEEL THIS INCIDENT HAPPENED BECAUSE OF FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN MORE TIME REVIEWING THE COCKPIT PROCS. 2) NOT COMPLETING A WRITTEN CHKLIST FOR EVERY SEGMENT OF THE FLT. 3) BECAUSE OF MY LOWER TIME (30 MINS) IN THIS ACFT THE GEAR CTL AND OTHER INSTS WERE IN A LOCATION THAT WERE UNFAMILIAR TO ME. 4) I WAS DISTRACTED BY THE DEPLOYING OF THE SPD BRAKES SO CLOSE TO THE GND. THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PROC I WOULD HAVE USED IN THE ACFT I HAD BEEN FLYING. 5) I FEEL I SHOULD HAVE STATED I WAS UNEASY WITH THE HIGH APCH GIVEN TO US BY ATC AND SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND. 6) I BELIEVE THE USE OF NOISE CANCELING HEADSETS MUTED THE SOUND OF THE GEAR WARNING HORN TO THE POINT THAT NO ONE HEARD THE WARNING WHEN LNDG FLAPS WERE SELECTED. 7) ON THIS ACFT THE GEAR WARNING CONSISTED OF ONLY AURAL, NOT VISUAL AND AURAL AS IS THE CASE ON LATER ACFT OF THIS MODEL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 472156: I PUT MY NEW PLT IN THE L SEAT, AND I TOOK THE R SEAT WITH THE INTENTION OF PERFORMING SIC DUTIES AS WELL AS INSTRUCTOR. WHILE GETTING BACK ON THE GLIDE PATH AND EXPLAINING TO THE NEW PLT WHAT I WAS DOING, I MISSED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. SO AFTER THE 50 FT CALL I WAS TRYING TO QUICKLY CATCH UP. INSTINCTIVELY I LOOKED OVER AT THE GEAR LIGHTS AND TO MY HORROR THEY WERE NOT GREEN. REALIZING THE WHEELS WERE NOT DOWN I IMMEDIATELY GRABBED THE GEAR HANDLE AS I YELLED, 'THE GEAR'S NOT DOWN.' AS THE PLANE WAS CLBING, THE GEAR WAS EXTENDING. AS THE GEAR CYCLE ENDED WE WERE INDICATING NOSE AND L MAIN EXTENDED AND GEAR DOORS IN TRANSIT. I SWITCHED BULBS -- L GEAR WITH THE R GEAR AND GOT 3 GREEN LIGHTS. HOWEVER THE GEAR DOOR IN-TRANSIT LIGHT REMAINED ON. I CONCLUDED WE IN FACT HAD CONTACTED THE RWY. I HAVE LITTLE EXPERIENCE TRAINING IN THIS TYPE OF ACFT. EVEN THOUGH I AMA VERY EXPERIENCED PLT AND A FORMER FLT INSTRUCTOR, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER PREPARED FOR THIS MISSION OR HAD SOMEONE ELSE DO THE TRAINING. I SHOULD HAVE SPENT MORE TIME BRIEFING AND MORE TIME WITH COCKPIT FAMILIARIZATION. WE PROBABLY SHOULD NOT HAVE FLOWN THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT. THE WX WAS VFR, BUT A COLD FRONT HAD PASSED DURING THE MORNING AND IT WAS WINDY AND GUSTY. EVEN THOUGH THE APCH WAS 'DOABLE' I SHOULD HAVE DECLARED A MISSED APCH AND REQUESTED AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND TO GIVE US MORE TIME TO GET SET UP FOR LNDG. I SHOULD HAVE BRIEFED MY EXTRA CREW MEMBER MORE SPECIFICALLY WHAT I WANTED HIM TO DO TO HELP. THE GEAR WARNING HORN SHOULD BE WIRED INTO THE HEADSETS. IT IS SPEAKER ONLY AND WHILE I BELIEVE IT WAS WORKING, NONE OF US REMEMBER HEARING IT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 472307: AT THE 50 FT CALL, THE COPLT WAS STILL READING THE CHKLIST, AND AT THAT POINT, IT WAS DETERMINED THE LNDG GEAR WAS NOT DOWN. THE COPLT CALLED THIS OUT, AND IMMEDIATE ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE PF, APPLYING FULL PWR FOR A GAR. AT THE SAME TIME, THE COPLT PLACED THE GEAR SELECTOR SWITCH DOWN, WHICH CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE GEAR DOORS. MY SUMMATION OF THIS INCIDENT AS A FLT INSTRUCTOR IS THAT THE RUSHED APCH AT FORBES PUT THE FLC AT A HIGH STRESS LEVEL TO ACCOMPLISH THE BEFORE-LNDG CHKLIST. AS A FLT INSTRUCTOR, I WOULD INSIST ON A STABILIZED APCH SO THAT THE CHKLIST CAN BE FULLY COMPLIED WITH IN A TIMELY MANNER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.